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A novel key management scheme for dynamic access control in a user hierarchy

A novel key management scheme for dynamic access control in a user hierarchy. Authors: Tzer-Shyong Chen ( 陳澤雄 ) and Jen-Yan Huang Source: Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 162, pp. 339–351, 2005 Reporter: Jung-wen Lo ( 駱榮問 ) Date: 2006/03/14. Introduction.

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A novel key management scheme for dynamic access control in a user hierarchy

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  1. A novel key management scheme for dynamic access control in a user hierarchy Authors: Tzer-Shyong Chen (陳澤雄) and Jen-Yan HuangSource: Applied Mathematics and Computation, Vol. 162, pp. 339–351, 2005 Reporter: Jung-wen Lo (駱榮問) Date: 2006/03/14

  2. Introduction • Definition: • ≦: binary partially-ordered relationship • User’s security clearance: each user is assigned to a security class. • Review • Akl & Taylor (1983) • Size of Ti is enlarged as the security classes expand • MacKinnon et al. (1985) • Harn & Lin (1990) • Bottom-up key generation scheme • Lin (1997) • When user change key, the new key will be exposed • Kuo et al. (1999) [Chen et al.] • Better then Lin’s scheme

  3. Key generation (CA) Select Ek() & Dk() Select H() & public it Select larger positive integer Pi & ski for all security class Sci IF SCj≦SCi, public Rij=EH(Pjski)(SKj) Key derivation (SCi) IF SCj≦SCi Compute H(Pjski) Kj=DH(Pjski)(Rij) =D(Pjski)(EH(Pjski)(SKj)) Key generation & Derivation Pi,(ski) SCi Rij=EH(Pjski)(SKj) Pj,(skj) SCj

  4. Adding class SCk (CA) Select Pk, skk IF SCk≦SCi Rik=EH(Pkski)(SKk) IF SCj≦SCk Rkj=EH(Pjskk)(SKj) IF SCk≦SCi & SCj≦SCk Rij=EH(Pjski)(SKj) Pi,(ski) SCi Rik Rij SCk Pk,(skk) Pj,(skj) SCj Rkj Dynamic access control ＋SC7

  5. Pi,(ski) SCi Rik Rij SCk Pk,(skk) Pj,(skj) SCj Rkj Dynamic access control (Cont’) • Deleting class SCk (CA) • Delete Pk, skk • IF SCk≦SCi • Delete Rik • IF SCj≦SCk • Delete Rkj • IF SCk≦SCi & SCj≦SCk • Delete Rij －SC7

  6. Adding relationships (CA) SCb≦SCa Rab=EH(Pbska)(SKb) IF SCj≦SCb & SCb≦SCa Raj=EH(Pjska)(SKj) IF SCa≦SCi & SCb≦SCa Rib=EH(Pbski)(SKb) IF SCj≦SCb & SCa≦SCi Rij=EH(Pjski)(SKj) Pi,(ski) SCi Rib Pa,(ska) Rab SCa Pb,(skb) SCb Rij Raj Rij Pj,(skj) SCj Dynamic access control (Cont’)

  7. Dynamic access control (Cont’) • Adding Relationship SC6≦SC5

  8. Deleting relationships (CA) Delete Rab IF SCj≦SCb & SCb≦SCa Raj=EH(Pjska)(SKj) IF SCa≦SCi & SCb≦SCa Rib=EH(Pbski)(SKb) IF SCj≦SCb & SCa≦SCi Rij=EH(Pjski)(SKj) Pi,(ski) SCi Rib Pa,(ska) Rab SCa Pb,(skb) SCb Rij Raj Rij Pj,(skj) SCj Dynamic access control (Cont’)

  9. Dynamic access control (Cont’) • Deleting Relationship SC5≦SC2

  10. Dynamic access control (Cont’) • Changing secret keys skksk’k • SCj≦SCk≦SCi • R’ik=EH(Pkski)(SK’k) • R’kj=EH(Pjsk’k)(SKj)

  11. Security analysis & Discussion • Attacks • Contrary attack  H() & E() • Interior collection attack  H() & E() • Exterior collecting attack  H() • Collaborative attack  H() • Sibling attack  H() • Functioncomparisons

  12. Comments • Remove too much when delete class or relationship • Nearly be a full tree • Root may have all relationships among all classes and itself

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