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Re-stated CTF Mission

Re-stated CTF Mission. When directed, CTF Meng Rai conduct HA/DR in the Combined Ops Area in support of RTARF to restore stability and reduce human suffering in order to transition relief effort to Government of Thailand. Essential Tasks. Re-establish border control

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Re-stated CTF Mission

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  1. Re-stated CTF Mission • When directed, CTF Meng Rai conduct HA/DR in the Combined Ops Area in support of RTARF to restore stability and reduce human suffering in order to transition relief effort to Government of Thailand.

  2. Essential Tasks • Re-establish border control • RTARF (Geographical consideration) • Gain & maintain stability (of DP Camps) • Assist with security, shelter, medical, food and log support for Displaced Persons as required • CTF’s main focus is HA/DR • Local security provided by RTARF • Need to assess NGOs’ capabilities/limitations • Establish ROE • Gain & Maintain Information Superiority

  3. COA # 3 Concepts of Ops • MNF deploy to Thailand arriving thru UTAPAO where they RSO & I to Combined Ops Area • CTF is stood up at 3rd Army Region • Regional Task Forces are formed • Forces are allocated based on HA/DR needs • Seamless Transition

  4. COA # 3 FEATURES • 4 Sectors based around 3rd Army Region/ Provincial Boundaries & APOD’s • Echelons of CMOC’s at CTF & Regional TF’s CTF HQ in Phitsanoluk • Optimizes RTAF, GOT and NGO’s Capabilities • Regional Task Forces organized based on needs assessment • National forces allocated as per unique skills

  5. COA # 3 Phases • Phase I: Pre- Deployment • Phase II : Deployment • Phase III : Conduct HA/DR Ops • Phase IV : Transition/Re-deployment

  6. COA # 3 Phase I • Phase I: Pre- Deployment • Assessment by Adv Parties: Expert Tms from various agencies/nations arrive to assess needs • Prep for movement. Force protection briefs. • Thai Army Forces along border remain in place • Border Control established by RTARF reinforcements • Info Ops commence • Preventive medicine

  7. COA # 3 Phase II • Phase II : Deployment • CTF Rear at UTAPAO • Reception, Staging, Onward movement & Integration (RSO & I), conducted by RTARF Central Command

  8. COA # 3 Phase III • Phase III : Conduct HA/DR Ops • Support NGOs / IGOs / Host Nation / RTARF • Delivery & distribution of Relief Supplies • Construction of Tents/Shelters • Provide curative medical treatment to DPs • Repairs of key infrastructures • Identify and categorize the needs of DPs • Collection of data to support Measurement of Effectiveness • Production & distribution of water • Conduct synchronized Info Ops • Establish a combined Info Bureau • Provide security as required • Establish Quick Reaction Force

  9. COA # 3 Phase IV • Phase IV : Transition & Redeployment • Complete Training &Transfer of CMOC ops to RTARF • Coordinate transition of support to RTG, UN, NGOs & IGOs

  10. Exit Strategy • Establish Transition Team from Phase I to develop and implement a dynamic Transition Plan • CTF Elements • RTARF • NGO’s, IGO’s, UN • Diplomatic Representatives

  11. CTF Meng Rai Task Organization

  12. Intel Update CTF Chiang Rai • Chieng Rai • Mae Hongsorn • Payao • Chieng Mai CTF MHS CTF Chiang Mai • Lampang • Uttarasdit CTF Pitsanulok • Pitsanulok • Tak IDP Camp DP Camp

  13. COA # 3 CTF Chiang Rai • Chieng Rai • Mae Hongsorn • Payao • Chieng Mai CTF MHS CTF Chiang Mai • Lampang • Uttarasdit CTF Pitsanulok • Pitsanulok • Tak IDP Camp DP Camp TF CHIANG RAI 17th Inf Regt (RTA) Engr Plt (Tonga, ROK) Med Tm (ROK) Med Tm (Nepal) Inf Co (Nepal) Inf Co (Mongolia) Air Tpt Hospital (US) TF MHS 2nd Cav Regt (RTA) Engr Co (Fiji) Engr Co (India) Med Bn (India) Med Tm (Mdg) Inf Bn (ROK) Inf Co (Aust) TF CHIANG MAI 7th Inf Regt (RTA) Engr Co (UK) SAR & Dog Tm (UK) Field Hospital (France) Med Plt (Singapore) Med Tm (Mongolia) Inf Bn (Malaysia) Inf Plt (Tonga) 633rd AMSS (TALCE) TF PITSANULOK 3rd Army HQ (RTA) 4th Inf Regt (RTA) Engr Plt (Nepal) Med Tm (France) RLC Sqn (UK) Sig Plt (Nepal) Inf Bn (Fiji) 31st MEU (US) 9th TSC (US) 3rd Army Sp Comd (US) 1-1 SFGA (US)

  14. C5 C17 C130 Helos Helos Helos COA #3 - Air Bases Utapao

  15. Review of CTF Assumptions • No known minefields on border area w/Haloa - FFIR • No insurgents in border area - PIR • MNF can carry small arms for force protection - RFI • Mission is 90 days or less • CTF can use over-flight rights over Haloa - RFI • Cannot commit MNF into Haloa - Policy in place • Pursuit across Haloa border is not allowed - Policy • Displaced persons in camps will increase with success of HA - PIR

