Lecture 4 & 5 The Ontological Foundations of EAP

1. Lecture 4 & 5The Ontological Foundations of EAP PEDU 7206

2. The Critical Realist declarations: “Since Descartes (1596-1650), it has been customary first to ask how we can know, and only afterwards what it is that we can know. But this Cartesian ordering has been a contributory factor to prevalence of epistemic fallacy: it is easy to let the question how we can know determine our conception of what there is. And if in a certain respect the epistemic question does seem prior, in another it is secondary to the ontological one.” (Collier, 1993, P. 137) Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

3. The Critical Realist declarations: “I shall concentrate first on the ontological question of the properties that societies possess, before shift to the epistemological question of these properties make them possible objects of knowledge for use. This is not an arbitrary order of development. It reflects the condition that …it is the nature of objects that determines their cognitive possibilities for us.” (Bhaskar, 1989) Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

4. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: Antagonism in ontological perspectives: Centuries of controversies among social researchers over epistemological and methodological perspectives have created two deeply divided definitions of the reality of the social world, namely objectivism and constructivism Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

5. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. Objectivism: Under the domination of the logical-positivism and analytical-empirical science, the prevailing social ontology, which has been characterized as objectivism, stipulates the social world as an objectively fixed and given reality as reality of the natural world. In this ontological perspective, social reality is stipulated as analytical and empirical in form, that is, the social world is conceived as a composition of particles or elements, the structures and operations of which are observable by human senses. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

6. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. Objectivism: …. Moreover, the social reality has also been stipulated as nomological and causal in structure, i.e. the constitutive particles of social reality are presumed to be structured in causal laws. The law-like structures of the social world can further be defined in terms of their degree of universality and permanence. Accordingly, the “strong” stance within the objectivism would argue that the law-like structures of social realities are universal across locations and permanent over time. Such an ontological stance could be characterized as “objective absolutism”. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

7. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. Objectivism: …. On the other hand, the “weak” stance of objectivism would assume that the laws governing the social world are only probabilistic laws and their universality and permanence are limited in particular social and historical contexts. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

8. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. Constructivism: In opposite to objectivism and more specifically in response to the domination and even assault from the empirical positivists, the social scientists in the historical-hermeneutic tradition have turned to interpretivism and constructivism for havens. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

9. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. Constructivism: …. By interpretivism, it refers to the research approach which emphasizes on the meaning-laden and value-laden nature of the social world. Accordingly, this group of social scientists focuses on the interpretive (i.e. meaning attributing) features embedded in social reality and stresses the uniqueness of each interpretive communities involved as well as the meanings they imputed to the social reality concerned. Moreover, some of these interpretativists would even advocate that the social reality is “a matter of interpretation” and its features and structures are “open to interpretation” as well. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

10. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. Constructivism: …. By constructivism, it refers to the research orientation which underlines the essential roles of human ideas, believes, and efforts in the constitution of the social world and more specifically its social institutions. Accordingly, it is assumed that realities of the social world are subject to construction by different interpretive communities according to their own ideas, believes or even vested interests. As a result, social realities are conceived to be relative in nature, i.e. relative to the subjectivities and intersubjectivities of the interpretive communities that have power over the respective social realities in point. Such a research approach can be characterized as “constructive relativism”. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

11. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. The “paradigm war” between these two perspectives in social ontology, especially the “dog fights” between extremists of “objective absolutism” and those of “constructive relativism” have left the field of social ontology in complete disarrays if not chaos for decades. On the one hand, there are advocates holding the ontological perspective of “structural determinism”, which insists on the definitude of causal laws at work in social structures. And accordingly human relationship and activities found in these social structures are conceived to be deterministic in nature. … Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

12. Objectivism vs. Constructivism: …. …….On the other hand, there are proponents promoting the ontological perspective of “constructive voluntarism”, which emphasizes the intersubjectivity and forgeability at work in social reality. Caught between the crossfire of these two camps, most of the students in social research are helpless at lost in these ontological, epistemological and methodological labyrinth. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

13. The Critical-Realist Movement Since the second half of the 1970s, Roy Bhaskar, a British philosopher, has produced a series of work on philosophy of science and social sciences (1975, 1979, 1986, 1989). His work has motivated a line of academic work in varieties of disciplines. As a result, they have together triggered an intellectual movement now known as Critical Realism. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

