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1. WHO LET THE BUNKER BURN? An investigation into the City of Philadelphias Final Battle with MOVE
Presentation by Shawn Dudley
2. Introduction On May 13, 1985 Philadelphia Police Department bombed 6221 Osage Avenue. The home of the MOVE Cult
Six adults, and 5 children were killed.
All were MOVE members
The fire engulfed the whole block.
Destroys sixty-homes
260 people become homeless
3. Introduction Over 10,000 rounds of ammunition was fired into the alley in the rear of the house after the fire was put out
Evidence that some members were killed by gunfire
The only two survivors were found escaping from the house through the alley
4. What Contributed to the Disaster? Three Factors that contributed to the Disaster
Anger between the residents of 6200 Osage Avenue and members of the MOVE House
Structural Failure within the City Administration
Oversight Failure on the part of the Chief Executive and his designees
5. THE PLAYERS
6. The Mayor Wilson Goode
Took office in Jan, 1984
Authorized a plan to
arrest four MOVE
members living at 6221 Osage Avenue on May 13, 1985.
7. 2nd IN COMMAND Leo Brooks
Managing Director for the City of Philadelphia.
Retired Army General
Supervised the Osage Avenue
Operation
8. Top Cop Gregore Sambor
Police Commissioner
Led the police operation against MOVE
Made the decision to let the bunker on top of 6221 Osage to burn
9. The Fireman William Richmond
Fire Commissioner
In charge of firefighters on May 13th
Agreed with Sambors decision not to put out the fire.
Instructed firefighters not to put out bunker fire on top of 6221 Osage
10. The Rambos Lt. Frank Powell
Police lieutenant, Bomb Disposal Unit.
Dropped bomb on the MOVE house from the helicopter.
William Klein
Police Officer, Bomb Disposal Unit. Made the bomb which was dropped on the MOVE house
11. 6200 Osage Avenue MOVE
Naturalist Movement founded by John Africa, a.k.a John Leapheart
Confrontation with police in 1978 led to the death of a police officer.
Conrad Africa, a.k.a. James Conrad. Leader of 6221 Osage Avenue MOVE house.
Frank Africa, aka Frank James listed on arrest warrant to be served on May 13, 1985
12. 6200 Osage Avenue Residents of Osage Avenue
Clifford Bond, block captain
Lloyd and Lucretia Wilson residents of adjoining house 6219 Osage Avenue
Wayne Butch Marshall-assaulted by MOVE members
Inez Nichols- former block captain
13. Structural FailureAnger on Osage Avenue Neighbors complain of large number of animals occupying MOVE house
Neighbors get into arguments with MOVE members regarding the blocking of their alleyway
Neighbors complain to police that MOVE members were building things on the rooftops
14. Structural FailureAnger on Osage Avenue MOVE members violate city ordinances
Neighbors complain about unsanitary conditions at 6221 Osage Avenue
Vermin and insect start to infest adjoining homes
Litter and waste gather on sidewalks
MOVE members verbally assault neighbors and children
15. Structural FailureAnger on Osage Avenue
16. Structural FailureAnger on Osage Avenue Goode took office in January 1984
April 1984 MOVE members threaten Dept of Water employee
May 30 , 1984 Residents meet with new Mayor who refuses to take action against MOVE.
May 1984 Frank Africa declared delinquent by the state parole board.
MOVE announces preparation for demonstration on August 8, 1984
July 4, 1984- residents met with Mayor. Warrant for rank Africa remained outstanding.
April 30 1985 Residents send a warning letter to the governor.
