Bangsamoro Governance

1. Bangsamoro Governance 1. Injustice: the Root of Conflict in Mindanao Injustice to the Moro identity – religious, cultural and political identity Injustice to Moro political sovereignty Injustice to Moro integral development (From Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, July 2001) 2. World Bank & Economist Cielito Habito Injustice: exclusion and marginalization

2. Bangsamoro Governance 3. Prof. Rody Rodil - Social anthropologist perspective Struggle for Bangsamoro self-determination Struggle of Moros to recover from marginalization and dispossession from ancestral lands and ancestral domain (by historical state policy) 4. Lawyer Soliman Santos – political scientist perspective Clash of narratives and clash of nationalisms

3. Bangsamoro Governance 5. Sociologist Prof. Randy David Bangsamoro and the challenge of modernity 6. Alan Tidwell and Peter Kreuzer – academic study of violence, war and peace Moros as the “other” in state formation and exclusion of Muslims from unifying Christian identity of Filipino (i.e. concept of nationhood) 6. Moro revolutionary fronts – sovereignty-based conflict due to illegal annexation and usurpation of homeland w/o plebiscitary consent of the Moros (i.e. referendum)

4. Bangsamoro Governance 7. Security Perspective a) Ethnic nationalism (such as the Moro narrative of lost sovereignty of the Sulu and Maguindanao Sultanates) is an enduring force in the world and as stated in the article Us and Them, the Enduring Power of Ethnic Nationalism by Jerry Muller (Foreign Affairs, March/April 2008), “Americans (and Filipinos for that matter) generally belittle the role of ethnic nationalism in politics but in fact, it corresponds to some enduring propensities of the human spirit, it is galvanized by modernization and in one form or another, it will drive global politics for generations to come. Once ethnic nationalism has captured the imagination of groups in a multiethnic society, ethnic disaggregation or partition is often the least bad answer.”

5. Bangsamoro Governance b) Ethnic conflict stems from deep historical roots. Thus, they ultimately require “political solutions” since the use of military force can never achieve a lasting solution (Stofft, Gen. W. and Guertner, G., Ethnic Conflict: Implications for the Army of the Future, U.S. Army War College, March 14, 1994). At best, military force can only accomplish temporary containment of violence and contribute to an environment that permits the establishment of political conditions or institutions that lead to a more lasting solution (ibid). c) There is a need to address the root causes of ethnic conflict based on ethno-nationalist grievances, (i.e. advance a political solution), particularly in Muslim insurgencies, before the hierarchical revolutionary organizations fighting for self-determination can evolve into Fourth Generation War groups, which will mean no political compromise can take place. For example, in Southern Thailand, this has happened after the disintegration of the Patani United Liberation Organization and there is now no particular group with which the government can enter into peace negotiations. d) In relation to (b), there is an imperative to engage (in peace negotiations or peace-building or other mechanisms for conflict resolution) the non-state actor and ethno-nationalist liberation movement in Muslim insurgencies to arrive at a political compromise before “Chechenization” [1]happens, which can take place at the same time as the evolution of the nationalist armed struggle into Fourth Generation War groups as further Islamist radicalization leads to a more networked structure characteristic of Fourth Generation War groups (Stepanova, E. Terrorism in Assymetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects, SIPRI, 2008).

6. Bangsamoro Governance e) Even before or once the ideology of transnational violent extremism is transplanted or grafted to an ethno-nationalist struggle (i.e. the process of “Chechenization” takes place) such as the Moro insurgency in Mindanao where the Jemaah Islamiyah has made inroads, there are few workable alternatives to using ethnic “nationalism” in order to erode the strength of Islamist supranationalism at a national level (ibid). Stepanova states: “The nationalization of transnational violent Islamism can at least make the latter more pragmatic, thus, easier to deal with. Radical nationalism in its different forms seems to be the only ideology that is radical enough for this purpose, especially in the context of an ongoing or recently ended armed confrontation. This role can be effectively played by both the more narrow ethno-separatist movements (such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front) and the broader nationalist resistance movements (such as in Iraq and Palestine). In sum, “nationalism”, especially cross-confessional or multi-ethnic nationalism (such as the Bangsamoro or Moro Nation ideology of the multi-ethnic Moros of Mindanao) is no less a powerful ideology in a local or national context as supranational quasi religious extremism. It can be employed as a way to weaken some of the most dangerous characteristics and erode some of the main comparative advantages of violent Islamism with a global outreach.”