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15. The Critical-Realist Movement In the past three decades Critical Realism has gained significant recognition and development in social-science researches; for examples economics (Lawson, 1997), social psychology (Greenwood, 1994), sociology (Archer, 1995; Danermark et al., 2002), geography (Sayer, 2000), management and organizational studies (Ackroyd and Fleetwood, 2000), social research methods (Sayer, 1992), policy studies (Henry, et al. 1998; Pawson, 2006, 2013; Mark et al., 2000), … Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

18. The Critical-Realist Movement and education (in particular sociology of education) (Maton, 2014; Maton & Moore, 2010; Muller, 2000; Moore, 2007, 2009; Scott, 2010; Shipway, 2012; Wheelahan, 2010; Young, 2008a, 2008b). Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

20. What is critical realism? Realism as doctrine in philosophy or more specifically in the philosophy of science “belief that there is a world existing independently of our knowledge of it.” (Sayer, 2000, P. 2). It assumes that the objects of study in science “is ontologically independent of human mind.” (Niiniluoto, 1990, P. 10) Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

21. What is critical realism?.... Critical realism as a theoretical branch within realism makes several specific theoretical claims: (Collier, 1994, P.6-7) Objectivity: It refers to the ontological stance that “what is known would be real whether or not it were known. Something may be real without appearing at all.” (P. 6) Fallibility: It refers to the epistemological stance that knowledge claims made by critical realists are “not about some supposedly infallible or corrigible data of appearance.” Instead, they “are always open to refutation by further information.” (P. 6) Therefore, social researchers must always be vigilant and critical to their research results and knowledge claims. Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

22. What is critical realism?.... Critical realism as a theoretical branch within realism makes several specific theoretical claims: … Transphenomenality (going beyond appearance): It indicates that “knowledge may be not only of what appears, but of underlying structures, which endure longer than those appearances, and generate them or make them possible.” (P. 6) Counter-phenomenallity: It refers to the epistemological stance which claims that “knowledge of the deep structure of something may not just go beyond, and not just explain, but also contradict appears. …It is precisely the capacity of science for counter-phenomenality which made it necessary: without the contradiction between appearance and reality, science would be redundant, and we could go by appearance.” (P.7) Bring the Ontological Foundation Back into the Research of EAP

23. Roy Basher starts his buildup of critical realism first with the analysis of the work and enterprise of natural sciences. One of his initial points of departure is to criticize the validity of empirical realism, which was the dominant approach in scientific research. Instead Bhaskar proposes to replace empirical realism with what he called transcendental realism. It means that the reality of the natural world is not confine its appearances or to what we could have experienced. He claims that there are deeper layers of mechanism and system at work than the mere appearances that we could sensorily experience. (Collier, 1994, Pp. 25-29) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

24. Concept of Depth Realism: The first conception of Bhaskar’s Critical Realism is his distinction of reality into three domains: Empirical domain: It refers to the aspect of reality which we have experienced with our senses. Actual domain: It refers to events which have occurred without our noticing, while we can infer from their effects. Real domain: It refers to the properties within entities, which are able to triggers events to take place or to constraint them from occurring. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

25. Bhaskar’s Depth Realism: Three Domains of Reality

26. Features of the domain of the Real: Bhaskar has further differentiated the features of the reality into levels: Power and liability: Powers or emergent power, in Bhaskar’s term, refers to the potentials which are able trigger events to take place; while liability are properties which can prevent or constraint events from happening. Mechanism: It refers to a set of powers working inter-connectively to set off the occurrence an event or a chain of events. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

27. Features of the domain of the Real: …… Structure of the system: It refers to the interconnections among operative mechanisms, which constitute the underlying structure against which events are taking places. Open/closed system: It refers the openness or closure (i.e. boundary) of a given system. According to Critical Realist conception, “no system in our universe is ever perfectly closed.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) And accordingly both our natural and social world are by definition open systems. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

