POSC 2200 – The Individual

1. POSC 2200 – The Individual Russell Alan Williams Department of Political Science

2. Unit Four: The Individual (Feb 9 & 11) Required Reading: • Mingst, Chapter 5 • Jervis, Hypotheses on Misperception, Mingst and Snyder, pp. 189-199, Outline: • Introduction • The Role of Elites • Individuals in Decision-making • The Role of the Public

3. 1) Introduction: Role of individual open to debate . . . (?) • Some see individuals as largely unimportant in international relations – including leaders • Neorealists – National interest and international structure • Radicals – International capitalist system

4. Some see large role for individuals • Liberals – as policymaking elites . . . • Lots of latitude of decision-makers to implement policies that pursue their interests • Constructivists – as holders of values • Major change in IR can be associated with new leaders bringing new values to forefront • E.g. Gorbachev and Soviet security concerns

5. In practical terms . . . • Hard not to see a role for individuals in IR – particularly “heads of state” • However: • Complicates analyses – hard to predict foreign policy – becomes more like History • At a general level, possible to overstate importance of individuals • E.g. Continuity in foreign policy regardless of who is in office • Canada’s foreign policy may have more to do with international structure then individuals . . .

6. How can we clarify, or hypothesize, the role of individuals? Several strategies: • Clarify the conditions under which individuals are more important • Examine individual and group psychological effects that may allow us to predict responses to events • Examine role in foreign policy decision making and diplomacy

7. 2) The Role of Elites: a) Under what conditions are the actions and values of individual leaders more important? 1) When political institutions are unstable • Gives decisive leaders opportunity to pursue own goals • Institutions new – Post colonial states and new democracies • E.g. Golda Miair • E.g. Vladimir Putin • Institutions in crisis or failing – • E.g. Weimar Germany and Adolph Hitler

8. 2) When institutional constraints are limited • E.g. Totalitarian states – limited channels to put pressure on leaders • E.g. China and Nixon 3) When the situation does not result in a clearly defined national interest • Issue is peripheral or unimportant • Issue is ambiguous – lack of information for a rational assessment of the national interest • E.g. Surprise situations

9. Does this describe most situations in IR? • If so, doesn’t this mean IR is driven by individual level???? • Or, does this just mean individuals effect things that don’t matter

10. b) What is the role of leader’s personalities? • Can they help us understand states’ behavior? • Research underdeveloped – leaders won’t submit to detailed observation and psychological analyses!!!! • However, Herman (1980) suggested a typology that some think can guide analyses • Argued: Two main types of leader personality that may effect foreign policy • The “Independent Leader” • The “Participatory Leader”

11. The “Independent Leader” • Policy Orientations: • High nationalism • High belief in control • High need for power • High distrust of others • Low understanding – conceptual clarity

12. The “Independent Leader” • Policy Orientations: • High nationalism • High belief in control • High need for power • High distrust for others • Low understanding –conceptual clarity Bush Chavez Stalin

13. The “Participatory Leader” • Policy Orientations: • Low nationalism • Low belief in control • Low in distrust of others • High need for friendly affiliations • High understanding – conceptual complexity

14. The “Participatory Leader” • Policy Orientations: • Low nationalism • Low belief in control • Low in distrust of others • High need for friendly affiliations • High understanding – conceptual complexity Trudeau Clinton ?

15. Risk of “circularity”(?) • Problem: We don’t know their real personalities, only what they show in public roles • International structures and events make leaders exhibit “personality traits” • E.g. Clinton and Bush not so different . . .

16. 2) Individuals in Decision Making: • Individual decision making never totally rational • IR presents observer with information overload • People use psychological shortcuts to “make sense” of what they observe • May influence foreign policy . . . .

17. Psychological processing concepts or “shortcuts”: 1) “Belief System”: Organized, integrated perceptions of individuals in society about how the world “is” • Influence leaders’ decisions • Constructivism – comes from history and norms • E.g. Cold War – seeing Soviet Union as a threat because of image of communism

18. 2) “Cognitive Consistency”: • Tendency to see images in a way that is consistent with belief systems or previous interpretation of facts • E.g. US and the Falkland War . . . .

19. 3) “Evoked Set”: Tendency to look for details in current situation that are similar to those previously observed • E.g. US and Chinese Relations • Realist view? • Liberal view? • Both based on selecting details that confirm past lessons . . .

20. 4) “Mirror Images”: Tendency to see other individuals and groups as having opposite characteristics from oneself • E.g. “Orientalism” • Jervis – “Hypotheses on Misperception” • Also a tendency to see behavior of others as centralized and coordinated =A kind of paranoia?

21. 5) “Groupthink”: Tendency of small groups to form a consensus and resist criticism of consensus • Disregard contradictory facts • Ostracize members who do not share view • E.g. US intelligence and Iraqi WMD’s

22. 6) “Satisificing”: Tendency to accept minimally acceptable solution rather then best possible outcome • In order to support consensus (“bureaucratic politics”) • Or, because people are lazy

23. Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” • Classic piece on the “irrationality” of rational foreign policy • Argues: • Decision makers fit new information into existing beliefs • More likely when: • Facts ambiguous – situation complex • People think existing theory well proven Result: Decision makers more likely to ignore new “discordant” information then to change their existing theories

24. Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” • Example: “Domino Theory” • Theory that communist revolutions spread like a chain reaction • I.e. Success in North Vietnam meant it would spread to rest of S. E. Asia • Required “containment” • Support for anticommunist allies • Result: US intervention in Vietnam

25. Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” • Example: “Domino Theory” • US supports corrupt, unpopular, anti-democratic regimes • Supplant French colonial role in S. E. Asia • US suffers 60,000 casualties, ends war effort in defeat • No Domino effect . . . . • Theory was well established and situation complex

26. Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” Solutions? See Jervis’s Safeguards – good advice! 1) Beaware that observations are not unbiased 2) Beskeptical of supporting ideas that are not logically linked to one another • E.g. Iraq: WMD and Democracy WWII: Stalin and “Barbarossa”

27. Jervis: “Hypothesis and Misperception” 3) Be sure concepts are clearly spelled out – makes it possible to know when your ideas are wrong or failing • E.g. “Victory Conditions” 4) Be sure to consider critical interpretations of new facts – don’t be surrounded by like-minded ideologues

28. 4) Role of the Public: • Traditionally little role for the public in foreign policy • Perhaps . . . More impact in practice then in theory 1) Private individuals: • Some people have “resources” necessary to have influence • Financial – Bill Gates • Expertise – George Sorros • Play a role in conflict resolution • E.g. Carter Foundation • “Track-two Diplomacy” • Play a role in changing perceptions of foreign policy • E.g. “Hanoi” Jane Fonda and Sean Penn

29. 2) The “Mass Public” – impact on Foreign Policy? a) Psychological factors? • “Filtering” and interpretation problems (“shortcuts”) may be similar to policymaking elites • E.g. “Groupthink” and “Mirror Images” • May be specific mass psychology effects in IR: • “Territorial Imperative”: Humans’ innate desire to control territory • “Frustration-Aggression Syndrome”: Societies whose desires are thwarted likely to become aggressive • Hard to predict much based on these – people do not always respond in the same fashion

30. b) Public Opinion? • Public orientations may have large impact on limiting range of policy options open to elites • Media coverage and opinion polling can be a big factor in what leaders may think is viable • E.g. Walter Cronkite and the Vietnam War • However, public opinion never unified – creates opportunities to move opinion in “necessary” direction • Result – New techniques: • Priming and propaganda • E.g. The Kuwaiti victims . . . • “Public Diplomacy”: Diplomatic techniques designed to improve image of a state in other societies • E.g. Gorbechev’s “New York walkabout”

31. 5) For Next Time . . . MID TERM EXAM (October 26 - In class) Format: Multiple choice & short answer definition questions • Definitions do not need to be exact – just show you know what they mean . . . • Lectures & Mingst textbook – as well as items from the reader • Up to, and including Chapter 6 – “The Individual” • Be sure to complete all of the reading!

32. MID TERM EXAM (October 26 - In class) • Do not look at other peoples’ exams! • Do not write in pencil • Guess . . . if you have no other answer. . .