Agenda

1. ISS/STS Sub-CommitteeDr. Sally Ride Dr. Leroy Chiao Dr. Charlie Kennel Gen. Les LylesJuly 28, 2009

2. Agenda • Background and context – Dr. Sally Ride • Shuttle Scenarios – Dr. Sally Ride • International Considerations – Gen. Les Lyles • Space Station Scenarios – Dr. Leroy Chiao • Summary & Committee Discussion – Dr. Charlie Kennel

3. Current Program • Shuttle • 7 flights remaining • Last flight scheduled for September, 2010 • Retirement frees (some) money for Constellation • ISS • Complete in 2010 • De-orbit in early 2016 (per budget) • De-orbit frees (some) money for Constellation • Constellation • Plan: 1st launch in March, 2015 • Orion initially to ISS

4. Budget Scenario 1: Baseline Based on Human Spaceflight Budget Gap Shuttle Retirement CxP IOC ISS Retirement

5. Shuttle Carrying Costs

6. Current Program – More Realistic? (1) • Shuttle fly-out – likely to extend into FY11 • Little margin remaining • Administration direction to fly out at safe rate • But… no funding currently reflected in FY11 budget • To estimate reasonable fly-out scenario (for budget planning), compare actual post-Columbia flight rate to currently projected flight rate: • Post-Columbia, avg. between flights = 115 days • Currently projected manifest = 62 days • Assume avg. 90 days • Implies fly-out to March, 2011 (for prudent budget planning)

7. Current Program- More Realistic? (2) • Constellation schedule? • LEO Access & ISS/STS sub-groups asked Aerospace to perform independent assessment ofthe Constellation Program • Cost, schedule, technical challenges, and risk • Method: Use program level analysis capability informed by technical and risk assessments based on expert opinion, historical data and technical analysis given time constraints • Results indicate that Constellation IOC is likely to slip

8. Projected Constellation Program Funding has seen Significant Reductions since ESAS ESAS Anticipated Funding FY10 Budget Reductions ISS extension Budget Reduction Impact - FY10 President’s Budget Submittal (PBS) significantly reduces planned funding available to Cx program; More than $1.5B (FY09) per year starting in 2013 *Budget request data runs for 5 years; out-year data is OMB estimate *ESAS budget numbers were not normalized for accounting structure changes

9. Summary – Cx Program Independent Assessment • Overall Results • There is a potential 1.5 year impact to the Orion / Ares I Initial Operational Capability (IOC) milestone due to the effects of the FY10 budget reductions • Per the Aerospace technical cost-risk assessment, there is an additional potential ~2 year impact to the Orion / Ares I Initial Operational (IOC) milestone due to the technical cost and schedule risk increase of the Cx Program • There is another potential 0.5 year impact to the Orion / Ares I Initial Operational Capability (IOC) milestone due to the effects of the ISS Extension to 2020

10. Impact to the IOC Milestone Multiple Effects Exacerbate the Gap

11. Current Program – More Realistic Cost? • To see how much current program is more likely to cost, assume: • Shuttle fly-out through March, 2011 • Constellation IOC in mid-2017 (2 year delay) • ISS extends to 2020 (discussed later) • Resulting budget impacts estimated by NASA’s independent PA&E group

12. Budget Scenario 2 Based on Human Spaceflight Budget Gap Shuttle Retirement CxP IOC ISS Retirement

13. Budget Scenario Comparison

14. Difference in Baseline & More Realistic Budgets

15. The Gap • Other options besides Constellation unlikely to reduce this gap by much • Gap in US ability to launch people into space • Reliance on Soyuz for crew transportation • Significant impact to workforce, potential lost skills • Significant reduction in ability to carry cargo up to, or (especially) down from, ISS • Reliance on new, but unproven launch systems (HII-B, Falcon 9, Taurus II) • Limits utilization 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 Future HSF Programs U.S. HSF Gap Space Shuttle Ops

16. Shuttle Scenarios • The sub-group selected 3 shuttle fly-out or extension scenarios for the full committee to consider • Program implications and budget estimates were provided by the Shuttle Program • Scenarios: • Fly-out existing manifest through March, 2011 • Add one additional shuttle flight in 2012 (ISS support) • Extend shuttle at 2 flights/year through 2014 (partially close gap) (note: analyzed in conjunction with Shuttle-derived HLV)

