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More Techniques for Elections with Homomorphic Tallying

Learn about homomorphic encryption and its applications in elections. Discover various encoding techniques and cryptosystems to ensure secure and efficient voting.

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More Techniques for Elections with Homomorphic Tallying

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  1. More Techniques for Elections with Homomorphic Tallying Jens Groth University College London

  2. Homomorphic encryption • Public key PK EPK(v; R) EPK(w; S) = EPK(v+w; RS) • Example: Exponent-ElGamal with public key (G,H) (GR,HRGv) (GS, HSGw) = (GR+S, HR+SGv+w)

  3. Elections based on homomorphic encryption Yes = 1, No = 0 EPK(0;R) EPK(1;S) EPK(1;T) Voters Authorities

  4. Homomorphic tallying Yes = 1, No = 0 PK public, SK shared EPK(0;R) Discard ineligible or double votes EPK(1;S) Compute and decrypt EPK(1;T) C1C2C3 = EPK(2;RST) to get the result Yes: 2, No: 1

  5. Complex elections • Many candidates • 1, 2, ..., K options • Many votes per voter • Limited vote: Can vote for fixed number of candidates • Approval vote: Can vote for any number of candidates • Divisible vote: Can distribute many votes between candidates (e.g. shareholder elections) • Borda vote: K votes to preferred candidate, K-1 votes to second choice, etc.

  6. Several candidates • Could encrypt votes for each candidate separately EPK(0;R1) EPK(1;R2) EPK(0;R3) EPK(0;R4) EPK(0;S1) EPK(0;S2) EPK(0;S3) EPK(1;S4) EPK(0;T1) EPK(1;T2) EPK(0;T3) EPK(0;T4) gives products EPK(0;U1) EPK(2;U2) EPK(0;U3) EPK(1;U4) decrypting to the result K1: 0 K2: 2 K3: 0 K4: 1 • Inefficient when there are many candidates

  7. Many candidates • Strict upper bound B on votes a candidate can get • Encrypted vote on candidate Ki EPK(Bi-1;R) • Example of tallying encrypted votesEPK(B2;R) EPK(B0;S) EPK(B2;T) EPK(B3;U) EPK(B2;V) = EPK(1+0B+2B2+2B3;RSTUV) decrypts to the result K1: 1, K2: 0, K3: 2, K4: 0, K5: 2

  8. Encoding votes when many candidates • Strict upper bound B on votes a candidate can get • Encoded vote on candidate Ki: Bi-1 • Sum of encoded votes Bi1-1 + Bi2-1 + Bi3-1 + Bi4-1 + Bi5-1 + ... + BiV-1 = t1 + t2B + t3B2 + t4B3 + t5B4 + ... + tKBK-1 encodes the result K1: t1 , K2: t2 , K3: t3 , K4: t4 , K5: t5 , ..., KK: tK

  9. Generalized encoding • Voter i encodes vote as vi = vi,1 + vi,2B + vi,3B2 + ... + vi,KBK-1 • Sum of encodes votes (v1,1+...+vV,1) + (v1,2+...+vV,2)B + (v1,3+...+vV,3)B2 + ... + (v1,K+...+vV,K)BK-1 = t1 + t2B + t3B2 + ... + tKBK-1

  10. Encodings for complex elections • Encode vote as v1+ v2B + v3B2 +...+ vKBK-1 • Limited vote v1,v2,...,vK {0,1} and v1+v2+v3+...+vK = N • Approval vote v1,v2,...,vK {0,1} • Divisible vote v1,v2,...,vK {0,...,N} and v1+v2+v3+...+vK = N • Borda vote v1,v2,...,vK is a permutation of 1,2,...,K

  11. Quality of encoding • Encoding a vote as multiple 0/1-votes is inefficient • How about encoding a vote as Bi-1? • Turns out is close to optimal when using homomorphic tallying • With T votes cast freely on K candidates the number of possible results is

  12. Quality of encoding • We have • Taking logarithms (base 2) we get • In comparison the size of our encoded result is at most

  13. Not too far from optimality of our encoding • Example:K = 100, T = 10000, B = 10001 • The optimal encoding of the result uses 0.7 kbits • Our encoding uses 1.3 kbits

