Challenges in Verification of Nuclear Weapons Reduction Treaties

1. Challenges in Verification of Nuclear Weapons Reduction Treaties ANS Section Dinner July 17, 2013 Duncan MacArthur LA-UR-13-25135

2. Overview • Nuclear arms reductions treaties • Treaty confirmation • Measurement types • Information Barriers • Challenges in warhead confirmation • The future Slide 2

3. Generic Arms Reduction Treaty • The owner of nuclear material or a device (the host party) makes a declaration concerning that item (the treaty-limited item or TLI) and/or its disposition to another entity (the monitoring party) and … • The monitoring party must confirm this declaration … • … without unintended release of classified information. • Current treaties are “counting-treaties”, future treaties may require confirmation Slide 3

4. The Challenges • Evaluate the material/object presented (Measurement) • Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) • Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication) Slide 4

5. Dismantlement and Warhead Confirmation • Dismantlement can be defined as separation of fissile material (FM) and high explosive (HE). • Measurements - “Absence”, “Everything present”, or something else • Confirmation – of an “item,” or a declared TLI, or the specified TLI? • No similar definition for “nuclear weapon” • Measurements - Characteristics, similarity, and/or history • Confirmation – How good, where, when? Slide 5

6. Confirmation Methods • Provenance: Has the item undergone movements or come from a location consistent with being a warhead? • Template comparison: Is the item consistent with other items known or believed to be warheads? • Attribute measurements: Are specified item properties consistent with it being a warhead? Slide 6

7. Provenance • From a delivery vehicle? • Handling procedures • Packaging details and procedures • Facility suitability • “Right place at the right time” • All of these are confidence building • Important to maintain chain of custody (CoC) Slide 7

8. Template Comparison • Compare each new item with template • Proof that an item is unchanged – use for CoC • May accommodate a shorter measurement time • Do all treaty limited items fit the template? • Template is probably classified • How does one initialize the template? • Only need to fool the system once—during the initialization Slide 8

9. Attribute Measurement • Measures agreed attributes of each item • Each measurement is independent of previous results • System can be used with several types of items with the same attributes • Attributes are necessarily not very specific • Choice of attributes is very important • Not only must the attribute display be unclassified, but the reason to choose that attribute must also be unclassified Slide 9

10. Information Barriers (IBs) radiation Control & Power Data Barrier Detectors Analysis & Output TLI Display Potentially sensitive Non-sensitive data within IB Information barrier Non-sensitive display Slide 10

11. The Challenges • Evaluate the material/object presented(Measurement) • Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) • Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication) Slide 11

12. Measurement: Technical Feasibility • The Trilateral Initiative demonstration • LANL/LLNL collaboration • IAEA/Russian audience • Small plutonium sources Slide 12

13. The Challenges • Evaluate the material/object presented(Measurement) • Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) • Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication) Slide 13

14. Certification: Feasibility • The Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration (FMTTD) • LANL/LLNL collaboration • Russian/USG audience • Measurements on US weapon component Only measurement of its kind ever performed. Slide 14

15. The Challenges • Evaluate the material/object presented(Measurement) • Protect the host country’s classified information (Certification) • Allow monitors to draw independent conclusions (Authentication) Slide 15

16. Authentication Challenge • Everything interesting (the object, the measurement system, and the data) has been hidden. • If the host has a reason to cheat, ... • Why should the monitors believe the red/green lights? Slide 16

17. Authentication: Proposed Solutions • Who gets it last? • Combination of methods for authentication • Joint design • Joint development • Random selection • Reverse engineering • Monitor “private” inspection • Construction techniques • Commercial off the shelf (COTS) • Custom Slide 17

18. Authentication: Construction Techniques • The Next-Generation Attribute Measurement System (NG-AMS) • LANL design • U.S. labs audience • Small plutonium sources COTS-based system Slide 18

19. Authentication: Joint Design • Both parties develop design together. • Both parties build systems from agreed design. • Both parties are intimately familiar with both design and capabilities of measurement system. • If the host certifies the measurement system and the monitor validates the validation system, then demonstrating the continued equality of the two systems (continuity of knowledge) is equivalent to authenticating the host system. Slide 19

20. Authentication: Joint Design • The Attribute Measurement System for Neutrons and Gammas (AVNG) • VNIIEF/LANL/LLNL collaboration • Russian construction • U.S. audience • Multi-kg plutonium sources Slide 20

21. AVNG Detail

22. Authentication: Random Selection • Motivation – confidence that the measurement system (host) and validation system (monitoring party) are identical. • Simple in concept • Several “identical” copies of a component or system are presented • One (or more) is randomly chosen for use in the measurement system • One (or more) is randomly chosen for validation • If the two are identical, validation of the “validation copy” is equivalent to validation of the measurement system • But the devil is in the details • What about continuity of knowledge? Slide 22

23. Authentication: Is it Possible? The third-generation attribute measurement system – My vision • Multi-lab (or international) design and construction • Designed for random selection • Multi-lab (or international) red teams • Testing with realistic plutonium and/or HEU items Slide 23

24. The Challenges: Current Status • Evaluate the material/object presented(Measurement) – Done for Pu (Ideas for HEU) • Protect host country’s classified information (Certification) – Toolkit exists • Allow monitors to (simultaneously) draw independent conclusions (Authentication) – • Building hardware is very expensive • Demonstrating hardware is much more expensive • Simultaneous Certification and Authentication Slide 24