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Neuroscience and psychology Cognitive Neuroscience

Neuroscience and psychology Cognitive Neuroscience. Keith J. Holyoak “Psychology in CS” (CD MIT 1998) “Psychology = Science investigates representation and processing of information by complex organisms.” Psychology= “Information processing – between sensory inputs and motoric outputs.”

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Neuroscience and psychology Cognitive Neuroscience

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  1. Neuroscience and psychologyCognitive Neuroscience

  2. Keith J. Holyoak “Psychology in CS” (CD MIT 1998) • “Psychology = Science investigates representation and processing of information by complex organisms.” • Psychology= “Information processing – between sensory inputs and motoric outputs.” • Today: Psychology strong related to neuroscience

  3. Anatomy of the Brain • Brain = Cerebral Cortex • Has two symmetrical hemispheres • Each hemisphere consists of large sheets of layered neurons • Human cortex: Highly folded to pack more cortical surface into the skull • Surface area of average human cerebral cortex is about 2200 to 2400cmxcm

  4. Fodor’s special sciences (1974) • Relation between special sciences (psychology, neuroscience) • Basic science: Physics • Entities/processes from special sciences cannot be defined/described using entities/processes from basic science • Psychology not reduced to neuroscience • Each special science: distinctive “taxonomy”, “distinctive ways of classifying and organizing descriptions and explanations of phenomena”

  5. One taxonomy (proper to one special science) – cannot be reduced to another taxonomy • Different particular sciences - Different “levels of reality”: Physics - lowest level Chemistry, biology, psychology, social sciences • Fodor rejects reductionism and implicitly the Unity of Science

  6. The Student's Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience by Jamie Ward (2006 Psychology Press) Cognitive neuroscience (CNS) • CNS = A bridging discipline: (1) Cognitive science + cognitive psychology (2) Biology + neuroscience

  7. A timeline - development of methods and findings relevant to CNS, from phrenology to present day

  8. Gall + Spurzheim (19th Century)- Phrenology: 2 assumptions: • Different regions of brain perform different functions + associated with different behaviours • Size of these regions produces distortions of skull + correlates with individual differences in cognition → Functional specialization within brain • Brain: 35 functions

  9. Task: Localization of specific mental functions on neural areas • Functions: Language, color perception, face recognition, self, etc. • 2 alternatives: atomistic or holistic

  10. Broca’s area: Patient could understand language but not speak • Patient’s left frontal lobe was damaged • Wernicke (19th Century): A stroke victim – could talk freely but with little sense • Could not understand spoken or written language (“Brain story” by Vaia Lestou)

  11. 3D MRI of human brain with Broca's area highlighted in red 3D MRI of human brain with Wernicke's area highlighted in blue

  12. Brodmann: Cellular organization → 52 distinct regions

  13. Revolution in our understanding of the nervous system: Camillo Golgi (Italy) and Ramon y Cajal (Spain) • Golgi: Impregnated individual neurons • Cajal: Neurons are discrete entities - transmit electrical information in only one directions from dendrites to axonal tip

  14. The methods of CNS 1. Neuroanatomy 2. Neurophysiology 3. Neurology 4. Functional Neurosurgery 5. Cognitive Psychology 6. Computer Modelling 7. Converging Methods

  15. The brain story by Vaia Lestou • Imaging the healthy brain

  16. Electrophysiological methods (EEG/ERP and single-cell recordings) and magnetophysiological methods (MEG) record the electrical/magnetic properties of neurons • Functional imaging methods (PET and fMRI) record physiological changes associated with blood supply to the brain which evolve more slowly over time. These are called haemodynamic methods

  17. Temporal resolution: Measure when an event is occurring • EEG, MEG, TMS and single-cell recording = millisecond resolution • PET and fMRI = minutes and seconds Spatial resolution: Measure where an event is occurring • Lesion and functional imaging = millimetre • Single-cell recordings = level of the neuron (The Student's Guide to Cognitive Neuroscience by Jamie Ward)

  18. “The goal of CNS: To explain how cognitive processes emerge from neural activity” • (Two methods: top-down or bottom-up) Bottom-up: Knowledge from neurons + patterns → Cognitive processing • 2 steps: (1) Psychological theory (computational) that explain cognition (2) Looking for neural implementation

  19. Kosslyn - Image representations • “Lower” brain functions = Early perception + motor control - Small neuronal areas • Functions: Reasoning and problem solving = “High-level” functions - Large neuronal areas • Kosslyn: “Wet mind” = Explain cognitive processes only by appealing (but not reducing) to neurobiological data-information ↔ Combination between mind-information and brain-information • Neural level: Difficult to grasp higher functions

  20. Johnson’s book Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience (1997) - “Representational Change in Development”

  21. Uttal (2001, 2002) • Impossibility of explaining mind through brain - Non-linearity of neural processes • Psychological-neural equivalence –necessary at a level much lower that today (resolution of neuroimage mechanisms deal with brain areas too large) • Using lesions and image techniques, Uttal considers that we cannot decompose a cognitive system in components that can be localized.

  22. Bechtel (2002, 2008, 2009) • “A [mental] mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its components parts, component operations, and their organization. • The orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or more phenomena.” (Bechtel & Abrahamsen, 2005; Bechtel, 2006, 2009, 2008)

  23. “Heuristic identity theory”: “to date, over 30 areas involved in visual processing have been found in primate brain” including not only the occipital lobe, but also parietal and temporal cortex. (2008) • Localization: Revised during advancing research • Decomposability (phenomenal –memory- and mechanistic - vision) and localization • Part-whole and the self • Reduction and autonomy (“explanatory pluralism” view)

  24. Gualtiero Piccinini (2006) • “[I]n the language of neurology …, presumably, notions like computational state and representation aren’t accessible” (Fodor, 1998, p. 96). = ‘Computational chauvinism’: Many neuroscientists - use computation and representation “in interpreting data, forming hypotheses, and building models. • Journals - Neural Computation, Journal of Computational Neuroscience, and Network: Computation in Neural Systems”

  25. Computational chauvinism’s: Neuroscientists have to discover neural mechanisms that implement computational processes from psychological level → Autonomy of psychology • Piccinini - “Nature has been uncooperative with this approach.” = There has been impossible to discover implementation • Neural networks are unable to help the researchers to find such implementation

  26. Hardcastle and Stewart (2002)vs. Bechtel • They criticize modularity of mind (Fodor + evolutionary psychology) • “Cognitive neuroscientists assume that they can localize brain function; they seek discrete, physically constant brain modules’ a material analogue for the psychologists’ set of distinct mental software packages.”

  27. The main attack: No empirical data, no theoretical framework! • Localization and single cell recordings • Lesion studies and the assumption of brain constancy • Functional imaging • None of these methods is sustainable in proving the modularity of the mind

  28. Jesse J. Prinz, (2006) “Is the mind really modular?” • Critics of Fodor’s modularity of the mind (1983) • Prinz attacked each property of modular system: localization, automatization, fast, shallow, ontogenetically determined, domain specific, inaccessible, information encapsulated Chemero & Silbernstein • Holistic and “explanatory pluralism” view

  29. Vul et al (2009) • 54 articles! • “The correlations between behavioral and self-report measures of personality or emotion and measures of brain activation obtained using fMRI” • “These correlations often exceed what is statistically possible assuming (evidently rather limited) reliability of both fMRI and personality/emotion measures.” • Such correlations are “impossible high”

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