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Roma Integration: Skills, Incentives, Policy Options. Martin Kahanec (CEU, IZA, CELSI) Vera Messing (CEU) Kl ára Brožovičová (CELSI) Brian Fabo (CELSI). The story. Education as a driver or Roma/non-Roma exclusion/employment gaps Measuring the role of low education in the labor market
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Roma Integration: Skills, Incentives, Policy Options Martin Kahanec (CEU, IZA, CELSI) Vera Messing (CEU) Klára Brožovičová (CELSI) Brian Fabo (CELSI)
The story • Education as a driver or Roma/non-Roma exclusion/employment gaps • Measuring the role of low education in the labor market • Welfare provisions and incentives to work • Policy options/conclusions
The context The Great Employment Barrier UNDP/WB/EC, 2011
Minorities at greatest risk of exclusion in the EU Roma/Sinti top the list Zimmermann et al. 2008
Risk of exclusion (Policy Matrix) Roma: highest possible risk and increasing Zimmermann et al. 2008
What barriers? Education next to discrimination Zimmermann et al. 2008
The role of education • Segregation (O’Higgins, 2010), discrimination (Kahanec and Zimmermann, 2011) etc. lead to gaps in educational attainment • Educational gaps are perpetuated through intergenerational transmission (Kahanec and Yuksel, 2010) • Bottom line – Roma heavily overrepresented among the low educated
Roma/non-Roma human capital gaps UNDP/WB/EC, 2011
Low education across countries Variation across the studied countries Messing et al. 2012; EU LFS 2010
The role of low education: Spain Messing et al. 2012; EU LFS 2010 Low education detrimental for activity, employment, hours
The role of low education: Slovakia Low education very detrimental for activity and employment Messing et al. 2012; EU LFS 2010
The role of low education: Slovakia Low education worse for the young or rural; the elderly can cope better Messing et al. 2012; EU LFS 2010
The activity penalty: All countries Messing et al. 2012; EU LFS 2010 Romania most severe, then Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, Spain
The employment penalty: All countries Messing et al. 2012; EU LFS 2010 Slovakia most severe, then Hungary, Bulgaria, Spain and Romania
Incentives D19.1
Does it pay to work (>50% return)? Monetary incentives to work smaller with children Assume min wage, control for benefits, taxes (Messing 2012)
Does it pay to work (>33% return)? Monetary incentives rather small especially for large families Assume min wage, control for benefits, taxes (Messing 2012)
Summary • Roma attain substandard labor market outcomes • Education is a key factor • Low education indeed leads to lower participation, employment, job quality • If you are low educated (min wage), returns to working may be small or negative, especially for families with children
Imagine a world… A policy reflection • There are a number of policies that could help to get at equal education • The key appears to be breaking three vicious circles • substandard socioeconomic outcomes reinforce each other for people, families (within and over generations), and communities; • they fuel negative attitudes and perceptions, leading to ill-chosen policies; • segmentation is perpetuated through (statistical) discrimination • But imagine a world where Roma educational attainment matches that of non-Roma
Would we be done? • Research: gaps only partly due to differences in education and other variables – much of the gaps is due to differences in returns to characteristics, i.e. unequal treatment (O’Higgins 2010, Drydakis 2012, Milcher and Fischer 2011) • Bottom line: Educational equality is necessary, but not sufficient
Martin KahanecTel/Fax: +36 1 235 3097Email: kahanecm@ceu.huDepartment of Public PolicyCentral European UniversityNador utca 9Budapest 1051Hungarypublicpolicy.ceu.hu Read more: NEUJOBS report D19.1