28. Stratification of causation: Taking together these conceptions of the natural world stipulated by the Critical Realists, theories and models of causal explanations formulated by scientists can be categorized into several strata Cause-effect explanation Explanatory mechanism Explanatory structure Structure of closed system: Nomological/law-like explanations Structure of open system: Theories of tendency or emergency Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

29. The work of science: Given all these specifications of the operations of the natural world, Critical Realists contend that the work of natural science is in no way close to the conceptions of experimental work stipulated by empiricism (based solely on sensory observation) and positivism (aimed solely at verifying nomological explanations). Instead, Critical Realists specify the features of the work of experimental science as follows: Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

30. The work of science: Science as work: Science in essence “is work, not contemplation, not observation, not taking up of some kind of scientific attitude.” “It is an active intervention into nature, made by people with acquired scientific skills, usually using special equipment.” (Collier, 1993, P. 50) And “the ‘product’ is not the new arrangement of matter brought about by the experiment. …It is the deepened knowledge of some mechanism of nature.” (P.52) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

31. The work of science: Dr = Da = De coincide: Deepening of knowledge of nature means to penetrate the empirical world and the actual events and to obtain the mechanism and structure underlying all human experiences. It is through scientific experiment, “we can set up a situation in which three domains (Dr, Da, De) coincide — in which a mechanism is actualized, i.e. isolated from its usual codeterminants, so that it can operate as a closed system, and to manifested as an event exemplifying the law to which it corresponds.” (Collier, 1994, P. 45) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

32. The work of science: Experiment as closure: “What the experiment does …is to isolate one mechanism of nature from the effect of others, to see what that mechanism does on its own.” (Collier, 1994, P. 33) It is “an attempt to trigger or unleash a single kind of mechanism or process in relative isolation, free from the interfering flux of the open world, so as to observe its details workings or record its characteristic mode of effect and/or to test some hypothesis about them.” (Bhashar, 1986, P. 35; quoted in Collier, 1994, P. 33) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

33. The work of science: Theory-led endeavor: “The classical sequence of experimental science is…: first we construct a theory, then we design an experiment to test it, then we receive nature’s answer to our question.” (Collier, 1994, P. 40) This indicates that experimental practice cannot replace theoretical thinking in the work of science. Power of abstraction and theoretical synthesizing is not only the initial point of departure for formulation of problems but also the guiding signposts throughout the path of scientific enquiry. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

34. The hierarchy of science: In view of the distinct domains, levels and strata specified by Critical Realists so far, the enterprise of science itself can then be further differentiated into “distinct sciences — physics, chemistry, biology, economics etc. — which are mutually irreducible, but which are ordered. Physics is in this sense more basic than chemistry, which is more basic than biology, which is more basic than the human sciences.” (Collier, 1994, P. 107) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

35. The hierarchy of science: …. For example, Benton and Craib proposed a hierarchy of sciences as follows. (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 127) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

36. The hierarchy of science: …. Andrew Collier posposes another hierarchy, which he calls “tree of science” (Collier, 1994, P. 132) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

37. The hierarchy of science: …. “This way of ordering the sciences could be justified in terms of the mechanisms characteristic of each level are explicable in terms of those of the nest one below it. This corresponds to a view of science as explaining wholes in terms of the parts of which they are composed.” (Benton and Craib, 2011, Pp. 126-127) However, it must be underlined that the causal flows can be construed in both directions, that is, “causality can flow down the hierarchy as well as up it.” (P. 128) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

38. Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science: Intransitive dimension of science: According to the basic tenet of Critical Realism, the natural world exists independently of human minds and knowledge. Hence, this object of science studies — the natural world and with all its substances, mechanisms and structures — constitute the intransitive dimension of the work of science. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

39. Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science: … Transitive dimension of science: Scientists, with their concepts and theories, their skills and practices, as well as their communities, associations and rival schools of thought, they constitute the transitive dimension of science. What scientists do is to strive to deepen the existing scientific knowledge of the nature world. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

40. Intransitive and transitive dimensions of science: … Accordingly, “the ‘results’ of scientific inquiry at any time are a set of theories about the nature of the world, which are presumably our best approximation to truth about the world….However much science deepens its knowledge of its intransitive object, its product remains a transitive object.” (Collier, 1994, P. 51) Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