17. Shuttle Scenario 1 Fly-out existing manifest through March, 2011 • Rationale: • Little margin remains in the shuttle schedule; experience indicates that it will take longer than currently projected to safely fly out the manifest. This scenario is more realistic, and would avoid undue pressure to complete flights within a particular budget year. • Advantages: • Prudent fly-out schedule • Allows realistic budget planning • Disadvantages: • Additional cost to current plan (but is likely closer to reality)

18. Shuttle Scenario 1 (cont’d) Fly-out existing manifest through March, 2011 • Cost: • $1.5 B (includes some carrying costs; most in FY11) • Notes: • No operational impact to Constellation program • Little change in workforce reduction

19. Shuttle Scenario 2 Add one additional shuttle flight in 2012 • Rationale: • ISS is totally dependent on 4 new vehicles for logistical, maintenance, and utilization support. 3 have never flown, 1 has only flown once. There is a risk of delays in one or more that could adversely affect ISS utilization (US National Lab and International). This scenario also offers limited ability to handle unforeseen up- or down- mass requirements. • Advantages: • Mitigate ISS reliance on unproven resupply capability • Enable some additional utilization support • Retain US human launch capability slightly longer • Disadvantages: • Additional cost (significant, for only 1 flight)

20. Cargo Capacity to/from ISS

21. Shuttle Scenario 2 (cont’d) Add one additional shuttle flight in 2012 (ISS support) • Cost: • $4.2 B over current baseline; $2.7 B over Shuttle Scenario 1. • Notes: • Shuttle program has one extra ET (not necessary to restart production) • Flights phased to best support ISS • Some (not much) relief for workforce transition • Still loss of skilled ops workforce

22. Shuttle Scenario 3 Extend shuttle at 1-2 flights/year through 2014 (partially close gap) (note: analyzed in conjunction with Shuttle-derived HLV) • Rationale: The most realistic way to significantly reduce the gap (and to robustly use ISS’ full capability) is to extend the Shuttle. When coupled with a Shuttle-Derived HLV, the synergy could mitigate the cost of shuttle extension. • Advantages: • Reduces the gap in US human launch capability • Supports robust US and International utilization of the ISS • Smooth workforce transition • Takes maximum advantage of existing infrastructure and production capabilities (cost savings, which should be investigated) • Disadvantages: • Cost, but mitigated when coupled with Shuttle-Derived HLV • Extends life of shuttle; independent risk assessment recommended

23. Shuttle Scenario 3 (Cont’d) • Cost: • Difficult to compare directly at this stage (because of different carrying cost profile) • Should be referred to Beyond LEO group and PA&E for consistent comparisons • Notes: • Preliminary estimate: Shuttle-Derived IOC in 2016 • Shuttle & Shuttle-Derived HLV not anticipated to compete for facilities or resources • Savings in Soyuz costs for ISS

24. ISS Post 2015 Options Review of U.S. Human Space Flight Plans Committee Leroy Chiao 7/28/09

25. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005 (P.L. 109-155) • SEC. 601. PLAN TO SUPPORT OPERATION AND UTILIZATION OF THE ISS BEYOND FISCAL YEAR 2015. • (a) In General- The Administrator shall take all necessary steps to ensure that the International Space Station remains a viable and productive facility capable of potential United States utilization through at least 2020 and shall take no steps that would preclude its continued operation and utilization by the United States after 2015.

26. Options Considered • ISS Option 1: End U.S. participation in ISS at the end of 2015 (Baseline) • ISS Option 2: Continue U.S. participation at current level, through at least 2020 • ISS Option 2a: Enhanced U.S. participation at current level, through at least 2020

27. ISS Option 1: End U.S. participation in ISS at the end of 2015 (Baseline) • Advantages • Some funds would be shifted to Constellation • But, majority of ISS costs are fixed (e.g. training and operations facilities) • These would be paid by Constellation after 2015, so the actual savings would only be a fraction of ISS operations costs • Decommissioning costs must be deducted

28. ISS Option 1: End U.S. participation in ISS at the end of 2015 (Baseline) • Disadvantages • US would cede leadership position in HSF • Loss of international prestige, not only in space exploration • If Orion is delayed past the end of 2015, US HSF stops. US would assume a position behind Russia and China • Damage to international relations • Would affect future international projects, not only in space • Loss of functioning international framework • Loss of national and international asset • Minimal ROI • Disruption in HSF medical research, some of which may have implications to life on Earth

