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With thanks to: all of TE/MPE/MI, A. Dinius, R. Schmidt, J. Wenninger et al. 0v2. What is the aim of this work?. Beam Interlock System was Internally Reviewed in 2006. Very well received. The 2006 internal review used only accelerator professionals.
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With thanks to: all of TE/MPE/MI, A. Dinius, R. Schmidt, J. Wenninger et al. 0v2
What is the aim of this work? Beam Interlock System was Internally Reviewed in 2006 Very well received • The 2006 internal review used only accelerator professionals. • no means of referencing the Beam Interlock System design to other interlock systems in industry • VHDL (software/firmware) safety is difficult to quantify. • CERN has other systems which would benefit from generic review methods • Comparison of the system to international standards, such as DO-178B This review is to continue and enhance that work Remember the following points are the aim of this review • identify possible weaknesses in the mission-critical path of the BIS before LHC reaches high intensity beam operation • assess the adequacy of the external and internal mitigations for critical component failure in the BIS • provide a general comparison of the BIS with approaches in industrial systems. • suggest potential improvements of the BIS • review and comment on the pre/during/post operational software sequences that verify the integrity of the BIS • provide CERN with a model for future assessments of mission-critical systems Beam Interlock System
Plan for the Review Week 18th August – 7th September Study of pre-review material Monday 7th September presentations Tuesday 8th September demonstrations Wednesday 9th September open-house Last week Thursday 10th September VHDL Friday 11th September AM:open-house PM: outgoing remarks 11th September – 2nd October Post-visit report Being created Beam Interlock System
Critical Systems Labs Inc. Canadian Firm… Military Safety Automotive Safety Train Safety Contribute to Writing Standards Chaired the International System Safety Conference 2008 ++ Very well placed to judge our work My personal ambition certification for our systems These are the certification experts = push us the right way Start next projects with this in mind Beam Interlock System
Preliminary Findings Engineering: Beam Interlock System is more than adequate for protecting LHC Safety vs Operation: Unusual to mix systems in industry = Justify all connections to BIS for safety Are all inputs adding to safety = Machine Protection System Hazard Table Documentation: Technical Engineering Specification & Hazard Table needed for the future Final Reference Manual for the future Traceability = Drill down from requirements to implementation Verification: Should be testable to meet the defined requirements Software & Testing: Pre-Operational Checks need integrity and verification As-Built Database needs integrity and verification Operator Screens need ‘heart-beat’ Beam Interlock System
FIN Beam Interlock System
Who is who…. ? Before we start… a quick ‘tour de table’… Section 3 of your folder has more Beam Interlock System
Presentation Day Session 1: Introduction 0900 – 0915 Introduction & Outline of Review B. Todd Session 2: Overview of CERN and LHC 0915 – 0935 CERN and the LHC B. Todd 0935 – 0955 LHC Beam Interlock System B. Puccio 0955 – 1015 Dependable Design B. Todd Coffee 1015 – 1045 Session 3: Critical Electronics 1045 – 1115 User – Beam Permit Critical Path B. Todd 1115 – 1145 The Matrix CPLD B. Todd 1145 – 1215 Generators and Detectors A. Castaneda 1215 – 1245 Safe Beam Flags and SMP A. Castaneda Lunch 1245 – 1400 Session 4: Software Sequences 1400 – 1430 Preoperation Testing & DIAMON I. Romera 1430 – 1500 Postoperation and PM I. Romera Coffee 1500 – 1530 Session 5: Operational Experience 1530 – 1600 Observations since 2005 B. Todd 1600 – 1615 UJ33 Incident B. Todd 1615 – 1645 Irradiation Testing B. Todd Beam Interlock System