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Putting the new aid agenda to work. Asia Programme Managers Meeting Delhi, May 22 nd 2002. Quick Recap (1). Asia poverty reduction strategy processes are different – not necessarily a PRS maybe state rather than federal level different views on role of state
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Putting the new aid agenda to work Asia Programme Managers Meeting Delhi, May 22nd 2002
Quick Recap (1) • Asia poverty reduction strategy processes are different – • not necessarily a PRS • maybe state rather than federal level • different views on role of state • large/entrenched private sector • welfarist vs. dev. concepts of poverty • capacity is available • civil society generally more organised
Recap (2) • A new opportunity to influence pro-poor change? • Not if political commitment remains weak – process conditionality unlikely to be any different, project/sector support still important • An entry point for DFID to support more strategic thinking, pro-poor dialogue & changes in donor behaviour • Pro-poor political change is complex & does not come from ‘outside’
Recap (3) • Challenges/dilemmas • What makes for a quality prs process? What’s the bottom line? Is there a shared Asian perspective? • Is a ‘sound’ prs one backed by an MTEF? Should DFID support national/subnational govts without such a strategy? What about China? India? MICs? • Need to establish some ground rules for working with more effectively with IFIs, RDBs (& Japan) • Need an HQ policy that is evidenced-based, able to address the VFM question
PRSPs & Aid instruments • Support country leadership/ownership by working to strengthen Govt. systems and processes: • A move away from parallel/off-budget projects • Shift towards joint funding of: • Sector programmes • General budget • Jointly agreed indicators, common performance assessment & monitoring systems (building on national systems) • Harmonised rules/procedures for disbursement, accountability & risk assessment
Implications • Types of project/sector support - on-budget, linked with PRS framework, performance-monitoring • Balance between conditionality, earmarking, accountability requirements • Capacity support/non-financial assistance • Working with other donors and with non-government entities
Issues in selecting aid instruments • Presence of a national commitment to poverty reduction (presence of a prs/MTEF?) • Quality of PEM & PFM, integrity of accounting & audit arrangements, off-budget exps., quality of indicators for performance monitoring/ expenditure tracking? • Reform record on macro & structural • Risk vs. reward
IFI Instruments • PRGF – ‘Key Features’ : supporting PRS policy fw. Performance criteria/benchmarks streamlined & linked to PRS policy commitments. Importance of PSIA. • PRSC – programmatic adj. credit, ex post performance assessment, annual tranches within medium term framework set by PRS. Due diligence tests – CFAA, CPA, SSR, PSIA. • Issues – Ambitious reform agenda, need to build on sectoral processes, ‘champions’ within Govt, annual tranching (reporting) vs.medium term perspective. • Dangers – ‘donors ganging up’, eggs in one basket
Budget Support – Risks/Safeguards • Risk of not achieving stated objectives because of: • only rhetorical commitment to poverty reduction • other reform measures not taken or macro deteriorates • corruption • Ways of assessing/mitigating risk • Presence of PRS backed by signs of pro-poor allocations/spend • CFAA, PER, CPA & other diagnostic tools • Safeguards - capacity support to budgeting & auditing, independent financial tracking, financial accountability conditions, expenditure/ sector earmarking • Media/NGO scrutiny
Case study - Tanzania • Shift to budget support based on: • Macro stability largely achieved • PRSP in place • Increasing poverty focus of Govt. spending • Commitment to improving Govt. systems • Features of budget support: • Common mech. (9 other donors), common performance assessment linked to PRSP • Safeguards: CFAA complete, TA support to Govt. systems & poverty monitoring
Tanzania • Risks • PRSP implementation off track • PFM/PSR reforms ineffective • Joint donor support collapses • Complementary measures • ‘Strategic’ project support for pro-poor growth; public accountability from below (CSOs) • Continued SWAP engagement in PRS priority sectors • Influencing through analytical support, aid coordination.