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The Honeynet Project. Setting Up A Honeynet Examples Of Blackhat Activity Test Results, by Kirk Hausman. Review – What Is A Honeynet?. A networked system behind a firewall. Black Hats use it rather than your production system. Can look like an actual production system
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The Honeynet Project Setting Up A Honeynet Examples Of Blackhat Activity Test Results, by Kirk Hausman
Review – What Is A Honeynet? A networked system behind a firewall. Black Hats use it rather than your production system. • Can look like an actual production system • Records network and system data to logs • Designed to learn who would like to use your system without your permission for their own ends • Gives organizations information when attacked • Learn vulnerabilities • Develop response plans
What About Honeypots? • Typically, these are single systems connected to a production system to lure attackers. • “The Cuckoo’s Nest” by Cliff Stoll • What products make a honeypot? • Fred Cohan’s Deception Toolkit • http://www.all.net/dtk/index.html • Cybercop Sting • http://www.pgp.com/products/cybercop-sting/default.asp • Recourse Mantrap • http://www.recourse.com/products/mantrap/trap.html
What’s The Difference? • Honeypots use known vulnerabilities to lure attack. • Configure a single system with special software or system emulations • Want to find out actively who is attacking the system • Honeynets are networks open to attack • Often use default installations of system software • Behind a firewall • Rather they mess up the Honeynet than your production system
Diagram Of A Honeynet IDS – Intrusion Detection System p. 21, The Honeynet Project. Addison-Wesley 2002.
Entry to Honeynet IDS – Intrusion Detection System p. 21, The Honeynet Project. Addison-Wesley 2002.
Exit from Honeynet IDS – Intrusion Detection System p. 21, The Honeynet Project. Addison-Wesley 2002.
Costs • For hardware, can be minimal • Honeynet Project used Pentiums and SPARC5 with Win ’98, RH Linux and Solaris 2.6. Also old Cisco routers. • High effort associated with configuring security • Restrict how Black Hats use the Honeynet • Don’t let them know they’re being monitored • High effort with analysis of data • No tools are available to perform this kind of analysis
Configuration Of Honeynet • Firewall rulebase • DNS and NTP • Anti-spoofing • Router • Bandwidth
Firewalls Suggested • CheckPoint Firewall-1 • Honeynet Project used it to enforce rules • Their book provides custom scripts to send alerts and limit outbound connections • IPFilter • Open source on Linux • “Swatch” utility to monitor and count outbound connections
Rules Enforced At Firewall • Anyone can connect from Internet to Honeynet • Unlimited inbound, restricted outbound • No packets allowed between Honeynet and Administrative network
DNS And NTP If want unlimited number of connections from Honeynet to Internet, recommend setting one machine as primary DNS and NTP. • Points to one trusted, recursive DNS on Internet • That system to resolve names • Black Hats expect & require DNS (downloading, etc.) • Easier to collect log data about network traffic from one machine than many within Honeynet. • Role as NTP (Network Time Protocol) server • Communicates with specific, trusted system for NTP updates • Maintains time to sync system clocks
Anti-spoofing • Critical to enact • This is the most common type of attack out of a Honeynet • How to enact • Set 5 to 10 connections maximum outgoing • Limit number to packets to between 5,000 and 10,000 per 24 hours. • Set these limits using script in rulebase of firewall • Apply limit to both UDP and TCP • Deny all outbound ICMP traffic
Router Honeynet Project used router to filter packets • Anti-spoofing • Only those with correct source IP allowed out • Router is secondary to firewall to control how Honeynet is used • Attackers not surprised to find a router • Firewall more transparent if limits on activity are suspected to be due to the router
Bandwidth Keep bandwidth small • Honeynet Project used 128 Kbps • Smaller throughput reduces number of packets sent out during DoS attack • Potentially cheaper to maintain the honeynet
Data Capture • This is the reason for setting up a honeynet. • Layers of data capture • Use more than one layer • Compromise of one layer leaves others available to see what happened • Kinds • Access control devices • Network layer • System layer • Off-line layer
Access Control Devices • Kinds • Firewall • Router • Scripting • Inbound alerting scripts capture logs • Use in firewall
Network Layer • Logging of packets in Honeynet network • Capture two kinds of data • Signature alerts • Packet payload • IDS (Intrusion Detection System) • They used utility called “Snort” (www.snort.org) • On suspicious activity, Snort captured data and sent alert message via syslogd to Log/Alert Server • “Swatch” on Log/Alert Server looked for specific alerts and sent e-mail or page notification to administrator
System Layer • By remote logging, send system logs to Administrative Alert/Log server • Recommended capturing keystrokes via modules within kernel or by modified bash shell • Expect logging within Honeynet to be attacked • Expect syslogd to also be killed or Trojan-horsed
Off-line Layer • Use utility like “Tripwire” to take images of system before opening up Honeynet • Take compromised system off-line and take another image • Inspect images to recover tools installed by Black Hats
Data Analysis • 30 minutes of blackhat activity is about 30 to 40 work hours of data analysis • All activity within Honeynet is suspicious • Less than 10 MB of logging per 24 hours is typical.
