Ideas on privacy vs. Authentication Authentication by online challenges. Charles H. Bennett IBM Research Yorktown Januar

1. Ideas on privacy vs. Authentication Authentication by online challenges. Charles H. Bennett IBM Research Yorktown January 2002 www.research.ibm.com/people/b/bennetc

2. Problem and Opportunity Cheap pervasive sensors and cheap data storage => temptation to record everything happening in public or even private venues and save it forever, with ensuing loss of privacy. But these recordings are sometimes good, protecting individual rights, e.g. Rodney King, war crimes evidence, polluters. In many situations the bad guys want privacy and the good guys want publicity, with authenticity. Societal solution: don’t prohibit data collection, but do it in a regulated and authenticated fashion, and establish a legal framework of rights and technical mechanisms for the interested parties to grant or deny access to the data, depending on circumstances and use to which the data is to be put.

3. A more specific problem: Recordings are easily doctored, and seemingly cannot be trusted unless they have been continuously in trusted hands from the moment of generation. Those making the recordings (police, claims adjustors) often have a vested interest and may be distrusted by the public. For example, in the OJ Simpson trial, many people believed the police had falsified video recordings and other evidence Solution: 1. Produce the recordings in a way that prevents falsification even by the makers and operators of the recording equipment. 2. Establish the societal expectation of an authenticated recording under certain circumstances, so its absence will be seen as evidence that the responsible authority has destroyed it.

6. Authentication by Random Laser Scan Challenge signal from trusted source controls aiming of a laser scanning over the scene being recorded, so as to affect the video image in a way that could not have been foreseen before arrival of the challenge signal.

7. Authentication by voluntary responses to verbal requests Random number challenges from the trusted source are translated into verbal requests chosen from a standard menu of possible requests, e.g. “touch your nose,” and the requests conveyed to the person being filmed via a display unit or speaker attached to the camera.

8. Video frame showing both laser scan and response to verbal request.

9. Wallpaper or “skin disease” Challenge-Controlled LCD projector projects a pseudorandom texture onto scene or person being recorded. Actions with props: Challenge-Controlled instructions for user to perform actions involving hard-to-render props e.g. liquids, soap bubbles.

11. Besides authenticating video, it is important to authenticate accompanying audio. This can be done by • Having the random challenge signal from the trusted source produce sounds, which then become part of the audio/video recording. • Having random challenge signal direct the subject to do something that alters the sound. Thump on your chest while speaking, or breathe some helium. • When making a video of spoken testimony, zoom in on speakers’ mouth(s). Have speaker(s) use phrases and terminology designed to be visually unambiguous, ie not substitutable by a similar-appearing phrase with a very different sound and meaning.

12. Other enhancements and variations • Low-bandwidth (eg. 56 kbaud) live video feedback to a human monitor at the trusted center, who could ask questions, suggest actions, intelligently aim camera. • Using invisible IR for challenge-controlled illumination (laser or LCD) to be less obtrusive. • Hard to render clothing and backgrounds. • Challenge-controlled shifts of camera viewpoint. • Challenge-controlled water pistol. • Non-visual interventions, eg challenge controlled dithering of control parameters in an industrial process.