Design Safety into Your Plant Mary Kay O’Conner Process Safety Symposium

1. Design Safety into Your PlantMary Kay O’Conner Process Safety Symposium Frank Joop Global Business Development Intergraph Process, Power & Marine

2. Be Pro-active – “SAFETY FIRST”

3. Safety is at the Forefront

4. Was this your plant…………….

5. The Basics • Risk Reduction • Instrument are a well accepted risk reduction system • Safety for personnel, facility and environment • Contributors to an accident • Course • Process deviation • What is released to the atmosphere

6. Risk Reduction Residual Risk Tolerable Risk Process Risk Increasing Risk Necessary Risk Reduction Actual Risk Reduction (ALARP) SIS Relief Alarms BPCS Design Process

7. Tolerable Risk

8. The Standards • ISA S84.01 and IEC 61508 • Framework for the design • Key steps are: • Process design • HAZOP and Risk analysis • Determine protection layers • Define Safety Integrity Level (SIL) • Define SIS • Specification of SIS • Design • Operating procedures • Commissioning • Modification coupled back to the process design

9. Risk Assessment

10. HAZOP’s – What, Why and How? Hazard Identification Likelihood vs. Severity Risk reduction • The best, most rigorous method for hazard assessment • Team of 5 – 8 experienced engineers, operators • Usually after the design / change is complete • Impacts time TO market and time IN market

11. Finance • Design Process Safety Information Systems • Control • Maintenance • Safety

12. Process Safety is Mission Critical Law • License to operate Cost • Injury, plant damage • Abnormal upsets Image • Staff • Community • Marketplace

13. HAZOP’s – What, Why and How? • HAZOP = Hazard and Operability Studies • Study of the possibility of deviation from the design intent • HAZOP Fundamentals: • Deviation • Course • Key words are: • Flow, Temperature, Pressure, Level, Separate (settle, filter, centrifuge), Composition, React Mix, Reduce (grind, crush, etc.), Absorb, Corrode Erode • Operational words • Isolate, Drain, Vent, Purge, Inspect, Maintain, Start-up, Shutdown • Secondary Key Words • No, Less, More, Reverse, Also, Other, Fluctuation, Early, Late DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION     

14. HAZOP’s – What, Why and How? Verifying each system DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION   Pressure measurement At pump Inspection of filter Add instr. Strainer Blockage Pump cavitations Wrong mixing No, Flow

15. HAZOP’s late in the schedule • Process Design • Instrument design • Piping layout • Material ordering • HAZOP • Found error • Design change ($$) • Change order for material/equipment ($$$$$)

16. Impact / Follow on Effect: DEVIATION CAUSE CONSEQUENCE SAFEGUARDS ACTION   Pressure measurement At pump Inspection of filter Add instr. Strainer Blockage Pump cavitations Wrong mixing No, Flow HAZOP’s late in the schedule • DCS Configuration • DCS HMI (Graphics) • Alarm Management • Asset Management • Instrumentation Design • Procurement Changes • Vendor Communications • Piping Changes • Material Changes • Construction Planning • Commissioning • Spare Parts Loading • Documentation • Etc... Multiple by thousands of potential “Safe-guards”

17. HAZOP’s – Earlier in the schedule • Process Design • Make HAZOP part of design process early on • Instrument design • Piping layout • Material ordering • HAZOP (final) • No errors • No Design change • No Change order for material/equipment • Reduced design and CAPEX risks

18. The Solution SmartPlant Process Safety enables to design safety into your plant and reduces the operational risks. • Design = EPC • Operational = OO

19. Knowledge base SPPS Process Safety information Hazop study Knowledge from experts, captured once only P&IDs Lessons learned Full, auditable record Comprehensive Consistent - Up to 50% time & cost reduction Structured database

20. Plant safety information today Hazop study Plant safety knowledge Lack of safety data impacts Plant Modification Operation Maintenance

21. The Solution Equipment Models in SmartPlant Process Safety • Knowledge about the behaviour of process equipment is essential for hazard identification. • Each equipment type in SPPS has a “Model”. • Describes behaviour, failure modes and hazards. • Connects to other equipment through ports. • Models collected into a “Unit Model Library”. • “Instances” of these equipment models are used in the P&IDs which SPPS analyses.

22. + + + + + + etc… + + – – + + + + + Qout Tout Pout Pout Qin Tin Pin Pin + + + noQin noQout Consequence: dry running The Solution Flow Modelling… Centrifugal pump:

23. The Solution Plant Modelling…

24. The Solution Equipment Models 270 + Models pre-built !!

25. The Solution Fault-consequence Lists…

26. The Solution Fault-consequence detail

27. The Solution Fault-Consequence Assessment

28. MoC workflow Existing plant Plant Safety database from SPPS and Hazop study P&IDs Run SPPS to find hazards Compare and Hazop new cause-consequences Proposed modification /new batch sheet Modify P&IDs Safety approval Engineering approval Final approval Permit to work

29. The Solution Comparing before and after Hazops

30. The Solution Brainstorming Any more F/C in this Node & deviation?

31. HAZOP’s w/ SP Process Safety SP Process Safety HAZOP Study Traditional HAZOP Study • Automatically create “nodes” using intelligent data / rules from SmartPlant P&ID • Semi-Automatic preparation of “node” worksheet, interactive navigation and selection from P&ID database • Interactive visual aid to P&ID for brain storming activities • Automatic recommendations of Safe-Guards • Electronic and collaborative assignment of actions for respective disciplines • Automatic email-notification of actions, including action management functions • Automatically generate HAZOP reports / results • History management / comparison reports • Manually divide P&ID’s / Plant into “nodes” to study and mark-up P&ID’s • Manually prepare “node” work- sheet • Focus on individual node and deviation at a time • Manually work to identify fault- Consequence both inside and outside the node • Manually identify and document safe- guards / instrumentation • Assign actions and manually communicate them to respective disciplines • Manually document study for future reference / audits

32. Process Safety Integration Vision... TEF CALCULATIONS TEF TEF SP- PID TEF TEF ACCIDENT DATA HAZOPS Data & Document Management CORPORATE SAFETY MEMORY Load, Exchange, Share, Collaboration & Integration Technologies TEF ‘eEngineering Integration Hub’ HUMAN FACTORS TEF SPI MoC TEF TEF BROWSER SP3D SPEL SECURITY ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

33. Business Results Achieved Action Management Data Handover Risk Assessment Early Hazard Elimination Hazard Identification Automation Check designs Using CSM Unified record • Faster re-hazops • Better MoC • Lessons learned • Safety of acquisitions • 50% time & cost reduction • Project schedule reduction • Better design • Make changes before limited, costly • Shorter Hazop studies • Consistent, thorough, Auditable • Re-usable, comparable Visual aid to improve brainstorming • Capture knowledge of experts once and re-use always Build corporate safety memory (CSM) Action validation • Better action management

34. Summary • Full, auditable, consistent Hazops record • Reduced time, cost and tedium • Early design checking enables change before becomes costly, limited • Knowledge capture and use • Company’s experts’ experience • lessons learned • Hazop study results - living data • Supporting MoC • Accessible information

35. Integrating the Engineering Enterprise…