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Why does the US still have DP?. Existing theories… Socio-cultural values? Vigilante tradition No history of rigid class distinction in punishment No obvious sense of outer limits/no history of exceptions for status Limited welfare state Liberalism/individualism? Racism?.
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Why does the US still have DP? Existing theories… • Socio-cultural values? • Vigilante tradition • No history of rigid class distinction in punishment • No obvious sense of outer limits/no history of exceptions for status • Limited welfare state • Liberalism/individualism? • Racism?
Garland – DP in the US: • US on abolition trajectory for much of 19th and 20th centuries • 1976 – Furman v. GA struck down state death penalty statutes as violations of due process (not violations of cruel and unusual punishment) • US public no more supportive of DP than other countries; form of executions much like other countries pre-abolition • What needs explaining is last 30 years • Political institutions: institutional structures disrupt reform and resistance to DP
U.S. institutional exceptionalism: high fragmentation and many veto points • Lack of clear mechanism for major social policy • Congress has enumerated powers that are often contested • Many veto points for powerful elites and ideological extremists • South, other regions (lower mid-west) • Federalism – multiple, simultaneous, overlapping • Senate • Supreme Court
Political structures/mechanisms for nation-wide abolition of DP do not exist in US (outside Supreme Court) • Absence of strong parties • Existence of populist political mechanisms (referenda) • Election of judges and prosecutors • Vigilante values as a function of limited capacity for state to control violence? (Roth?)
What about race…? • Where is race in Garland’s account of the persistence of the death penalty? • Garland privileges institutions but Unever and Cullen seem to suggest race is central to understanding DP in US. Why?
Institutional features and their effects: • Parliamentary v. presidential • Presidential systems (separation of powers) may stalemate. • Parliamentary systems avoid stalemate (more effective) • Two-party v. multi-party (SMD v. PR) • PR/multi-party promotes broad representation, consensus • SMD/two-party promotes one-party rule, majoritarianism • Judicial v. parliamentary supremacy • Judicial supremacy can (maybe) mitigate ‘heat of the moment’ decision-making by legislative bodies • Parliamentary supremacy ensures that political ‘losers’ don’t use courts to overturn decisions that benefit the majority
How institutional rules matter: Arrow’s impossibility theorem (paradox) 3 candidates, A B and C. Voter preferences are as follows: A > B B > C C > A Merkel>Cameron Cameron>HollandeHollande>Merkel First round: A v. B = A (Merkel) Second round: A v. C = C is winner (Hollande) First round: B v. C = B (Cameron) Second round: B v. A = A is winner (Merkel)
Do institutional designs matter for rates of crime and punishment? • How might institutional structures (party systems, parliamentary/presidential, federalism and so on) affect rates of imprisonment in a country? • Which arrangements are more ‘democratic?’
Liberal market economies: US and UK • Corporatist, conservative market economies: Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium • Social democracies: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland