Michel Chevallier Geneva State Chancellery

1. Citizen engagement and compliance with the legal, technicaland operational measuresin iVoting Michel Chevallier Geneva State Chancellery

2. Setting the stage • Turnout is low in many modern democracies • Does easy voting mean more voting? • Postal vote (introduced 1995) increased turnout by 20 percentage points • After 5 years of postal voting, 95% of votes come in by post • Yet, 40%-45% of citizens still do not vote • Can we reach for them through a new delivery channel? To see it for ourselves, we began iVoting in 2003 • We run 3 channels: postal vote, iVote and polling station

3. Our perimeter of compliance • As we are handling protected data – the voters' register, the votes – we must comply with strict rules • iVoting must be at least as secure as postal voting:this is the benchmark set by the federal authorities • It has legal translations in the federal constitution, in the federal law on political right and its ordinance and in the Geneva cantonal constitution and legislation • These texts define our perimeter of compliance

4. What are the rules? • The law states technically neutralyet very specific security rules to be implemented: • One citizen, one vote • Impossibility to capture or alter a substantial amount of votes • All ballots must be counted for the final result • No third party must see a vote(protection of the vote secrecy) • Ballots must be encrypted in the voter's PC, for the transmission procedure(anonymity of the votes) • IT application linked to vote process must be split from all other IT apps. • During ballot opening time, interventions on the IT system must be performed jointly by at least two persons and recorded in a log book • Before every ballot, authorities must check the hardware, software,organisation and procedures according to the current best practices • An independent 3rd party endorsed by the Confederation must confirm that all safety measures are met and that the system works properly (protection of the citizens' choice)

5. Defining the right perspective • Like notes on a score, laws must be interpreted • In most people's view, the security of electronic voting is associated with voter ID protection and vote secrecy • It boils down to a user-centric approach: "I wantto be protected from my neighbour sniffing on me" • The correct approach is a society-wide one • The society requires trust and certainty, i.e. accurate ballot results that reflect correctly the voters' intent • Protecting the community against iVoting misusemeans therefore protecting the data integrity

6. Tales of two worlds • Two worlds unite in iVoting, the real one and the virtual one • We have to manage both harmoniously

7. The real world

8. Physical identity • It is tempting to use a tokenbased on the X509 normto identify the voter • This would raise more problemsthan it would bring solutions • The identity control would be delegated to the browser • We would not be able to know who is behind the keyboard • Therefore, we combine something that the voter owns(the Pin code reproduced on his voting card)with something he knows(his birth date and municipality of origin) • The voting card is a numerical ID with time-limited validity

9. The voting card Paper-based ballot iVoting

10. The virtual world

11. Three contexts – three features • There are three contexts or environmentsthat we must take into account in the virtual world • The voter's PC • The internet • The State's IT system(electoral register and vote processing application) • We only control one of these: the State's IT system • Our challenge is to ensuredata protection inuncontrolled environments

12. Change of paradigm • In our approach to security, we have changed paradigm • In the past, we operationalized the legal rules one by one • This imposed trade-offs between usability and security • This illustrates our old approach • We have now adopteda systemic approach • We view the system as a platformto be secured – including the weband the voters' device • The voting application is "plugged" into this platform • Security is our main business, voting is a side-offer

13. A word about the procedures • Auditing by the Confederation • Systematic splitting of crucial data: • Anonymisation of the voters' register – you are but a number in our files • Anonymisation of the vote by splitting the vote from the voter's authentication parameters • Permanent electoral commission, created when online voting was introduced in the law as additional watchdog • ISO 27001 certification process achieved – for budgetary reasons, we will not seek the actual certification • ISO 27001 means that all procedures are documented and their implementation can be checked by the electoral commission

14. The secure channel • The SSL protocol is vulnerable on two accounts: • Because it is activated by the browser, it can be easily compromised • It can be broken by brute force attack • The secure channel (a java applet) fulfils a triple function: • It provides an second encryption layer on top of the SSL, without having any link to the browser • It checks whether the messages we receive from the voters are coherent with a normal voting procedure • By doing this, it keeps the malware that might have infected your PC away from our IT system • The secure channel encryption key is made oftrue random numbers generated by a quantum generator

15. SSL without secure channel SSL only Wahlgang | Scrutin| Scrutinio| Scrutini| Poll Wahlgang | Scrutin| Scrutinio| Scrutini| Poll   Ja | Oui| Si| Gea| Yes Ja | Oui| Si| Gea| Yes Nein | Non| No| Na| No Nein | Non| No| Na| No Hacker

16. SSL with secure channel Wahlgang | Scrutin| Scrutinio| Scrutini| Poll DEMK3A2#3KKJLJNJ{@3*BSÉ1=DEMK3A2#3KKJLJNJ{@3*BSÉ1= What you see is unreadable ????? Hacker

17. Guaranteed ballot box integrity • The coherence control performed by the applet guarantees the integrity of the ballot box's content • We know for sure that it is possible to read the ballots • We know for sure it does not contain any incoherent result • A second control is provided by the test ballot box • The electoral commission owns the ballot box's encryption keys in application of the principle of segregation of duties • Its members vote in a imaginary constituency and also record their votes on paper • Comparing this constituency's electronic ballots with the paper notes provides a confirmation that the system does not introduce a bias

18. A large controlled perimeter • The strength of the polling station resides in the controlby the State of the voting and ballot counting premises • Postal voting weakens this control • The secure channel contributes re-establishingState control over the full voting perimeter • The hardening of all IT levels (vote application, OS, hardware and network) also contributes recreating conditions close to the polling station's • We are already past our government defined benchmark, postal voting

19. A large controlled perimeter: illustration Controlled perimeter with secure channel(in this case, port 80 is being used instead of port 443) consoles voters' register citizen browser internet 443 IDS/IPS IDS/IPS firewall web server application server Controlled perimeterwithout secure channel electronic ballot box quantumgenerator Cryptographic factory

20. The control code • The control code fulfils two functions: • It confirms the voter that she is connected to the State of Geneva voting web site (as we know that hardly anybody ever checks the site's certificate) • It allows us to embed the voters' choices in an image, thus adding noise to the message • This code is differentfor each citizen • It changes for each ballot • You find it on the voting card

21. The control code (followed)

22. A few other measures • No connection electronic ballot box/voters' register • Voters' register only contains voting cards numbers • eBallot box has a built-in encrypted device to record the number of cast votes • This device is off-limits for the database administrator; no vote can be subtracted without us noticing • Altering the votes is impossible: the ballot box's encryption key is owned by the electoral commission • The ballot box is shaken before being decrypted in order to alter the ballots' reading order • Helpdesk calls are screened for feedbacks

23. The iVote users

24. Two publics • There are two publics for iVoting: • The Swiss living abroad • The Swiss residents • iVoting offers the expatriates an effective wayto exercise their political rights (at last) • For them, iVoting makes a qualitative difference • Between 35% and 50% of all votes cast from abroadare electronic votes • Consider in valuating this figure that the borderis 5 km away and that "abroad" begins 5 km from here

25. Weight of thedifferent age groups among active voterswithout eVote Weight of the different age groups among active voters with eVote Residents: iVoting appeals to young voters Demographical weight of age groups 100% 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 18-29 30-39 • With eVote, the younger voters cast their ballotaccording to their demographic weight

26. No men/women digital divide Demographical weight of age groups Online voting behavior by Men Women 100% 40-49 50-59 60-69 70-79 18-29 30-39 • Until 50, vote online according to their demographic weight • Their behavior through age is similar to the (parallel lines)

27. Postal vote eVote 52% 44% 1st ballot week 2nd ballot week 3rd ballot week Two voting channels, two styles

28. The search for a driver • Why do some voters use iVote? • Do the iVote users have anything in common? • Multifactor analysis shows that socio-demographic and political preference variables have no explanatory value • I can't anticipate your voting channel based on your age, gender, income or education • I can't anticipate your voting channel based on your political opinion

29. What eVote users have in common • Subjectively • They assess positively their own IT skills • They trust online information, communication and transactions • Objectively • They use the web on a daily basis • They have a broadband access

30. A broken barrier • While 22%-25% of all voters use internet • 55.5% of usual abstainers use it • 18.7% of regular voters use it • Online voting breaksan invisible barrier that keepsmany voters away from politics • Internet voting reaches further,it touches citizens more distant from politics • Internet voting makes a paradigmatic difference,it appeals to one's subjectivity or way of life

31. The hosting process • The conception of our platform allowsa great deal of versatility • We took advantage of this to proposeother Swiss cantons to host their citizens on our system • We are currently working with three cantons, hosting their expatriates (some 25'000 citizens altogether) • To manage this project and keep these cantons in-line, we have set up a user group • The user group is an added security factor becauseit forces us to rethink and optimise our procedures

32. Hosting canton Hosted canton Voters id / authentication 2 Voting material 4 Voting cards Voters 5 Postal voting recording Ballot description Publication Electoral register of the hosted canton electronic ballot box Hosting illustrated Ballot type (date, topic, etc).1 Electoral register 3 Print file 6 E-voting Results – Turnout

33. A last word • iVoting is totally different from any other "e" project • It cannot live on without trust • How did we achieve it? By a very careful project management approach • We went on slowly, never forcing the politicians • As we would like to capitalize on our achievements, we licensed two private companies to commercialize our system outside of Switzerland

34. Thank you for your attention www.ge.ch/evoting michel.chevallier@etat.ge.ch