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IP Sec

IP Sec. Basics. Network-level: all IP datagrams covered Mandatory for next-generation IP (v6), optional for current-generation (v4) Authentication-only or confidentiality too. Architecture & Concepts. Host or gateway implementation Tunnel vs. Transport mode Security association (SA)

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IP Sec

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  1. IP Sec CSE 5349/49

  2. Basics • Network-level: all IP datagrams covered • Mandatory for next-generation IP (v6), optional for current-generation (v4) • Authentication-only or confidentiality too CSE 5349/7349

  3. Architecture & Concepts • Host or gateway implementation • Tunnel vs. Transport mode • Security association (SA) • Security parameter index (SPI) • Security policy database (SPD) • SA database (SAD) • Encapsulating security payload (ESP) • Authentication header (AH) CSE 5349/7349

  4. IPSec Placement • Host implementation • OS integrated, modify the IP code • Bump-in-the-stack • Layer between data link and IP • Bump-in-the-wire • IPSec outside host, in a router/firewall • Least intrusive CSE 5349/7349

  5. New IP Header AH or ESP Header Orig IP Header TCP Data Tunnel vs. Transport Mode Encrypted Tunnel Gateway Gateway Encrypted Unencrypted Unencrypted A B CSE 5349/7349

  6. Transport Mode Security IP header IP options IPSec header Higher layer protocol • ESP protects higher layer payload only • AH can protect IP headers as well as higher layer payload ESP Real IP destination AH CSE 5349/7349

  7. Tunnel Mode Security Outer IP header IPSec header Inner IP header Higher layer protocol • ESP applies only to the tunneled packet • AH can be applied to portions of the outer header ESP Real IP destination Destination IPSec entity AH CSE 5349/7349

  8. Security Association - SA • One way relationship (uni-directional) • Determine IPSec processing for senders • Determine IPSec decoding for destination • SAs are not fixed! Generated and customized per traffic flows (manual as well as dynamic) • If manual, no lifetime; dynamic has lifetime CSE 5349/7349

  9. Security Parameters Index - SPI • Can be up to 32 bits large • The SPI allows the destination to select the correct SA under which the received packet will be processed (according to the agreement with the sender) • The SPI is sent with the packet by the sender • SPI + Dest IP address + IPSec Protocol (AH or ESP) uniquely identifies a SA CSE 5349/7349

  10. SA Database - SAD • Holds parameters for each SA • Lifetime of this SA • AH and ESP information • Tunnel or transport mode • Every host or gateway participating in IPSec has their own SA database CSE 5349/7349

  11. SA Bundle • More than 1 SA can apply to a packet • Example: ESP does not authenticate new IP header. How to authenticate? • Use SA to apply ESP w/out authentication to original packet • Use 2nd SA to apply AH CSE 5349/7349

  12. Security Policy Database - SPD • What traffic to protect? • Has incoming traffic been properly secured? • Policy entries define which SA or SA bundles to be used on IP traffic • Each host or gateway has their own SPD • Index into SPD by Selector fields • Dest IP, Source IP, Transport Protocol, IPSec Protocol, Source & Dest Ports, etc. CSE 5349/7349

  13. SPD Entry Actions • Discard • Do not let in or out • Bypass • Outbound: do not apply IPSec • Inbound: do not expect IPSec • Protect – will point to an SA or SA bundle • Outbound: apply security • Inbound: check that security has been applied CSE 5349/7349

  14. SPD Protect Action • If the SA does not exist • Outbound processing: use IKE to generate SA dynamically • Inbound processing: drop packet CSE 5349/7349

  15. Outbound Processing Outbound packet (on A) A B IP Packet SPD(Policy) SA Database SPI & IPSec Packet … … Send to B Is it for IPSec?If so, which policy entry to select? IPSec processing Determine the SA and its SPI CSE 5349/7349

  16. Inbound Processing A B Inbound packet (on B) SPD(Policy) From A SPI & Packet SA Database … … Use SPI to index the SAD Was packet properly secured? Original IP Packet CSE 5349/7349

