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OpSpec D301 Aircraft Network Security Program. Presented to: OSWG 2011-04 Presented by: Chris Parfitt, AFS-360 Date: November 2 nd , 2011. Background. Avionics interface via ARINC or Mil Spec databus (429, etc.) Passenger compartment electronics interface via TCP/IP
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OpSpec D301Aircraft Network Security Program Presented to: OSWG 2011-04 Presented by: Chris Parfitt, AFS-360 Date: November 2nd, 2011
Background • Avionics interface via ARINC or Mil Spec databus (429, etc.) • Passenger compartment electronics interface via TCP/IP • Physical partition between avionics and passenger compartment electronics
e-Enabled Aircraft • Avionics interface using Transmission Control Protocol and/or Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) • Passenger info and entertainment still use TCP/IP • System architecture may allow read/write access to/from external systems and networks (Airline operations and maintenance systems, Sat Comm, World Wide Web, etc.) • No longer a physical partition between avionics and passenger electronics. • Examples of e-Enabled aircraft: Boeing 747-8 and 787, Airbus A350 and A380, Bombardier CS100 and CS300
Risks • Avionics and passenger systems now similar to a Local Area Network (LAN). • Aircraft have the capability to reprogram flight critical avionics components wirelessly and via various data transfer mechanisms. • May result in cyber security vulnerabilities from intentional or unintentional corruption of data and/or systems critical to the safety and continued airworthiness of the airplane.
Risks cont. • Credible examples of potential misuse include the potential for: • Malware to infect an aircraft system • An attacker to use onboard wireless to access aircraft system interfaces • Denial of service of wireless interfaces • Denial of service of safety critical systems • Misuse of personal devices that access aircraft systems • Misuse of off-board network connections to access aircraft system interfaces
Risk Mitigation Efforts • RTCA SC-216 Aeronautical Systems Security (jointly with EUROCAE WG-72) to form a consensus and document guidance for security of aircraft systems. • Information/Cyber Security Guidance for Instructions for Continued Airworthiness and Continuing Airworthiness (Maintenance/Operational Implementation) • Current plan for publication early 2013 • FAA Advisory Circular based on this guidance Participation from airline operators is almost non-existent. We encourage participation from airline maintenance, engineering, and information technology (IT) departments.
OpSpec D301 • Applies to aircraft operated under 14 CFR parts 121, 121/135, 125, and 129. • Necessary to verify that operators have the skills, tooling, and procedures in place to accomplish the requirements of the manufacturer’s aircraft security document. • Aircraft that require an ANSP include any aircraft produced or modified that requires the manufacturer to provide operator guidance documentation for FAA approval. The FAA requirement is in the form of Special Conditions. • Boeing provides this guidance in an ancillary document referred to as “Airplane Network Security Operator Guidance (ANSOG).” Airbus includes “Aircraft Information System Security” guidance in Part 6 of Aircraft Limitations Section (ALS) of the aircraft maintenance manual.
D301 Point of Contact Rochelle Brisco AFS-360, Avionics Maintenance Branch rochelle.brisco@faa.gov (202)385-6413