17. Structural Failure Failure to modify 1978 confrontation plan to accommodate change of circumstances in 1985
City refuses to intervene on residents behalf
PPD allows MOVE to manipulate them into revealing their response tactics
Citys Non-involvement on Osage Avenue gives MOVE time to build the bunker, and fortify property
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18. Structural FailureBroken Chain of Command
Communications failure
Objective was clear, concise and agreed upon
Method was not discussed in detail
Brooks and Goode not informed of police plan
Sambor took full control of the plan
Brooks unaware of capacity of officers in charge of the operation, specifically the bomb unit
19. Structural FailureBroken Chain of Command Divided Authority
Brooks is responsible for supervising operation
Sambor runs the operation without supervision from Brooks, or Mayor Goode
20. Structural FailureThe Bomb Members of the bomb units were not experts
Very little research done regarding the use of the explosives in this type of setting
Police ignored the flammable items on the roof.
21. Structural FailureThe Bomb Making of the Bomb
Restricted materials used.
Materials obtained illegally
Powells lack of experience in disposing of explosives
Kleins limited knowledge of manufacturing bombs
No one questioned the use of the explosives
Bomb experts were not consulted prior to operation
Ignitable materials on the roof overlooked
Overemphasis on targeting bunker
Missed targets
Possibility of considerable collateral damage not weighed against importance of taking down the bunker
22. Oversight Failure Neutralization of key leaders
Brooks
Mayor Goode
Fire Commissioner Richmond
23. Oversight Failure Unmonitored Leadership
Police Commissioner Sambor had free reign of the mission
Ability to keep Goode out of the decision making process by dispensing misinformation, and half truths
Neither Sambor or Richmond sought Goode's or Brooks approval to let the bunker burn
24. Oversight Failure Mayor Goode failure to obtain critical unbiased information
No one to ask Alexanders Question
An unusually restrictive dependence on information provided by subordinate officials
25. Oversight Failure Fire Commissioner failed in his duty to protect the public
Relied on Sambors directions
Did not directly communicate concerns with the Mayor or Brooks
Did not instruct firefighters to fight fire until too late
26. Oversight FailureThe decision to let the bunker burn Sambor and Richmond used fire as a weapon
Sambor made the decision was made to let the fire burn until bunker was destroyed
Richmond admitted he balanced the lives of the MOVE members (including children) against the lives of the firefighters and police. He made reference to the 1978 confrontation with MOVE
Richmond claimed his intention was not to burn the entire house
Mayor and Brooks were assured that the bomb could not lead to a fire
27. Oversight FailureThe decision to let the bunker burn 5:27 p.m. fire starts
6:00 p.m. Mayor instructs Brooks to put out the fire
Fire Department puts water onto roof of 6219
The hose does not reach past 6219
Richmond tells firemen to shut of hose
6:10 p.m. fire starts to spread
Firefighters start to squirt water on 6219 and 6223.
6:30 p.m. firefighters ordered to put fire out
Water squirts were turned on and off during the duration
Sixty two houses were destroyed
28. The Commission Mayor Goodes administration showed serious system failures
The Commission finds that both current Mayor and former Mayor showed poor leadership in handling MOVE situation
These failures were directly responsible for the disaster
Brooks showed ineffectual leadership
and was ignorant to facts which should have been known to him
29. The Commission The direct and most immediate cause of the death of the MOVE children and destruction of 6200 Osage Avenue was attributed to Commissioners Sambor and Richmond
They eventually retired from their positions without penalty
Dept of Justice conducts investigation into MOVE disaster and decides that no indictments will be handed down
30. Treating the Symptoms The Commission found that many factors were played a role in the tragedy.
Structural Failure
Leadership should be understood and respected
There should be clearly defined roles for people who make decisions
Placing of the right people in the right positions
No splintering of authority
Address issues immediately, make decisions and correct what needs to be corrected
Leaders should ask themselves what would they do if factors change in the midst of an operation
Have an alternative plan that address those changes
31. Treating the Symptoms Oversight Failure
The leader must maintain control over the operation
Crisis decision making not to be confused with final authority by subordinate managers
Communication systems must be put into place, and be operational
Leaders must be aware of every decision made in an operation.
Orders and instructions should be clear and concise. They should also be delivered to those directly responsible for carrying them out.
Avoid giving subordinate managers free reign of an operation.
Leaders must be informed of all options
Base decision on all information presented and not presented by managers.