Interrogation & Confession

1. Interrogation & Confession Class 18

2. Confession and Immaturity • Haley v Ohio • 15 year old “lad” interrogated starting at midnight, denied him access to counsel, confronted him with evidence of co-defendants’ confessions, leading to confession at 5AM • Ruled “involuntary” by U.S. Supreme Court • Gallegos v. Colorado • Confession of 14 year old ruled involuntary because he did know or understand his rights, was not the “equal” of the police, was unable to protect himself

3. Key issue in both Gallegos and Haley is youthfulness and “voluntariness” of confessions • Youthfulness is a “special circumstance” requiring the law’s close scrutiny and special protections • Miranda protects juveniles from self-incrimination, and custodial interrogation is deemed inherently coercive • What is “custodial” interrogation? Was it custodial when youth was questioned by parent in front of probation officer in his own home? What about in school, if only the Principal is present? When a police officer enters the school and participates, is that custodial? • See, also, Gault – “special caution” (45) and “immaturity and vulnerability” (55), and citing Miranda (50, 56), extended Fifth Amendment rights to juveniles • What do kids know and when do they know it? Can they make a “knowing, intelligent and voluntary” waiver decision when in custody, or in some approximation of custody? Do kids have the developmental capacity to discern when they are in custody?

4. Fare v Michael C.(1979) • Defendant taken into custody by two police officers and interrogated after Miranda warnings. Defendant waived right to counsel, but asked to speak with his probation officer. Police refused to contact PO, and interrogation proceeded and defendant made incriminating statements. • CA Supreme Court ruled that request to speak with PO was not the same as a request to speak with an attorney • PO cannot provide legal counsel, despite protective mandate • Fare (16.5 years) was experienced in the legal system (on probation since age 12), and had prior incarceration • US Supreme Court reversed, stating that totality of circumstances analysis needs to be applied, but also stating that defendant’s confession was “voluntary” and “knowing” • Marshall dissent – Given role of PO in CA law, asking for PO is same as asking for attorney, Miranda therefore applies, and interrogation should have stopped immediately

5. Powell, in his dissent: • Although the defendant had prior brushes with the law, and was under the supervision by a probation officer, the…transcript of his interrogation… demonstrates that he was immature, emotional, and uneducated, and therefore likely to be vulnerable to the skillful, two-on-one, repetitive style of interrogation to which he was subjected….[t]he interrogating police officer did not exercise the “greatest of care” to assure that the respondent’s “admission was voluntary”….I am not satisfied that this…16 year old boy…was subjected to a fair interrogation free from inherently coercive circumstances…

6. How do we define “totality of circumstances” with respect to juveniles? • “Custody + Interrogation = Miranda requirement” • If juveniles are immature generally, do Miranda warnings adequately protect their rights? • Owing to their immaturity and diminished competence, do juveniles have the capacity to understand Miranda warnings? To act on these warnings by requesting the presence of an attorney, perhaps risking the displeasure of the police authorities? Are they able to resist enticements to avoid attorneys (e.g., in return for a promise of freedom)? • Does Miranda apply in school settings? • Should the school principal in T.L.O. have offered to have an attorney present? • Does interrogation by a school authority qualify as “inherently coercive”? Are school officials de facto law enforcement officers when interrogating students? • Should questioning by a school authority in the principal’s office or security office deemed custodial”?

7. Immaturity • State v Benoit (NH, 1985) -- “immaturity significantly affects ability to comprehend rights and makes juvenile susceptible to the compelling atmosphere of the interrogation” • “Interested Adult” should be present • Dino (1978) – 3 prerequisites to waiver for purposes of interrogation • Juvenile spoke to an atty • Atty was interested in juvenile’s welfare • Atty or adult gave full advice to the juvenile • LA overturned Dino standards in Fernandez (1998), opting instead for a “totality” standard • See Grisso et al (2003) research – immaturity as part of ‘totality of circumstances,” but evidence seems probative for establishing a ‘bright line rule’ on either procedure or age (16 has same understanding as those over 18) • Despite LA rejection in Dino, per se protections against immaturity are becoming more common • KS (B.M.B) – PA, MA, GA, CO cases (eg, Nicholas 1999) • NJ (Presha) – WI – Jerrell • What about in waiver cases? Juvenile or adult standard for competence in waiver and interrogation evidence? • CT – State v Ledbetter (2003) – protections limited to “delinquency” proceedings, not adult prosecution

8. Recent Cases • Yarborough v Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) • Reverses Alvarado v Hickman, 316 F. 3d 841 (2002) • Facts • Alvarado (17 yrs, 7 months) and accomplice Soto attempted to steal truck then murdered driver, part of a larger group of teenagers at a mall; Alvarado helped hide gun • One month later, Sheriff Comstock left word at Alvarado’s home and then with his mother at work that she wanted to speak with him. • Parents brought Alvarado to the Sheriff’s Station, he was questioned for two hours starting at 12:30PM, and interrogation was recorded with consent. Parents’ request to be present at interrogation was denied. IS THIS CUSTODIAL? • No Miranda warnings given. Alvarado denies knowledge of he murder

9. Alvarado had no criminal record, had never been questioned. • He confessed under continued questioning to assisting in the carjacking and then hiding the gun • He refused two offers to take a break. • Two months later, he was charged with murder 1 and attempted robbery. • Alvarado moved to suppress confession, denied claiming that interrogation was non-custodial. Interview tape introduced at trial to impeach Alvarado’s testimony. Alvarado characterized interrogation as friendly and confession as uncoerced. • Alvarado was convicted of murder 1, reduced to murder 2 by judge, and he was sentenced to 15-life.