  14. Problems with exponent-ElGamal • Suppose we have an encrypted result (GR,HRGResult) • Authorities can jointly decrypt to get GResult • But hard to compute discrete logarithm for complex elections since there are possible results and this is hard tobrute force search when K and T are large

  15. Cryptosystems • Will use cryptosystem with message space ZN • Must have N > TBK-1 to compute correct result • Must have efficient threshold decryption so the authorities can get the result out • There are various types of such cryptosystems such as Okamoto-Uchiyama, Paillier, ElGamal-Paillier and Damgård-Jurik encryption

  16. Paillier encryption • Public key N=PQ=(2p+1)(2q+1) • Secret key d satisfying d=1 mod N, d=0 mod 4pq • Encrypt vote v  ZNusing randomness R  ZN* C = (1+N)vRN mod N2 • Decrypt by computing v = (Cd-1 mod N2)/N

  17. Correct decryption • Public key N=PQ=(2p+1)(2q+1) • Secret key d satisfying d=1 mod N, d=0 mod 4pq • The multiplicative group ZN2* has size 4Npq • We also have (1+N)N = 1 + N·N + ... ≡ 1 mod N2 • Correctness Cd = ((1+N)vRN)d = (1+N)vd RNd • = (1+N)vd R4Npqk ≡ (1+N)v mod N2 • (1+N)v = 1+vN+ N2+... ≡ 1+vN mod N2 • (Cd-1 mod N2)/N = v

  18. Homomorphic • Public key N=PQ=(2p+1)(2q+1) • Encrypt vote v  ZNusing randomness R  ZN* C = (1+N)vRN mod N2 • Homomorphic (1+N)vRN · (1+N)wSN • ≡ (1+N)v+w(RS)N mod N2

  19. Homomorphic cryptosystem • Public key PK • Secret key SK shared between authorities • Message space ZN • Homomorphic EPK(v;R) EPK(w;S) = EPK(v+w mod N;RS) • Root extraction: Given (e,w,S) such that Ce = EPK(w;S) possible to extract (v,R) such that C = EPK(v;R)

  20. Elections based on homomorphic encryption EPK(u;R) EPK(v;S) EPK(w;T) Voters Authorities

  21. Attacks • The voting scheme described so far is insecure • Attacks on correctness: • Submit vote of the form EPK(100B-99B2;R) • Corresponds to voting for K2 and additionally taking 99 votes from K3 and giving them to K2 • Attacks on anonymity: • If voter i submits C as the encrypted vote another voter may copy the vote by submitting C·EPK(0;R) • If K3 only gets 1 vote, then we learn the voter did not vote for K3

  22. Countering the attacks • Will use non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments of knowledge for validity of the vote • The voter submits (C,) • The NIZK argument  guarantees that the voter knows the plaintext and that the plaintext is a valid vote • The NIZK argument does not reveal the vote

  23. Zero-knowledge argument Accept/Reject Statement: C contains a valid vote Prover Verifier a e z

  24. Zero-knowledge argument • Complete: • An honest voter who encrypted a valid vote can convince the verifier • Sound: • Infeasible to find an argument convincing the verifier if the ciphertext does not encrypt a valid vote • Zero-knowledge: • The proof only reveals that the vote is valid, it does not reveal anything else. In particular, the actual vote remains secret

  25. Non-interactive ZK argument Accept/Reject Statement: C contains a valid vote Prover Verifier 

  26. Advantages of non-interactivity • Voters do not need to interact with verifiers and do not need to keep state during interaction • Election authorities do not need to coordinate which challenges to send to the voters • Can be publicly verifiable so anybody, including neutral third parties, can verify validity of all votes

  27. Fiat-Shamir heuristic • An argument is public coin if the verifier just sends uniformly random challenges to the prover • In the Fiat-Shamir heuristic the prover uses a cryptographic hash-function to compute the challenges instead of asking the verifier • Example:A three round argument as described before gives an NIZK argument looking like this = (a,e,z) where e=Hash(C,a)

  28. Example: C contains 0 • Common input: PK, C • Prover knows R such that C = EPK(0;R) • Initial message: P  V: A = EPK(0;S) • Challenge: P  V: e R {0,...,2k-1} • Answer:P  V: Z = ReS • Verification: Accept if CeA = EPK(0;Z)