41. Intransitive & transitive dimensions of science:… In light of these distinctions between intransitive and transitive dimensions in science, we can see that Critical Realists take on different stances for their ontological and epistemological foundations. Ontologically, Critical Realists assume its objects of their enquiry are intransitive and real and the products of their enquiry could be truth. However, epistemological, Critical Realists admit that their scientific work and practice at any given in time are only relative to the material, social as well as theoretical configuration of the scientific enterprise, in which they find themselves. Conceptual constituents of Transcendental Realism of Natural Sciences

42. The debate between the natural and the social sciences has been raging on since the nineteenth century around the issue of the unity of scientific method. Recently Roy Bhaskar reformulates the issue at the beginning of his book The Possibility of Naturalism as follows. “To what extent can society be studied in the way as nature?” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 1) Two conventional answers to this issue are Distinction between the Natural & the Social Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

43. Two conventional answers to this issue are … Naturalism: The positive answer to the issue can be summarized under the doctrine, which Bhaskar called naturalism. By naturalism, it refers to the doctrine which asserts that there “is (or can be) an essential unity of method between the natural and the social sciences.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) With this naturalist camp, subdivisions can further be differentiated Distinction between the Natural & the Social Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

44. Two conventional answers to this issue are … Naturalism:…subdivisions can further be differentiated Reductionism, which claims that “there is an actual identity of subject matter” between the two sciences.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) Scientism, which “denies that there are any significant differences in the methods appropriate to studying social and natural subject.” (Bhaskar, 1998, P. 2) That appropriate method is of course the scientific method. Positivism, which claims that the products of studies in both the natural and social sciences are the same, that is, to verify causal laws, which can account for the events under study to the full. (Bhaskar, 1998; Collier, 1994, P. 102-102) Distinction between the Natural & the Social Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

45. Two conventional answers to this issue are … Hermeneutics and interpretive theory: In opposite to the naturalists positive answer to the issue, social scientists in hermeneutic and interpretive tradition insist that it is impossible to study society in the way as nature! They have argued for centuries that human and social sciences are essentially distinct from natural sciences in terms of their methodology and epistemology, but most importantly in their ontological foundation. (These arguments have been explicate on Topic 2 and 3 in this course) Distinction between the Natural & the Social Sciences: Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

46. Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the possibility of naturalism of social science: Critical Realists have distanced themselves from the epistemological arguments between positivism and hermeneutics and the methodological arguments between quantitative and qualitative research practitioners; they have chosen a different approach to the issue, by looking into the ontological differences between the natural world and the social reality. They have synthesized a series of concepts, which attempt to build a conceptual framework of social ontology of critical realism. Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

47. Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the possibility of naturalism of social science: … Human agents and their agency: Critical Realists assert that one of the major differences between nature and society is that society is made up of human agents, who would not act or behave mechanically to antecedent causes or stimulus. Human beings are “meaning making animals”, who forge ideas, hold believes, adhere identities, plan intentional actions, and carry out projects and agencies. …… Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

48. Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the possibility of naturalism of social science: … Human agents and their agency: …… As a result, in accounting for social events, social scientists could not simply look for antecedent causes, in the form of necessary and/or sufficient conditions. They must dig deep into social reality and look for “reasons”. In fact, Critical Realists have argued at length that reasons, which include beliefs, desires, ideas, intentions, should belong to the causal orders in accounting for social events. (Bhaskar, 1998, Pp.80-119; Collier, 1994, Pp. 151-156) Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

49. Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the possibility of naturalism of social science: … Activity-dependent structure andTransformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA): One of the fundamental differences between structures of society and nature is that “social structures are maintained in existence only through the activities of agents (activity-dependence), whereas this is not true of structures of nature.” (Benton & Craib, 2011, P. 135) ….. Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism

50. Critical Realists’ stance on the issue of the possibility of naturalism of social science: … Activity-dependent structure and Transformational Model of Social Activity (TMSA): ….. More specifically, the continuity and consistency of a given social structure depends mainly on the willingness and capacity of its members to participate and carry out the obligations and duties prescribed to their specific positions within the structure. Therefore, the endurance of a social structure rely on the efficacies of its institutions of production, socialization, social control and reproduction. Conceptual Constituents of Critical Naturalism