Development and Application of Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment Models for the Korea Railway

1. International Railway Safety Conference 2008 Denver, Colorado Development and Application of Hazard Analysis & Risk Assessment Models for the Korea Railway October 5-10, 2008 Chan-Woo Park, Jong-Bae Wang, Sang-Log Kwak, Don-Bum Choi

2. About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute

3. About KRRI :Korea Railroad Research Institute • Founded in 1996, financed by Korean government • 254 individuals works for railway R&D division and national project division • Key research area • - Rolling stock, track & civil engineering, signaling & electrical engineering, • railway policy & operation • National projects • High speed train development , upgrading conventional railway, • design urban rail transit system, transportation technology, trans-Korean railway construction • National safety R&D program from 2004 • Homepage : www.krri.re.kr

4. Contents I Introduction II Risk Assessment Procedure III Hazard Identification IV Risk Assessment Model Development V Conclusion

5. 1. Introduction Background • Cyclic occurrence of major train accidents • - 2003: Daegu, subway train fire accident, 191 fatalities • - 1993: Gupo, train derailment accident, 78 fatalities • - 1982: Kyongsan, train collisions, 54 fatalities • Environmental changes in Korea • - KTX (Korea Train eXpress) operation at 2004 • - Structural reform of railroad industries • - Electrification of conventional lines • - Preparation of TCR & TSR • “Railway Safety Act” announced in 2004 • - Focused on the risk-based safety management • - Nation-wide railroad safety program & safety regulations • - Hazard analysis, risk assessment & control

6. 1. Introduction Research Objective Since Oct. 2005, KRRI has developed the common hazard analysis & risk assessment models for the Korea Railway. Research Objective is to introduce - Developing procedure of the risk models - Application of the developed model to the Korea railway.

7. 2. Risk Assessment Procedure Common Approach Risk Management Risk Management Process System Definition Railway System Risk Analysis Context Modification Risk Definition Organization Demolition Exploitation Concept Construction Design Risk Evaluation Operation System Life Cycle Maintenance Risk Reduction Techniques/ Technology Risk Management

8. 2. Risk Assessment Procedure Production SE Management Concept Design Design Operation Evaluation Hazard Analysis National Safety Management System Safety Control Measures Construction of Safety Infrastructure Safety Management Safety Evaluation 1. National Safety Policies (NSP) Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP Establishment of plan for NSP Construction of Basis for NSP NSP Management NSP Evaluation 2. National Safety Objectives (NSO) Establishment of Basis Direction for NSO Establishment Of National Safety Objectives Resource Construction & Distribution Resource Management NSO Evaluation 3. National Safety Organization (NSOR) Establishment of Basis Direction for NSOR NSOR Design NSOR Construction NSOR Management NSO Evaluation 4. National Safety Integrated Plan (NSP) Establishment of Basis Direction for NSP NSP Establishment Construction of Operation Basis for NSP NSP Operation Management NSP Evaluation 5. National Safety Information Sys. (NSI) Establishment of Basis Direction for NSI NSI Design NSI Construction NSI Evaluation NSI Management 6. Nation Risk Assessment Sys. (NRA) Establishment of Basis Direction for NRA NRA Establishment NRA Operation & Management NRA Construction NRA Utility Evaluation 7.National Education & Training Sys, (NET) Establishment of Basis Direction for NET NET Establishment NET Construction NET Operation & Management NET Utility Evaluation NAI Establishment NAI Construction NAI Operation & Management NAI Utility Evaluation 8. National Accident Investigation Sys, (NAI) Establishment of Basis Direction for NAT 9. Training & Supply for Safety Specialist (TS) TS Establishment TS Construction TS Operation & Management Establishment of Basis Direction for TS TS Utility Evaluation 10. Safety P.R. Sys. (SPR) Establishment of Basis Direction for SPR SPR Establishment SPR Operation SPR Construction SPR Appropriateness Evaluation 11. Infrastructure Safety Inspection (ISI) ISI Plan Establishment ISI Sys. Modernization ISI Sys. Operation Analysis of ISI Problems ISI Sys. Appropriateness Evaluation 12. Infrastructure Safety (IS) IS Safety Certification System Operation Construction of IS Safety Certification System IS Safety Performance Evaluation IS Hazard Analysis Establishment of IS Safety Design Requirements 13. Railway Rolling Stock Safety (RS) RS Hazard Analysis IS Safety Performance Evaluation Operation RS Safety Certification System Operation Establishment of RS Safety Design Requirements Construction of RS Safety Certification System TR&TP Safety Performance Evaluation Operation TR&TP Safety Certification System Operation Establishment of TR&TP Safety Design Requirements 14. Train Operation Safety & Train Protection (TR&TP) TR&TP Hazard Analysis - Terror, illegality Construction of TR&TP Safety Certification System National Railway Risk Management System Architecture

9. 2. Risk Assessment Procedure Railway Risk Assessment Procedure Hazard Identification Defining the Initiating Hazardous Events Development of Accident Scenarios Casual Analysis Consequence Analysis Railway Accident Progress Scenarios Railway Accident Appearance Scenarios Hazardous Events FTA Model ETA Model Risk Evaluation & Reduction

10. 3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios Hazard Identification Procedure Setting up objective of hazard identification & its boundary System definition and boundary setting Including the definition of measures which stops the increases of accident Identifying hazardous events/ hazards/ barriers Defining relationships among hazardous events, hazards and barriers. Developing accident appearance scenarios Considering the relevant key influential factors. Developing accident progress scenarios Drawing up hazard log. Accident scenario management

11. 3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios System & Boundary Definition Typical railway system configuration proposed in SAMRAIL project • According to the accident classification of “Railway Accident Report Regulation”, • The scenarios were divided into the five main areas • 1) Train collision accident, • 2) Train derailment accident, • 3) Train fire accident, • 4) Level crossing accident, • 5) Railway (traffic/safety) casualty accident.