7. Bangsamoro Governance f) “All possible efforts must be made to turn relatively decentralized terrorist networks into more formal, more streamlined and more hierarchized hybrids. This goal can best be achieved by encouraging the politicization and political transformation of major armed groups that employ terrorist means and the general demilitarization of politics, especially in post-conflict areas. That implies stimulating the armed groups to becoming increasingly politicized and involved in non-militant activities. They should be encouraged to form distinctive and fully fledged political wings (rather than merely civilian ‘front organization’ for fund-raising and propaganda purposes). These political wings could then gradually develop a stake in increasing their legitimization, and so develop into or join political parties and eventually be incorporated into the political process.” (Stepanova, 2008).

8. Bangsamoro Governance g) The recommendation for policymakers and others to be “proactive” about ethnopolitical conflicts and to view the effect of “delegitimation” of ethno-nationalist struggles as escalating into “catastrophic terrorism” (with the Islamist variety as its most dangerous manifestation) is not new advice; indeed, it even predates 9/11. Ehud Sprinzak (1991), for instance, argued nearly 15 years ago that: terrorism does not exist in isolation and that as a form of human behavior it is integrally linked to the normal world. Rebel terrorism … is a direct behavioral extension of non-terroristic opposition politics. It is the most dramatic part of a longer political process of delegitimation undergone by an opposition movement vis-a-vis the regime. Only a small splinter fraction of the opposition movement reaches terrorism, which is the highest peak of the process, and it usually does not stay terroristic too long. The full story of terrorism is therefore not simply the climax of the radicalization process, in which terrorist practice is resorted to by a small group, but the process of delegitimation in its entirety (emphasis in original) (p. 50). In other words: The main policy implication of this conclusion is that effective anti-terrorist policy may be initiated long before the actual appearance of terrorism. If terrorism is the highest stage of a long process of delegitimation, then the prudent policy-maker does not have to wait until all the conditions for the emergence of terrorism are present. We may act much earlier to either stop the radicalization that produces terrorism or be prepared for its upsurge (emphasis added) (ibid., pp. 67-68).”

9. Bangsamoro Governance 8. Alternative perspective from the country level by David C. Martinez “A COUNTRY OF OUR OWN” (Bisaya books 2004): “Preferring kith and kin to the State - in our particular case preferring our regions to the entire archipelago - is a universal phenomenon but our syndrome transcends this principle. Stripped of pretense, any loyalty we profess for our country ends where our loyalty to blood, tongue, and territory begin. We are, at heart, loyal to our regions to the exclusion of country.Judging from our uniform common conduct - not from any sociological, political or ideological claim - its patent that family, linguistic community and region constitute both the essence and the totality of our cultural constellations. Beyond the ambit of these three orbs, we possess no demonstrable emotional devotion. Our barong Tagalogs and ternos at formal affairs may distinguish us as Filipinos to the world, but that fictive identity is as flimsy as the fabric of these borrowed costumes. Behind that mask we are, at heart - to name a few - Cebuanos who identify with the Visayas, Ilocanos who identify with Luzon, Ifugaos who identify with Cordillera, Joloanos who identify with Bangsamoro, and Davaowenos who identify with Mindanao. These are our primal and exclusive affinities.Our true identities are not to be found in our citizenship, which is allegiance to a state; they lie in our nationality, which is loyalty to bloodline, language and heritage. Within each of our five distinct regions our households are our nuclear family; the members of our linguistic community our extended family; and neighboring cultures - being our distant cousins - our clan. Beyond this cultural solar system of family, kin, and clan, no other planets orbit. We are, each and all, unabashedly "tribal" a pejorative word for that sacred, distinctively Filipino contrivance "nationalistic" .Contrary to popular perception, each of us possesses a deep and abiding sense of nationalism, but it is of the authentic, cultural variety - that intuitive sense of belonging and instinctive awareness of duty that we reserve for family, tribe and region, a sense that many of us have lost or are in dire danger of losing in favor of its ravenous counterpart, political nationalism, that fictive fealty founded on the pretense that we all share the same heritage. What's wrong with heritage? Nothing, except that in the hands of a politically dominant, homogenizing conspiracy - in our case consisting of our omnipotent central government, influential "nationalistic historians" and much of our intelligentsia - it becomes, in Regina Bendix's view, "a strange, neutralizing word" that has "the power to disempower, to hide history...by putting everything into a collective pot of 'culture' and 'past'.