  17. Authenticated Header (AH) CSE 5349/49

  18. AH Security • Connectionless integrity • Flow/error control left to transport layer • Data integrity • Authentication • Can “trust” IP address source • Use MAC to authenticate • Anti-replay feature • Integrity check value CSE 5349/7349

  19. Integrity Check Value - ICV • Message authentication code (MAC) calculated over • IP header field that do not change or are predictable • IPSec protocol header minus where the ICV value goes • Upper-level data • Code may be truncated to first 96 bits CSE 5349/7349

  20. AH Header Format Payload Length Next Header (TCP/UDP) Reserved SPI Sequence Number ICV CSE 5349/7349

  21. AH Modes • Tunnel • Transport • Nested headers • Multiple SAs applied to same message • Nested tunnels CSE 5349/7349

  22. Processing Outbound Messages • Insert Next Header and SPI field • Compute the sequence no. field • If processing < 232 message • Increment • Place new value in AH and SAD • Else, • Change keys at wrap around if replay protection is enabled • Else set to 1 CSE 5349/7349

  23. Outbound Processing (cont’d) • If transport mode, change preceding IP header’s Next Header field to AH • If tunnel mode, add the tunnel header • Recompute header length, header checksum etc. • Compute authentication value CSE 5349/7349

  24. Outbound Processing (cont’d)ICV • Calculated on entire IP packet including AH header • Zero out all mutable fields including authentication data field • Get the key from SA • HMAC-MD5-96 or HMAC-SHA-96 • Insert the cryptographic hash code in the AH header CSE 5349/7349

  25. Outbound Processing (cont’d)Fragment the Message • IPSec processing may result in large message which will be fragmented • Transport mode • Source address initiator of the message • Total message authentication before fragmentation • Tunnel mode • Message may have been fragmented already • Authenticate the fragment and further fragment CSE 5349/7349

  26. Input Processing • Identify the inbound SA • If not found, drop the packet • Replay protection check • Drops duplicates within the window • Drops late arrivals outside window • Advances with the receipt of authenticated message CSE 5349/7349

  27. Inbound Processing (cont’d) • Verify authentication data • Authentication hash computed and checked • If no match, discard • Strip off the AH header and continue IPSec processing for any remaining IPSec headers • Either an upper layer protocol header or a tunnel header is encountered CSE 5349/7349

  28. Replay Protection • Sequence number checking • Anti-replay is used only if authentication is selected • Sequence number should be the first check on a packet upon looking up an SA • Duplicates are rejected! Check bitmap, verify if new verify reject Sliding Window size >= 32 0 CSE 5349/7349

  29. Anti-replay Feature • Sequence number counter - 32 bit for outgoing IPSec packets • Anti-replay window • 32-bit (or more) • Bit-map for detecting replayed packets • Window should not be advanced until the packet has been authenticated • Without authentication, malicious packets with large sequence numbers can advance window unnecessarily • Valid packets may get dropped CSE 5349/7349

  30. Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP) CSE 5349/49

  31. Encapsulated Security Protocol (ESP) • Confidentiality for upper layer protocol • Traffic flow confidentiality • Data origin authentication and connectionless integrity (optional) CSE 5349/7349

  32. ESP Packet Tunnel Mode CSE 5349/7349

  33. Outbound Packet Processing • Form ESP payload • Pad as necessary • Encrypt result [payload, padding, pad length, next header] • Apply authentication • Allow rapid detection of replayed/bogus packets • Allow potential parallel processing - decryption & verifying authentication code CSE 5349/7349

  34. Outbound Packet Processing (cont’d) • Sequence number generation • ICV calculation • ICV includes whole ESP packet minus authentication data field • Implicit padding of ‘0’s between next header and authentication data is used to satisfy block size requirement for ICV algorithm CSE 5349/7349

  35. ESP Transport Example Original IP Header SPI Sequence Number Authentication coverage Payload (TCP Header and Data) Variable Length Encrypted Padding (0-255 bytes) Pad Length Next Header Integrity Check Value CSE 5349/7349

