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The Tragedy of the Commons. Belongs to a Class of Problems that have no Technical Solutions. The Nuclear Arms Race Human Population Growth. The Tragedy of the Commons. Background: What Shall We Maximize?. Thomas Malthus on Population Growth Jeremy Bentham: Greatest Good for the Greatest
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The Tragedy of the Commons Belongs to a Class of Problems that have no Technical Solutions The Nuclear Arms Race Human Population Growth
The Tragedy of the Commons Background: What Shall We Maximize? Thomas Malthus on Population Growth Jeremy Bentham: Greatest Good for the Greatest Number Adam Smith: The Invisible Hand
Thomas Malthus: Unlimited Growth Unlimited Population Growth Based on the Exponential Equation
Pierre Francois Verhulst: Limited Growth Limited Population Growth Based on the Logistic Equation
The Logistic Equation rate of change = N = Population Size R = Reproductive Capacity of the Species K = Carrying Capacity of the Ecosystem
Pierre Francois Verhulst: Limited Growth Multiple “Steady States” Possible with the Logistic Equation Multiple “Steady States” Possible with the Logistic Equation
The optimum population is less thanthe maximum possible population. But: “The difficulty of defining the optimum is enormous…”
Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons Pasture Example (the village green) Grazing Example (the wide open west) “Inexhaustible” Resources of the Ocean
Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons Pasture Example (the village green) What are the benefits and costs to me of adding one more animal to my herd? Benefit: I get all the biomass generated by that animal Costs: The village green is degraded a bit, but that cost is shared by all other animal owners
Tragedy of Freedom in a Commons Oceans Example (fisheries) What are the benefits and costs to me of taking yet more fish from a stressed population? Benefit: I get all the biomass generated by those fish. Costs: The fish population is further degraded, but that degradation is shared by all my competitors.
Pollution A Commons Can Absorb the Pollution of a Small Population, but Not of a Large One.
Bottom Line • Use of a Commons Involves: • Privatization of Profit; • Socialization of Costs
Bottom Line • Use of a Commons Involves: • Privatization of Benefits • Socialization of Risks
Legislating Temperance Morality is System-Sensitive Prohibition (“Thou Shalt Not…”) is Easy Legislating Temperance is Difficult
Freedom to Breed is Intolerable ? ? ? ?
Freedom to Breed is Intolerable To couple the concept of freedom to breed with the belief that everyone born has an equal right to the commons is to lock the world into a tragic course of action.
Conscience is Self-Eliminatingand Pathogenic The genes of those with the conscience to restrict their uses of the Commons or to restrict their breeding will sooner (themselves) or later (their lack of offspring) be eliminated from the population.
Mutual CoercionMutually Agreed Upon We institute … taxes and other coercive devices to escape the horror of the Commons
Recognition of Necessity The Commons is justifiable only under conditions of low population density Injustice is preferably to total ruin Freedom is the recognition of necessity (Hardin Quoting Hegel)
Tragedy of the Anticommons The existence of numerous rights-holders impedes the attainment of a socially desirable outcome Patents Permits Biodiversity Access
The Ingredients for Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons: Elinor Ostrom 1. The nature of the resource 2. Recognition of resource depletion 3. Nature of the community: “Small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better”
The Bermuda Fisheries: A Tragedy of the Commons Averted? James Butler James Burnett-Herkes John Barnes Jack Ward
The Bermuda Fisheries: A Tragedy of the Commons Averted? 1. A Problem Perceived A Study Undertaken 3. A Policy Changed Background:
The Ingredients for Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons: Elinor Ostrom 1. The nature of the resource 2. Recognition of resource depletion 3. Nature of the community: “Small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better”
Prior to 1970: Resource was in excess of the demand. A “Commons” use of the resource seemed OK. Policy was to increase fisheries activity. In 1975: Policy was to “exploit the harvestable resources to their maximum sustainable levels”
X Hamlet o o x o o x
1980 and 1984 attempts to regulate the use of fish pots, but problems remained: Pots were too indiscriminately efficient Pot fishery was too difficult to police Fishermen used more pots than they were allotted - and tagged their illegal pots with other fisher’s names! Fishermen took other fisher’s pots
1980 and 1984 attempts to regulate the use of fish pots, but problems remained: Pots were too indiscriminately efficient Pot fishery was too difficult to police Fishermen used more pots than they were allotted - and tagged their illegal pots with other fisher’s names! Fishermen took other fisher’s pots
I. Reporting and Measurement Issues “I Fish, Therefore I Lie”
1980s: A growth in the use of the resource by other economic interests. Tourism: Scuba, Snorkel, Glass-Bottom Boat Charter fishermen found their interests aligned more with tourism than with commercial fishing
1990: Anne Cartwright DeCouto moves the Fish Pot Ban through Parliament Fish Pots redeemed by the government for substantial cash compensation 1991 and beyond: Fish Pot ban to be permanent Reef fishery goal to be “obtaining the maximum yield of fish consistent with the conservation of resources for other users." In short, “Fish to well below the MSY”
The Bermuda Example of Averting a “Tragedy of the Commons” Made possible by a fortuitous set of circumstances: A. Affluence B. Isolation C. Changing Economic Interests D. An Advantageous Political Environment
The Ingredients for Avoiding a Tragedy of the Commons: Elinor Ostrom 1. The nature of the resource 2. Recognition of resource depletion 3. Nature of the community: “Small and stable populations with a thick social network and social norms promoting conservation do better”