29. ISS Option 1: End U.S. participation in ISS at the end of 2015 (Baseline) • Disadvantages (continued) • Potential loss of National Lab concept • Customers may not expend effort and funding for short term opportunity • Negative impact on COTS providers • Additional workforce impacts, if Orion delayed past the end of 2015

30. ISS Option 1: End U.S. participation in ISS at the end of 2015 (Baseline) • Notes • IP’s issued strong joint statement to continue ISS operations past 2015 • July 2008 ISS Heads of Agency meeting • Russia has stated that it will continue ISS operations past 2015, regardless of US decisions • May not be possible technically • But, the US should not underestimate Russia’s ability to execute a creative solution

31. ISS Option 1: End U.S. participation in ISS at the end of 2015 (Baseline) • Notes • Estimates show that IP’s could not absorb operations costs • ITAR would also be an issue for transfer of operations to IP’s • Analysis of “mothballing” ISS • Order of magnitude increase in risk of loss of vehicle • Increase in risk of uncontrolled entry • Liability and image issues • Minimal operating mode still expensive (2-3 crew) • Utilization costs are very small relative to ops costs • Full analyses would be required for de-orbit case • Should be started soon

32. ISS Option 2: Continue U.S. participation at current level, through at least 2020 • Advantages • US maintains leadership position in HSF • Maintain international partnership • Opportunity for innovation • National Lab concept • New research • Commercial • Supports COTS efforts

33. ISS Option 2: Continue U.S. participation at current level, through at least 2020 • Disadvantages • Requires additional funding, past 2015

34. ISS Option 2: Continue U.S. participation at current level, through at least 2020 • Notes • Leadership in space exploration is highly visible • Operations-only case • Majority of operations costs are fixed. Thus, savings from this case would be significantly limited

35. ISS Option 2a: Enhanced U.S. participation, through at least 2020 • Advantages • US expands leadership position • Clear commitment to full utilization of ISS • Opportunity to expand international partnership • Further align space program with national objectives • Opportunity to build on ISS partnership for exploration • “Training wheels” for International Exploration agreement • Opportunity for full realization of National Lab concept • Maximum return on construction investment • Opportunity for use as technology and operations test bed

36. ISS Option 2a: Enhanced U.S. participation, through at least 2020 • Disadvantages • Slightly higher cost than Option 2 • Most ISS operations costs are fixed, so additional utilization costs would be relatively small • Transportation costs could be a significant variable

37. ISS Option 2a: Enhanced U.S. participation, through at least 2020 • Notes • Inclusion of new partners should be aligned with US national interests • New IP plan should be integrated • Consider political interactions • Some potential candidate nations are financially healthy • Potential cost offset for current partners

38. ISS Option 2a: Enhanced U.S. participation, through at least 2020 • Notes • New partners may offer game changing opportunities • Example: China is only the third nation capable of HSF independently

39. Back-up

40. Ground Rules and Assumptions • Scenario 1, Baseline • Space Shuttle Program ends in fiscal year 2010 • International Space Station ends in fiscal year 2016 • Constellation Initial Operating Capability occurs in fiscal year 2015 • Scenario 2 • Space Shuttle Program ends in the middle of fiscal year 2011 (February) • International Space Station ends in fiscal year 2020 • Constellation Initial Operating Capability occurs in fiscal year 2017 • Data based on human spaceflight budget given to Augustine committee • International Space Station Fixed Costs Based on official human spaceflight plans • No Shuttle tanks, booster, or engines built in 2010 or beyond, operations only for Scenario 1 • Additional Shuttle hardware built as required for Scenario 2

41. Scenario 1 Based on Human Spaceflight Budget Total = $99.2 Billion Scenario 2 Based on Human Spaceflight Budget Total = $114.5 Billion

42. Trend

43. Question 3 • An assessment of the case that combines shuttle extension with a shuttle-derived HLV (i.e., any of the versions that retain ET & (4 segment) SRB infrastructure. • Assume 1-2 additional STS flights per year from 2012 - 2015; • assume IOC of the new vehicle in 2017. • We're particularly interested in impacts on STS costs and workforce (gov't and contractor). • Also identify when the two programs would begin to meaningfully compete for facilities/resources. • Response • Close the Gap option flies SSP through 2014 with IOC in 2016. • No significant conflict between the two programs was identified. • Options with their cost and workforce impacts are covered in the attached presentation