  36. Inbound Packet Processing • Packet decryption • Decrypt [ESP payload,padding,pad length,next header] per SA specification • Processing (stripping) padding per encryption algorithm • Reconstruct the original IP datagram • Authentication verification (optional) CSE 5349/7349

  37. Internet Key Exchange (IKE) CSE 5349/49

  38. Key Management • AH and ESP require encryption and authentication keys • Process to negotiate and establish IPSec SA’s between two entities CSE 5349/7349

  39. Manual Key Management • Mandatory • Useful when IPSec developers are debugging • Keys exchanged offline (phone, email, etc.) • Set up SPI and negotiate parameters • Not scalable CSE 5349/7349

  40. IKE • Use the frame work of ISAKMP • Internet Security Assignment and Key Management Protocol • Developed by NSA • Implements parts of two key management protocols • Oakley and SKEME CSE 5349/7349

  41. IKE - Phases • Used when an outbound packet does not have an SA • Tow phases: • Phase I: Establish an IKE SA (main mode, aggressive mode) • Used to define encryption & authentication of IKE traffic • Multiple IPSec SAs can be established with one IKE SA • Bidirectional • Phase II: Use IKE SA to negotiate IPSec Sas (quick mode) CSE 5349/7349

  42. Phase I – Create IKE SA • Negotiate protection suite • Use Diffie-Hellman to establish shared secret • 3 groups of DH defined • Authenticate the shared secret , IKE SA • Preshared keys (secret) • Digital signatures • Public-keys CSE 5349/7349

  43. IKE Modes • Phase I • Main Mode – flexible, 6 messages • Checks cookies before DH work • Aggressive mode – faster, 3 messages • Open to DoS, doesn’t check cookie before DH work • Used mostly for remote access • Phase II – Quick mode CSE 5349/7349

  44. Oakley Key Exchange • Designed to • Leverage advantages of DH • Fresh keys • Secret never on the transit • Counter DH weaknesses • No information on the Ids of the parties • Man-in-the-middle attack • Computationally intensive CSE 5349/7349

  45. Oakley - Major Features • Cookies to thwart DoS • Nonce to prevent replay • DH for key exchange • Authenticated key exchange • Specification of global parameters for DH CSE 5349/7349

  46. Cookies • Requirements • Depend on specific parties • Only the issuing entity can generate acceptable cookies – implies issuer using local secret • Cookie generation and verification must be fast • Suggested - Hash over IP Src/Dest; UDP Src/Dest; local secret CSE 5349/7349

  47. Initiator Responder SA, CKY-I I R SA, CKY-R NonceI, YI NonceR, YR IDI, HashI IDR, HashR Example: Main Mode Preshared Negotiate IKE SA parameters Exchange items to generate secret Generate SKEYID Send hash digest so peer can authenticate sender CSE 5349/7349

  48. Main Mode Preshared • PRF, Pseudo-Random Function • SKEYID root secret =PRF(preshared-key,Ni|Nr) • SKEYID_d for IPSec SA =PRF(SKEYID,K|CKY-I|CKY-R|0) K is the secret generated by DH • SKEYID_a for IKE message data auth & integrity = PRF(SKEYID,SKEYID_d|K|CKY-I|CKY-R|1) • SKEYID_e use to encrypt IKE messages = PRF(SKEYID,SKEYID_a|K|CKY-I|CKY-R|2) CSE 5349/7349

  49. Main Mode Preshared Hashes • To authenticate each other, each entity generates a hash digest that only the peer could know Hash-I=PRF(SKEYID,YI|YR|CKY-I|CKY-R|SA Offer|ID-I) Hash-R =PRF(SKEYID,YR|YI|CKY-R|CKY-I|SA Offer|ID-R) CSE 5349/7349

  50. Phase II • What traffic does SA cover ? • Initiator specifies which entries (selectors) in SPD are for this IPSec SA, sends off to responder • Keys and SA attributes communicated with the Phase I - IKE SA • Passes encrypted & authenticated CSE 5349/7349

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