  29. Completeness • An honest prover uses C = EPK(0;R) A = EPK(0;S) Z = ReS • This gives usCeA = EPK(0,R)eEPK(0;S) = EPK(0;ReS) = EPK(0;Z) • An honest verifier always accepts an argument made by an honest prover

  30. Soundness • We will show the prover has at most 2-k probability of cheating the verifier into falsely believing that C contains 0 when it does not • If for instance k = 256, then this is a negligible probability of 2-256 for cheating the verifier • Suppose for contradiction that there is a prover that has more than 2-k chance of fooling the verifier after having produced some C and A • This implies there are at least two challenges e and e’ that can be used in a convincing argument

  31. Soundness • This means there exists Z and Z’ such that CeA = EPK(0;Z) and Ce’A = EPK(0;Z’) • Dividing the equalities with each other gives us Ce-e’ = EPK(0;Z/Z’) • The root extraction property gives an opening (w,R) such that C = EPK(w;R) • The equation above gives us (e-e’)w ≡ 0 mod N • Assuming gcd(e-e’,N)=1 we get w=0

  32. Honest verifier zero-knowledge • The verifier could simulate the argument without knowing anything about C except that it contains 0 • Simulation: Pick e and Z at random Compute A = EPK(0;Z)C-e • Compare real argument and simulated argument • In both types of arguments e and Z are random • Given PK, C, e, Z the verification equation CeA = EPK(0;Z) uniquely determines A • So they have identical distributions • Since the verifier could simulate the argument itself she gains zero knowledge from the real argument

  33. Non-interactive argument for C containing 0 • Fiat-Shamir heuristic conversion = (A,Z) where A = EPK(0;S) and Z=RHash(C,a)S • Verifier computes e = Hash(C,a) and accepts the argument if CeA = EPK(0;Z)

  34. Security in the random oracle model • The Fiat-Shamir heuristic yields secure NIZK arguments in the random oracle model, where the hash-function is modelled as a random function • In the random oracle model the challenge e = Hash(C,a) is random, which gives us soundness as in the interactive setting • In the random oracle model, we can pick the challenge e first and then associate it with (C,a), which still gives us a random function and also gives us zero-knowledge

  35. The random oracle model • The random oracle model captures the intuition that cryptographic functions are complex and the adversary may not gain more than if the function was truly random • There are “artificial” counter-examples where the random oracle model yields insecure protocols • We hope the Fiat-Shamir heuristic yields sound protocols for “natural” arguments

  36. Argument for C containing 0 or 1 • Common input: PK, C • Prover’s input: C = EPK(v;R) where v{0,1} • Strategy: C0 = C or C1 = C·EPK(-1;1) contains 0 • Initial message: Simulate (A1-v,e1-v,Z1-v) for C1-v containing 0 Give initial message Av = EPK(0;S) • Challenge: e R {0,...,2k-1} • Answer: Split e = e0 + e1 and set Zv = RevS • Verification: C0e0A0=EPK(0;Z0) C1e1A1=EPK(0;Z1)

  37. Soundness • Corresponds to running two 0-arguments in parallel for respectively C and C·EPK(-1;1) • At least one of them is not 0. By the soundness of the 0-argument the initial message A1-v has exactly one challenge e1-v that can be answered • When picking e random the split e = e0+e1 therefore uniquely defines ev, which is random • The soundness of the 0-argument therefore implies Cv contains 0

  38. Complexity • Consider the case with K candidates • We can prove v=1 or v=B or v=B2 or ... or v=BK-1 • But the argument has complexity O(K) ciphertexts, which is expensive when K is large • Goal: Efficient argument with O(1) complexity for encryption of valid vote

  39. Homomorphic integer commitments • Commitment key: ck • Commitment: c = comck(m;r) • Opening: (m,r) • Messages and randomizers in Z • Homomorphic comck(v;r)·comck(w;s) = comck(v+w;r+s) • Root extraction

