GMOs and Hunger: Food Security and Food Aid

1. LECTURE GEOG 270 Fall 2007 November 30, 2007 Joe Hannah, PhD Department of Geography University of Washington

2. GMOs and Hunger Food Security and Food Aid

3. Last Time • Reviewed “Permissive” vs. ”Precautionary” approaches • A little history of GMO adoption • US, Canada, Argentina first users (rich, large farms) • “Mad Cow” and European adoption of Precautionary Principle • Third World policy dilemmas • Is “privatized development” a good thing for Third World countries? • Some policy examples (from Paarlberg) • Kenya, Brazil, China

4. Today • GMOs and Food Security • Famine, Food Aid, and GMOs: Southern African Food Emergency 2002

5. The Food Security Debate • What is “Food Security?” • Over 200 definitions (Maxwell and Buchanan-Smith, 1992) • Different scales: • e.g., amount of food available world-wide • e.g., access to food by all people at all times • my experience in early 1990s: seasonal security • Different focus • Production, sustainability, nutrition, trade/markets, access (e.g., famines)

6. Food Security and GMOs • Proponents of GMOs • Future “food gap” • population -- +73 million per year thru 2010 • Urbanization • “productivity gap” • can’t leave the poor behind • Must use available land to its utmost potential

7. Food Security and GMOs • Opponents to GMOs • Technology not the answer: Green Revolution did not end hunger • GMO technology is driven by commercial (not humanitarian) interests • Real challenges are social/political: foremost is access to food, poverty alleviation, land reform • Ecologically sustainable agriculture will give cheaper, longer-lasting increases in productivity

8. Food Security and GMOs The debate over whether GMOs can help reduce hunger reflects, in large part, actors’ ideas of the causes of hunger (i.e., their definition of “food security”): • production, • sustainability, • nutrition, • trade/markets, • access (e.g., famines) • etc.

9. GMOs and US Food Aid:Southern Africa 2002 • Six countries, over 14 million people “rapidly slipping into a food crisis” • Estimated food requirements: over 1 million metric tons of grain • “Trigger” for crisis: weather (floods, drought) • “Causes” more complicated (poor governance, land redistribution, sale of surpluses to pay debt, etc.) • Access to food (no alternative sources) – not lack of food

10. US Donates GMO Grain • US took the lead in donating food to alleviate crises: ½ required additional food • Some of the unmilled grain aid was GMO • Each country had to respond: • Swaziland, Lesotho accepted aid (Lesotho initially asked that it be milled first) • Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia challenged: grain did not have regulatory approval in US

11. Concerns about GMO Aid • Potential health impacts on food recipients • Impact on local agricultural biodiversity (genetic pollution) • Impact of possible GMO pollution on abilities to export grain n the future

12. Recipients’ Policy Responses • Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe asked that the grain be milled first (to prevent replanting by farmers and crossing with local varieties) • Zambia: refused aid until Zambian scientists could study potential health impacts; concluded: • Health effects unclear • High risk of eroding biodiversity • High risk of impacting exports (e.g., honey, corn) to EU • Rejected Aid

13. Official US Response • Initially simply dismissed critics’ concerns: “ignorant and uninformed” • As opposition grew, US sought to “educate” recipients on safety of GMOs • Refused to replace food aid with cash aid (to by regionally available grain) • Refused to mill the grain first (too expensive)

14. Official US Response “Washington, however, failed to to both understand the nature of the concern of the governments of the region and to take them seriously. For Washington, the choice was simple: either accept US food aid unconditionally, or allow your population to starve” (Zerbe, 2004)

15. Recipients’ Policy Dilemma “For the governments of the region, however, the matter was far more complex. For them, the decision to accept US assistance in the form of GM food aid represented a trade off, not just between the potential short and long term health of their populations, but between the short and long term health of their economies.” (Zerbe, 2004)

16. Short-term resolution • South Africa intervened: milled US donated grain. • Malawi, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe accepted distribution

17. Zambia Still Refused US Aid • “Framed” as sovereignty – Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa: “we may be poor and experiencing food shortages but are not ready to expose people to ill-defined risks. . . I am not prepared to accept that we should use our people as guinea pigs” (Zerbe, 2004)

18. US vs. EU • US blames the EU: “This dangerous effect of the EUs moratorium became painfully evident last fall when some famine-stricken African countries refused US food aid because of fabricated fears stoked by irresponsible rhetoric about food safety.” (US Trade representative) • The EU responds: “Food aid to starving populations should be about meeting the urgent humanitarian needs of those who are in need. It should not be about trying to advance the case for GM food abroad, or planting GM crops for export, or indeed finding outlets for domestic surplus…” (EU policy response)

19. Policy Situation, 2005

20. Will GMOs Reduce Hunger? • The debate seems to have come to an impasse – entrenched positions divided along lines of “theory” and “world view” • Causes of hunger, importance of markets, safety • Each side claims “moral high ground” • Each stakeholder has (potentially) a great deal to gain or lose • Policy approaches are developed inthis ambiguos environment, relying on best science, local knowledge and understandings, and personal beliefs

21. Next time… • Wrap up GMO Topic • Re-visit “Sustainability” and “Development” • Talk about ”Participatory Development” approaches