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Behavioral Finance. Economics 437. Q-Group Conference, Apr 2-4. “Bubbling with Excitement” by Terrance Odean (U Cal Berkeley) Odean was the first to find the “disposition effect” in actual data of investors
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Behavioral Finance Economics 437
Q-Group Conference, Apr 2-4 • “Bubbling with Excitement” by Terrance Odean (U Cal Berkeley) • Odean was the first to find the “disposition effect” in actual data of investors • Experiment conducted with 9 students: Each given money and stock, 15 periods, dividend each period is either 0, 8, 28, 60) each with ¼ probability every period. Expected value of the asset is $ 24 per period. At the beginning 15 times $ 24, then declining to t time 24 (where t is the number of periods remaining) • Tells the story of Red Hat • IPO in Aug 1999 at $ 14 …. Traded later in the day at 52 • By Dec, 1999 traded at 142 ($ 20 billion market cap) • By Summer, 2000 traded at 20, by Jan 2002 traded at 2 • Then three different situations • Exciting 5 min film with happy ending • Boring 5 min history film • Exciting 5 min film from horror movie
Result $ 360
“New Research in Behavioral Finance” by Nicholar Barberis (Yale) • Investors “overweigth” recent experience (Barberis refers to this as “representativeness”…. • Probability weighting • From DeBondt-Thaler-Tversky • Overweights unlikely events • Values “positive skewness” • Three predictions • Investors value “positive skewness” • Mutual fund flows predict momentum in stocks • Realization utility (“neural experiments at Cal Tech)
“What is ‘risk neutral’ Volatility” by Stephen Figlewski (NYU) • Liquidity • How do you define it? • How do you “measure it” in real life • Is it priced? • Fit a treasury curve…look at deviations from the yield curve
Illiquidity During a crisis….more observations Far away from the best fit Maturity
Fitting the treasury yield curve During normal times…very good fit Maturity
Implications of EMH (“Market Efficiency”) • Stock prices should not be “serially correlated” • There should no “mean reversion” • There should be no “earnings momentum” • Or “stock price momentum” • Or “delayed reaction to news” • In general, no predictability of prices
Definition of absence of serial correlation Let pt-1, pt-2, pt-3, etc. be a series of past prices Now, think about, pt E[ pt | info, pt-1, pt-2, pt-3, etc.] = E[ pt | info] Then, no serial correlation
DeBondt and Thaler: “Does the Stock Market Overreact” (1985) • W – three year loses • L – three year winners • Question: How do the W’s do in the next three years? How do the L’s do in the next three years? • Other things worth noting • Almost all of the impact is in January • When the W portfolios are formed, they have very high P/E ratios, the L portfolios have low P/E ratios at the time of formation
DeBondt-Thaler conclusions • Definite evidence of mean reversion (a form of serial correlation): • L portfolios consistently outperform W portfolios • 19.6 % better than the market after end of 3 years • W portfolios consistently underperform the market • 5 % less than the market after end of 3 years