10. ARMM Governance 1. Prof. Miriam Coronel Ferrer – Patronage autonomy 2. World Bank - “Central control of the bulk of the ARMM expenditures underlines the governance issue of a legally autonomous regional government that has no more real or practical autonomy in deciding the level and allocation of funds intended for its politically distinct than other non-autonomous administrative agencies of the national govt.”

11. ARMM Governance 3. Benedicto Bacani - “The ARMM which is supposed to be the vehicle of Moro self-determination is recognized right now as less autonomous than local governments such as cities, towns and provinces, and more subservient and dependent on the national government than any other political subdivision in the country” (2005) “Is ARMM merely a development body, an employment agency for Moro leaders or is it supposed to be an instrument for Moro self-determination? The string of ineffective and uninspired leadership in the autonomous region emboldened [the perception of] the autonomous region as a milking cow of Moro interest groups than as a vehicle of Moro empowerment. This brand of autonomy is not in accord with the spirit and letter of peace agreements and fits well with the national government's short-sighted policy of co-opting Moro insurgent leaders. This misplaced yet dominant ARMM identity flourishes because it advances the selfish agenda of interest groups in the national government and the autonomous region.” 4. “Democratic constructs like the regional governments within the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao that do not provide real legislative autonomy or reasonable operating budgets are just hollow bureaucracies that widen the divide and deepen the distrust between the Bangsamoro people and the GRP” (US Maj. Morea)

12. ARMM Governance 5. Kit Collier and Malcolm Cook in “Mindanao: A Gamble Worth Taking” - “The failure of these institutional frameworks for peace (referring to ARMM and SPCPD) hit at the heart of the problem in Mindanao. Strongmen, the armed retainers, and the military are the main manifestations of the Philippine state in Muslim Mindanao – and yet they thrive in symbiosis with their putative rebel enemies.” (Lowy institute 2006)

13. ARMM Governance 6. The problem of ARMM governance is symptomatic of the general structural problem of the Philippines as a “weak state” or “fragile state” Failed States Index since 2005 has ranked Philippines in the 60 most vulnerable states in the world and in 2009 current rank is 53. The principal characteristic of fragile states is that the population lacks social cohesion.

14. ARMM Governance The principal characteristic of fragile states is that the population lacks social cohesion. Political fragmentation warps incentives, encouraging short term opportunism at the expense of long-term investment. Formal governing institutions and regulations, disconnected from the way things actually work in social practice, and not having become part of the informal institutional frameworks that guide people’s behavior, command only lip service allegiance and compliance. In these fragile states, the population is more likely to feel allegiance to a tribe, ethno-linguistic groups, region, or family clan which they and their forefathers have been closely connected than to a state with which they fail to identify with. Groups compete in capturing the state’s formal institutions for their own selfish objectives. Groups out of power view the state, or its current leaders as illegitimate and where cooperation does extend across group lines, it is usually just an alliance or convenience, as cliques of various backgrounds compete to take advantage of the general lawlessness to siphon off money from everything from construction projects to gold mines to warfare (Kaplan, S. “Fragile States” Hoover Institution Stanford University, Dec 2008-Jan 2009). The business people who flourish are not those with the best education or the best ideas but those connected by blood or marriage or social links to the ruling clique, or those skilled at manipulating and bribing officials, while the best and brightest flee to other countries to live and work and the country barely makes any progress.

