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i-2 Internet problems. Taekyoung Kwon tkkwon@snu.ac.kr. scalability. Network prefix keeps increasing Superlinearly Forwarding info base (FIB) size increases routers in Default free zone (DFZ). Why increase?. Multi-homing Traffic engineering Non- aggregatable prefix allocation.
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i-2 Internet problems Taekyoung Kwon tkkwon@snu.ac.kr
scalability • Network prefix keeps increasing • Superlinearly • Forwarding info base (FIB) size increases • routers in Default free zone (DFZ)
Why increase? • Multi-homing • Traffic engineering • Non-aggregatable prefix allocation Source: bgp.potaroo.net
Multi-homing • reliability 4.0.0.0/8 3.0.0.0/8 ISP1 ISP2 3.4.0.0/16 3.4.0.0/16 company1
Traffic engineering (1/2) • E.g. load balancing 4.0.0.0/8 ISP1 3.4.0.0/16 3.4.0.0/16 ISP2
Traffic engineering (2/2) • E.g. load balancing 4.0.0.0/8 ISP1 3.4.0.0/16 3.4.1.0/24 ISP2 3.4.2.0/24
ViAggre, “Making routers last longer with ViAggre”, NSDI ‘09 Why routing scalability matters? • FIB is expensive
scalability • LISP (locator identifier separation protocol)
mobility • Session continuity • TCP/IP socket • IP address is fixed • IP address is changed with mobility • Initial lookup • DNS assumes static binding between domain name and IP address • What if IP address of a host changes dynamically?
mobility • Destination mobility • Client changes her point of attachment during session • Source mobility • What if source moves? • What if both endpoints change their points of attachment simultaneously?
Taxonomy: mobilityproposals • L3 • MIPv4, MIPv6, PMIP • L4 • Shimlayer
IP mobility problem • Internet hosts/interfaces are identified by IP address • Host identifier • Locator • Moving to another network requires different network address • But this would change the host’s identity • How can we still reach that host?
MH = mobile host CH = correspondent host Foreign network Home network MH CH Routing for mobile hosts How to direct packets to moving hosts transparently? CH Home network Foreign network MH
Host-specific routes • There are numerous routers • There will be even more mobile hosts • Whenever a host changes its address, it may have to be propagated across the Internet
Mobile IP • LD (location directory) • identifier: location • home address (HoA): care-of address (CoA)
L4 Proposals • MSOCKs • “MSOCKS: An Architecture for Transport Layer Mobility,” infocom ‘98 • SCTP • RFC 4960, “Stream Control Transmission Protocol” • Migrate • “An End-to-End Approach to Host Mobility,” MobiCom ‘00
Migrate • Locate hosts through existing DNS • Secure, dynamic DNS is currently deployed and widely available (RFC 2137) • Maintains standard IP addressing model • IP address are topological addresses, not Ids • Fundamental to Internet scaling properties • Ensure seamless connectivity through connection migration • Notify only the current set of correspondent hosts • Follows from the end-to-end argument
Location Query (DNS Lookup) Location Update (Dynamic DNS Update) DNS Server Connection Initiation Connection Migration Mobile Host foo.bar.edu yyy.yyy.yyy.yyy Migrate Architecture Correspondent Host xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
Shim layer: Insert an ID-locator mapping layer • Shim6 • Level 3 Multihoming Shim Protocol for IPv6 , RFC 5533 • HIP • Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Architecture, RFC 4423
Content delivery efficiency • P2P: BitTorrent • CDN • IP multicasting • Wireless multicasting/broadcasting • CCN
Content centric networking • FIB Scalability • Source mobility • Cache-BW tradeoff
Security: DDOS • DDoS • Filtering-based • Capability-based
Digital Certificate “I officially approve the relation between the holder of this certificate (the user) and this particular public key. Security: PKI • PKI is vulnerable • Certificate chain • certificate Source: AtulKahate
Digital Certificate Subject Name: … Public Key: … … CA’s Digital Signature To verify this certificate, we need to de-sign it using the CA’s public key. If we can de-sign the certificate, we can safely assume that the certificate is valid. Digital Certificate Signed by CA “de-sign” means to verify the message digest of certificate by using CA’s public key
Root CA Second Level CA Second Level CA Second Level CA Third Level CA Third Level CA Third Level CA Third Level CA … … … CA Hierarchy
PKI threats • Everybody can be a CA • A naïve/reckless/malicious CA may issue a certificate to a malicious entity. • The malicious entity runs a bogus server • Say, citibank.com • Somehow DNS response of citibank.com has the IP address of the malicious entity • Then what?
Video adaptation • How to maximize users’ QoE in a cell or a group of cells in adaptive multimedia framework • QoS: throughput, delay, jitter, loss • QoE: PSNR, MOS, zapping time
Rate Adaptation is a must • Different devices • Link/path bandwidth • Dynamics 2Mb/s 0.5Mb/s 1Mb/s 0.2Mb/s
Online transrating/transcoding • Original video is modified Netmanias, 2012
Dynamic Adaptive Streaming over HTTP (DASH) • Segments for multiple quality levels Thomas Stockhammer, Qualcomm
Scalable video coding (SVC) • Multiple layers for progressive quality enhancement Spatio-Temporal-Quality Cube Layered Video Layered Encoder Layer l … Enhancement Layer Layer 3 Layer 2 Layer 1 Base layer * MDC: multiple description coding
Location-based Mobile Networking • offloading • handoff • P2P communications
Data center networking • Monitoring • Re-routing • TCP
TCP for Big Data • “Understanding TCP Incast and Its Implications for Big Data Workloads” • “Cascaded TCP: Big Throughput for Big Data Applications in Distributed HPC”
Oracle Mapping System • Mobility • Routing scalability • Content delivery • Certificate Verification