  16. Review of CTF Assumptions • US & UK will provide strategic lift for smaller nations if required - RTSC to coord • Comms - CTF to coord • MSQ-126 will be provided • Tactical communications only initial reliable means of comm • Countries will provide comm to C2 their organic units • Comms with non-military organisations would be resolved • Civil Affairs - PIR • Displaced persons flow from Haloa will continue until border is secured

  17. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Initial Assessment • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  18. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • MNF RSO & I • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  19. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Establishment of Border Control • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  20. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Epidemic Control • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  21. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Establish Air Traffic Control in Combined Ops Area • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  22. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Establish CMOCs • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  23. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Establish Distribution Network • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  24. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Establish Order in DP Camps • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Movt & Screening DP to new camps • Info • Assets • Time • Decision Point • When to deploy QRF? • CCIR

  25. COA 3 CRITICAL EVENTS • Implement Transition Plan • Consequences • Counter-Actions • Quantifiable MOEs • Data collection and verification of MOEs • Assets • Time • Decision Point • CCIR

  26. COURSE OF ACTION #3 • ADVANTAGES: • DISADVANTAGES:

  27. COA # 3 - Decision Points • Phase I : Pre- Deployment • Phase II : Deployment • Phase III : Conduct HA/DR Ops • Phase IV : Transition/Re-deployment

  28. INITIAL FORCE STRUCTUREANALYSIS • SHORTFALL • COMMUNICATION (MSQ - 126) - Assumed CTF Coord • SOF RIVERINE CRAFTS • INSUFFICIENT GROUND TRANSPORTATION ASSETS • AIRBORNE RADIO BROADCAST PLATFORM • FOOD INSPECTION ASSETS • PREVENTIVE MEDICINE • COUNTER-INTEL ASSETS • LINGUISTS (NORTHERN THAI DIALECTS)

  29. KNOWN FACTS, STATUS, CONDITIONS. AIRFIELDS • BANGKOK INTL C-5 • U-TA-PAO INTL C-5 • CHIANG MAI INTL C-5 • CHIANG RAI INTL C-5 • MAESOT C-130 • MAE HONG SON C-130 • LAMPANG C-130 • PHRAE C-130 • TAK C-130

  30. KNOWN FACTS, STATUS, CONDITIONS SEAPORTS • BANGKOK • LAM CHABANG • SATTAHIP

  31. Results of Analysis • Identification of advantages and disadvantages of each friendly COA • Identification of additional assets required (if any) • Refinements or modifications to the COA • Risks and actions to reduce the risk at each • geographic location or functional event • Adjustments to any established control measures

  32. Analysis Results (cont) • Deployment requirements • Synchronization requirements • Estimate of the duration of critical events as well as the operation as a whole • Required support from outside of the CTF • Requirements for logistic support • Clear picture of command relationships • branches and sequels

  33. Analysis Results (cont) • Critical information required to support decision points • Additional commander’s decision points • Measures of effectiveness for each phase • Areas of high interest for reconnaissance, surveillance • Identification of component tasks • Task Organization requirements

  34. COA 3 Risk Assessment • Phase 1 Predeployment • Risk: Inappropriate forces • Mitigation: Detailed assessment • Risk: Unfavorable media coverage • Mitigation: Positive message projected • Phase 2 Deployment • Risk: Bottleneck of traffic • Mitigation: Maximize use of civilian airports and alternate means of transport • Risk: Wrong aid at wrong place and wrong time • Mitigation: Close coordination with GOT and NGOs

  35. COA 3 Risk Assessment • Phase 3 Conduct HA/DR OPS • Risk: Inadequate force protection • Bandits/criminals threaten CTF forces • Health, nutrition disease. • Mitigation: • Rapid notification to Thai security forces. • Robust medical services and support and open dialogue with NGOs / local red cross/crescent • Phase 4 Transition / Redeployment • Risk: Thai military is not prepared to assume full responsibility for HA / DR effort

  36. COA 3 Risk Assessment • Phase 4 Transition / Redeployment • Mitigation: Determine problem early, notify NCA authority, bolster Thai forces as appropriate. • Risk: NGOs are not able to provide for their own security (e.g. due to riots etc.) • Mitigation: Consider funding effort to provide contract security. Bottom Line: Residual risk of COA 3 is acceptable.

  37. COA 3AAR (MPAT TE-2)

  38. SUSTAIN • MULTILATERAL, VICE UNILATERAL, • DEVELOPMENT OF MISSION SOLUTIONS • UNDERSTANDING OF A COMMON • APPROACH TO A MISSION SOLUTION • CRISIS ACTION PLANNING • MPAT

  39. IMPROVE • COA DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURES • STEP BY STEP PROCESS TO FOLLOW • UNDERSTANDING OF EXISTING HOST • NATION ‘s (CIV/MIL) STRUCTURE WHICH • MULTINATIONAL FORCES ARE • AUGMENTING/SUPPORTING

  40. DISCUSSION • Civilian leadership should always be in • charge with military supporting • Common operating procedures increases this efficiency • Host nation govt institute procedures with host nation mil -- MNF have direct coord with host nation mil

  41. IFRC NGO Host Nation Mil UN MNF Host Nation Govt DISCUSSION

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