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This discussant paper examines the role of peer monitoring in minimizing information asymmetry between banks and regulators. It discusses mechanisms to reduce market failures and highlights the potential of market discipline to improve regulatory capacity in assessing market stability.
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Addressing the Information Asymmetry between Banks and Regulators: The Role of Peer Monitoring Discussant Paper Dalvinder Singh, Professor of Law, University of Warwick
Regulation and SupervisionInformation Flow: Minimise Market Failures
Market Discipline fits Mic-Pru-Sup and Mac-Pru-Sup approaches
Concluding Observations • The paper by Murinde et al highlights the pro’s and con’s of utilising market discipline to minimise the agency problems associated with asymmetry of information between banks, regulators and markets • It points towards improving the use of market discipline to develop the capacity of regulators to better inform themselves about the stability of the market place