More Advanced Analysis • Passive fingerprinting • Forensics
Fingerprinting • Learn about attacker without detection • Active fingerprinting • Fyodor’s Nmap Security Scanner (http://www.insecure.org/nmap) • Ofir Arkin’s paper “ICMP Usage in Scanning” (http://www.sys-security.com) • Passive fingerprinting • Sniffer traces
Forensics • UNIX systems • The Coroner’s Toolkit, by Dan Farmer and Wietse Venema • Automated data gathering • Recovery of deleted files • Reconstruction of events based on modify/access/change times • Windows and NT • EnCase (http://www.encase.com) • J.D. Glaser (Foundstone) (http://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-99/bh3-speakers/html)
Example Of A Blackhat Session Following An IRC Chat Session The Honeynet Project. Know Your Enemy. Addison-Wesley, 2002.
Scenario • What was attacked • Solaris 2.6 honeypot with a rpc.ttdbserv Solaris exploit • Buffer overflow in TookTalk object database server • Exploit listed in SANS Institute’s Top Ten List (http://www.sans.org/topten.htm) • What blackhats put there • IRC bot installed • It captured all conversations on the IRC channel • Honeynet Project listened in • After setting system up for their use, they harden security on the system to prevent other blackhats from using it • Authors believe kiddie scripts were used
The Adventures Of D1ck And J4n3 • D1ck probably an older teenager living in Pakistan, possibly near Kashmir, maybe in Lahore • J4n3 possibly from Pakistan but wants to appear as an “elite” hacker. • IRC chat captured • Underground language and slang. • Parts using Urdu, native language of Pakistan
Where In Pakistan? http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html
What Was Happening • Appeared that several Black Hats in group were sympathetic to Pakistani causes but others to Indian. • Justification for hacking was for these causes • Frequently attacked other Black Hats • Compromise systems to hinder their exploits • Shared common skills and techniques
Example of Blackhat WarfareJune 6, 2000 D1ck! :I just tookover 3 of diz’s box today ;( D1ck! :one day I did 36 Sp07! : *** it D1ck! :heh D1ck! :*ALL* his boxes J4n3! :woo D1ck! :Sp07 D1ck! :hmmmmmm D1ck! :um Sp07! :? D1ck! :J4n3:who’se domain example.com is? D1ck! :and who host’s it D1ck! :satnet called up zahid eh p. 196, The Honeynet Project.
D1ckJune 9, 2000 • Rooted more than 40 systems • Here, he gives J4n3 access to one of them J4n3 : D1ck D1ck :sup J4n3 : I can’t access www.example.com with the user k1dd13 and pass u gave … D1ck :sha..d4v3 J4n3 :yup that is … D1ck :site work? J4n3 :wait J4n3 :yup p. 244, The Honeynet Project
Honeynet Project’s Favorite QuotesJune 9, 2000 • D1ck brags how many Linux boxes he compromised in 3 hours D1ck :hehe come with yure ip I’ll add u to the new 40 bots D1ck :I owned and trojaned 40 servers of linux in 3 hours D1ck ::)))) J4n3 :heh D1ck :*** J4n3 :107 bots D1ck :yup J4n3 :wait brb D1ck :105 :P J4n3 :back D1ck :kewl p. 250, The Honeynet Project
Psychological Review Of D1ck And J4n3’s Group • Social structure was robust with a complex meritocracy • Status hierarchy in his local social group and in groups outside this local group • Use of derogatory statements to challenge status of others and to control social processes • High level of tension reduces their cohesiveness • Constant fear of detection and arrest
Questions? Next, Kirk Hausman