15. ARMM Governance The key to helping fragile states is to emphasize institutional changes that foster more decentralization, greater integration of traditional norms into state institutions, a stronger focus on human security, and various ways of promoting accountability. In all cases, the empowerment of local groups should be made paramount, to ensure that the state has firm foundations. According to Seth Kaplan, “states will work better if they are structured around cohesive groups –such a Kurds in Iraq, the Isaaq in Somaliland, and the Aymara in Bolivia – that can capitalize on their common institutions and group affinities. Similarly, large sprawling countries (like archipelagos) are more likely to harness existing societal bonds and capitalize on pockets of relative cohesion if they give individual regions or large urban areas (even those with multiple groups) much greater authority to manage their own affairs. In contrast, the top-down approach typically advocated by the international community ignores local populations’ indigenous capacity for institution building – and reinforces a dependency on outsiders. Although partition is impractical in most places, where conflict has already led to the creation of an ethnically, religiously, or tribally homogenous areas, as in Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Kosovo, redrawing the boundaries to match these divisions is far more likely to produce peace and development-oriented states than is an insistence on remixing obviously hostile peoples.”

16. ARMM Governance If you notice the groups mentioned by Kaplan are all distinct ethnic groups within a formal state structure, who have been given local power or enjoy a measure of self-governance, whose indigenous or local institutions the state recognizes and abides by. Kurds are part of a Federal Iraq, Somaliland is a rump state of Somalia, and the Aymara are indigenous peoples, South American Indians, inhabiting the Bolivian highlands. If ever the Bangsamoro people in Mindanao are also allowed, within a territory that is predominantly Moro, their own indigenous self-governance structure that is not an imposed solution from the top but is part of an indigenous process enjoying popular legitimacy, we will see a stable Mindanao, and then building on that foundation of a stable Mindanao, we can foresee a strong an stable Philippines.”

17. ARMM Governance Conclusion Two Asia foundation surveys and the recent Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society says that the Moros or Muslims in Mindanao want Sharia to “govern” them or at least implement aspects of it. “Although inherited and chosen layers of identity will be as “authentic” as conventional categories of citizenship and nationality, one category will possibly continue to stand out. Islam will remain a robust identity” (Global Trends, A Transformed World, NIC 2025)

18. ARMM Governance The Peace Research Institute Frankfurt in a 2005 comparative study of conflicts in Sri Lanka, Philippines and Malaysia noted that the Filipino conflict perspective in the Mindanao (Moro) conflict: Is zero-sum oriented and basically unilateral, insofar as it centers on a language similar to the colonial concept of “white man’s burden” in order to legitimise state action. This cognitive concept reduces the other to an inferior person, unable to face you at an equal level; Differentiates sharply between political rhetoric and practice. Time and again the rhetoric  seemed to substantiate the fact that the political intentions were good. However, social practice showed completely different patterns; Is centred on coupling continuous discussion with social and political action. Whereas the first is destined to guarantee that the critics comply with the rules of the game and continue to voice their grievances within the liberal-democratic arena, the disconnected social and political action normally aims at maximizing the interests of the dominant players and undermining the chances of protest and rebellion. Repeatedly new factual situations – always more to the disadvantage of the minority – were created by “spontaneous” local action, which had to be debated afterwards. As the debates drag on, new facts are created on the ground. The coupling of perpetual discussion and negotiation with seemingly disconnected aggressive local action created a system of diminishing returns for the Moros. In effect, the system of perpetual discussion of grievances without consequences results in a fundamental democratic disempowerment of protest (Kreuzer, P.  and Weiberg, M., “Framing Violence: Nation-and State-Building”, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Reports No. 72, 2005).