12. 3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios Hazardous Event Identification

13. 3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios Railway Accident AppearanceScenario Built up by classifying properly the immediate causes and underlying causes. •Immediate Causes: conditions which immediately cause hazardous events - Substandard Act: Substandard acts/behavior of who can cause hazardous events - Substandard Conditions: Physical conditions which can cause hazardous events •Underlying Causes: reason or source of substandard acts and conditions - Human Management Factors - Technological Factors - External Factors

14. 3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios Underlying Causes Immediate Causes Hazardous Event Railway Accident AppearanceScenario

15. 3. Hazard Identification using Railway Accident Scenarios Railway Accident Scenario Critical factors influencing accident severity were identified in the accident progress scenarios” Example of the Accident Progress Scenarios

16. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Risk Measure Method Risk assessment model : the form of a cause and consequence analysis : using fault trees and event trees. Collective Risk (Average Number of FWI/year) = Frequency (Average frequency at which the scenario sequence occurs) X Consequences (the number of FWI/scenario sequence) 1 FWI = 1 fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 minor injuries

17. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Data Population • Industry safety data: safety related incidents within industry database. • Incidents recorded range from train collisions to passenger burns from coffee spills • Many thousands of recordsare reviewed and classified • Where data was not available, • Use was made of: • - Human error probability assessments • : using a revised Human Error Assessment and Reduction Technique (HEART) • - Safety expert judgment from in-house expertise within Korea railway. • - Statistical methods including Monte Carlo simulation and Bayesian uncertainty distributions.

18. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Accident Analysis Risk Analysis Safety Requirement Verification Management System Management Safety Requirement Management Event Tree Analysis User Management Accident Search Railway System Management Fault Tree Analysis Code Management Environment Analysis Risk Evaluation Safety Requirement Change Management Classification Management Hazard Analysis Human Factor Analysis Damage Analysis Requirement Traceability Management Options Analysis Railway Risk Assessment &Information Management System (RAIMS) RAIMS

19. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Web-Based Accident Analysis Subsystem • Application running on the web • One purpose is to provide • - Fundamental information for an in-depth risk assessment of railway accidents • - Information on railway safety performance levels to both assessors and the public • This system is composed of three modules • 1) Accident input module. • 2) Accident analysis & statistics module • 3) Hazard management module. Environment Analysis Accident Analysis Accident Statistic Analysis

20. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Risk Analysis Subsystem • Windows-based application • Dedicated railway risk assessment software package • - Event Tree Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Risk Evaluation, Human Factor Analysis • The risk of the railway systems can be assessed by the ET/FT linking approach • - Accident progress scenarios: defined as event trees, using an event tree editor. • - Each branch of the accident progress sequences requires one or more supplementary fault trees, • which can be developed by a fault tree editor. • - Sum of the frequency of each sequence becomes the total frequency of the accident of concern. Event Tree Editor View ET/FT Linking approach Fault Tree Editor View

21. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Railway Human Reliability Analysis (R-HRA)Module • Supporting the analysts in analyzing potential human errors • Used under the railway risk assessment framework • Computer software developed for aiding the R-HRA process. • Revised R-HRA method supplementing the original R-HRA method developed by RSSB • Providing a specific task analysis guideline and a classification of performance shaping • factors (PSFs) General Information Input Error Analysis & Quantification Reporting Results

22. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Railway Accident Risk Assessment Results • Railway accident data until 2005 year on the main line of South Korea • Train operation on the main line fully carried out by Korea Railroad Corp.. • The total risk: 217 FWI per year • The overall risk made up from different profiles of frequency and consequences. • Railway casualty accident • : Tend to consist of high frequency low consequence type events (slips, trips and falls) • Train accidents • : Tend to have a risk contribution from the low frequency high consequence type events • : Increase the risk contribution for the hazardous events above the level seen in practice.

23. 4. Risk Assessment Model Development Future Development of the Risk Model The model is being prepared currently and will include: • Feasibility and uncertainty test in the results of the developed model • Improved level of human factors modeling • Use of more sophisticated statistical analysis techniques

24. 5. Conclusion • This study has proposed • Developing procedure of the risk models for the Korea railway • Application of their application to the Korea railway • The developed model will provide a generic model of the safety risk on the Korea railway • Which will • Increase the industry’s knowledge of the risk from the operation and maintenance • Allow the identification of areas of railway operation that need further risk controls • Allow sensitivity analyses to be carried out to determine the risk reduction • Allow cost benefit analysis of proposed changes

25. Thank you!