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The Economic Effect of Governmental Incentives on the Ethanol Fuel Market. Quinn Kelley Graduate Student University of Georgia. Problem Statement. Limited research available on the market for ethanol.
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The Economic Effect of Governmental Incentives on the Ethanol Fuel Market Quinn Kelley Graduate Student University of Georgia
Problem Statement • Limited research available on the market for ethanol. • To determine the effectiveness of current subsidies for ethanol, the economic structure of the fuel-blending market for ethanol is required.
Objectives • Investigate the impact market determinants have on the ethanol market. • Develop an econometric model of the fuel-blending market demand and supply for ethanol. • Based on this econometric model, elasticities are calculated and implications for this highly subsidized market are discussed.
Alternative Fuel Legislation • Alternative Motor Fuels Act (AMFA) of 1988 • Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990 • Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992 • Federal Ethanol Subsidy of $0.54 per gallon • Additional State Subsidies
Ethanol • Ethanol is an alcohol-based, colorless liquid fuel with a characteristic odor. • Currently, ethanol is used as a fuel additive in gasoline. • In the U.S., corn is the predominant feedstock in ethanol production. • Ethanol is produced through a process of fermenting and distilling starch crops that have been converted into simple sugars.
Competition Methyl Tertiary-Butyl Ether (MTBE) • First synthesized in the early 1960s and commercial production began in 1979. • Classified as a volatile organic compound (VOC). • Produced by a chemical reaction between methanol and isobutylene.
Empirical ModelDemand QitD = β0 + β1Pwt + β2Pgt + β3Vit + β4CAAAit + Σ5j=1βj+4Rji + εitD Q = annual ethanol quantity sold Pw = lagged price wedge (Peth – Pmtbe) Pg = annual grade-weighted wholesale price of gasoline V = annual number of registered vehicles by state CAAA = Clean Air Act non-attainment dummy variable R = regional dummy variable
Empirical ModelSupply QitS = α0+ α1 Pwt + α2Pcit + α3Si + Σ5j=1αj+3Rji + εitS Pc = state-level annual corn price S = state-level annual subsidy
Data • Data were collected from the Economic Research Service, the U.S. Department of Transportation, the Energy Information Administration, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. • The data set includes: 1988 to 2002 annual observations by state.
Tobit Two-Stage Least Squares Results *Significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level
Tobit Two-Stage Least Squares Results *Significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level
Market Implications • With fuel-marketing firms bearing the major impact of any ethanol subsidy removal (91%), any reduction in the subsidy will negatively impact ethanol’s competitiveness over MTBE. • A gradual phase-down of the subsidy will be dramatic for the industry. • A 45% reduction in the ethanol subsidy will result in the elimination of the ethanol market.
Impacts • If a state is designated in non-attainment, ethanol demand will increase by 14 million gallons. • An elastic input demand for corn limits any bargaining leverage corn producers have in their attempts to influence market price. • The increases in state ethanol subsidies over the last decade have not resulted in inducing a positive ethanol supply response.
Conclusions • The economic structure of the ethanol market indicates ethanol agents are addicted to the federal tax exemption on ethanol blended fuels. • The potential for demand expansion resides in structural shifts occurring from clean air and water regulations, health restrictions, renewable fuels, and global warming.