  40. Homomorphic integer commitment • Hiding: The committed value is secret • Information-theoretically hidden • Binding: Not possible to open a commitment to two different values • Information-theoretically commitments can be opened to an infinite number of integers, but there is negligible probability for a computationally bounded committer to guess or compute two openings to different integers

  41. Example • Let N = PQ = (2p+1)(2q+1) • Let g,h be two elements in QRN • Commitment key: ck = (N,g,h) • Commitment: comck(v;r) = gvhr mod N • Homomorphic gvhr gwhs ≡ gv+whr+s mod N • Hidden order pq, so cannot reduce v+w mod pq, which is what makes it an integer commitment • Secure under the strong RSA assumption

  42. NIZK arguments for complex votes • Strategy: • Prove ciphertext C and commitment c contain the same message • Prove c is a commitment to a valid vote • Advantage: • Commitments are smaller • Commitments contain integers • Can use unique factorization and other properties of integers

  43. Argument for same message • Common input: ck, PK, c, C • Prover’s input: c = comck(v;r) C = EPK(v;R) • Initial message a = comck(d;s) A = EPK(d;S) • Challenge: e R {0,...,2k-1} • Answer: f = ev+d z = er+s Z = ReS • Verification: cea = comck(f;z) CeA = EPK(f;Z)

  44. Soundness • Answers to two challenges e ≠ e’ gives us cea = comck(f;z) CeA = EPK(f;Z) ce’a = comck(f’;z’) Ce’A = EPK(f’;Z’) • Giving us ce’-e = comck(f’-f;z’-z) Ce’-e = EPK(f’-f;Z’/Z) • The second equality shows f’-f ≡ (e’-e)v mod N • The root extraction property of the commitments shows f’-f = (e-e’)v’ • We have v’ ≡ v mod N (assuming gcd(e-e’,N)=1) • With 0 ≤ v’ < N (shown later) we get v’ = v

  45. Multiplication argument • Common input: ck, a, b, c • Prover’s input: a=comck(u;r) b=comck(v;s) c=comck(uv;t) • Initial message: A=comck(d;R) B=comck(-dv;S) • Challenge: e R {0,...,2k-1} • Answer: f = eu+d za = er+R zb=fs+S-et • Verification: aeA = comck(f;za) bfB = ce · comck(0;zb)

  46. Soundness • Imagine given A, B we get answers to e ≠ e’ • Verification gives us aeA = comck(f;za) bfB = ce · comck(0;zb) ae’A = comck(f’;za’) bf’B = ce’ · comck(0;zb’) • Dividing the equations with each other gives us ae-e’ = comck(f-f’;za-za’) bf-f’ = ce-e’ · comck(0;zb-zb’) • Root extraction shows a contains u so f-f’=u(e-e’) • This means (buc-1)e-e’ is commitment to 0 • Root extraction shows (buc-1) contains 0 • If v is inside b this means c is a commitment to uv

  47. NIZK argument for committed valid vote • We want to prove a commitment c contains a vote v  {1,B,B2,...,BK-1} • Let B = p2 where p is prime then we want to show v {1,p2,p4,...,p2(K-1)} • Do this by committing to u, w and making a trivial commitment with randomness 0 to pk-1 and using two multiplication arguments to show uw = pK-1 and u2 = v

  48. Soundness • Suppose we prove that uw = pK-1then u divides pk-1 so u  {1,p,..., pK-1} • If u  {1,p,..., pK-1} and v = u2then v  {1,p2,..., p2(K-1)} = {1,B,...,BK-1}

  49. Goal achieved • The combined argument for C and c containing the same message and c containing a valid vote costs one ciphertext and a small constant number of commitments • Since commitments are smaller and cheaper than encryptions the single ciphertext may actually be the most expensive part of the NIZK argument • This compares well to the O(K) ciphertexts used in the straightforward NIZK argument

  50. Encodings for complex elections • Encode vote as v1+ v2B + v3B2 +...+ vKBK-1 • Limited vote (think of N as small) v1,v2,...,vK {0,1} and v1+v2+v3+...+vK = N • Approval vote v1,v2,...,vK {0,1} • Divisible vote (think of N as large) v1,v2,...,vK {0,...,N} and v1+v2+v3+...+vK = N • Borda vote v1,v2,...,vK is a permutation of 1,2,...,K

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