10. State Appellate Court denied appeal, citing that warning was not required in non-custodial setting for the interview, although Alvarado was not told that he could leave at any time or ask for an attorney to be present. • 9th Circuit reversed, citing Haley and Gault. Trial court and state appellate court failed to consider youthfulness and inexperience in evaluating whether a reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave. Age must be a factor, and a minor with no criminal record is more likely to feel coerced. Combination of age and inexperience made interview into a custodial interrogation.

11. SCOTUS Decision (Kennedy) • Rejected the idea of a subjective evaluation of whether Alvarado felt free to leave • Citing California v Beheler and Thompson v Keohane, the test is whether there was “a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest” – objective conditions, not subjective perceptions • Relevant inquiry is how a ‘reasonable person in the suspect’s situation’ would have understood his situation’ … not a boy of 17.7- did he feel he had the liberty to terminate his interrogation? • Rule re: specificity of test is clear re: conditions of custody. This wasn’t custody. • No pressure, threats • Police can’t administer a “maturity test” • Appeal to conscience, no manipulation • Alvarado returned home after interview, he was not taken into custody • Court rejected relevance of age, experience and maturity in a Miranda analysis (Beheler) – again, objective conditions • Breyer dissent • Age matters, context matters, ‘reasonable’ should invoke a juvenile standard, not a median adult standard

12. Recent Cases • Lacresha Murray (In re L.M., 993 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. App. 1999) • Female, 11 years, charged in 1996 with capital murder in death of 2 year old female, Jayla Belton • Youngest homicide prosecution in Texas history • No prior contact with juvenile justice system • Victim was stomped to death, sneaker imprints on victim’s body were linked to defendant • Interrogation lasted 2.5 hours, was conducted and videotaped at a group home facility where defendant was placed following her arrest; neither parents nor attorney present • Detectives read Miranda warnings from printed card, did not ask if Lacresha understood them and could repeat them back to detectives. Detectives did not affirmatively ask if she wanted to have an attorney present.

13. Detectives suggested a scenario that Lucresha confirmed (after repeated questioning), then added a hypothetical that Lucresha said was “possible” as accidental contact. • She had reading and comprehension difficulties while trying to understand the confession she was about to sign • Was LaCresha in custody? Did Miranda apply? Was confession obtained under duress? Was LaCresha competent? To comprehend Miranda warning? To resist pressures of police and suggestion? To comprehend her confession? for what else? • TX 3rd Ct of Appeals reversed the second conviction, ruling that the age of the child was relevant in determining whether the child was “in custody” and what rights therefore attached. Standard is…… “whether…a reasonable child of the same age would believe her freedom of movement was significantly restricted” • Prosecutor dropped charges at that point.

14. Wisconsin v. Jerrell C.J. (2005) • Facts: • Three young men rob a McDonald’s • AT 6:20 AM the next morning, 14-year-old Jerrell arrested at his home, taken to police station, booked and fingerprinted, and placed in an interrogation room. • Handcuffed and left alone for two hours. • When detectives enter room, Jerrell repeatedly asks to make a phone call to his mother or father, police refuse. • Given bathroom breaks and lunch. • After almost 6 hours of questioning, Jerrell signs a statement admitting his involvement in the robbery. • Jerrell moves to suppress written confession, claiming it was involuntary, unreliable, and coerced. • Appellate court denies motion, rules confession was good “under totality of circumstances,” but worries about false confessions

15. Wisconsin Supreme Court: • Jerrell’s written confession to the police was involuntary under the totality of circumstances • Police cannot ignore request to speak with parents • Court adopts a per se rule requiring the state to electronically record all juvenile interrogations. • Only two states require this: Alaska and Minnesota • However, refuses to adopt a per se rule excluding in-custody admissions from any child under the age of 16 who has not been given the opportunity to consult with a parent or interested adult • Should be given weight under totality of circumstances • Court reaffirms its warning that the failure “to call the parents for the purpose of depriving the juvenile of the opportunity to receive advice and counsel will be considered strong evidence that coercive tactics were used to elicit the incriminating statements

16. False Confessions • Susceptibility to suggestion • Susceptibility to threat from authority figures (Drizin and Leo, 82 NCLR 891 (2004) • Desire to please authority figure, leading to distorted or inaccurate information • Loss of temporal perspective • Legal decision making capacity to waive rights • How common? Per se rule as prophylactic?