An Overview of Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security Biodefense Activities

1. An Overview of Princeton’s Program on Science and Global Security Biodefense Activities Laura H. Kahn, MD, MPH, MPPResearch Staff Program on Science and Global Security, WWS, Princeton University 7th NJ Universities Homeland Security Research Consortium Symposium, New Brunswick, November, 2006

2. Co-Principal Investigators • Laura H. Kahn, MD, MPH, MPP Research Staff member • Frank von Hippel, PhD, Professor of Public and International Affairs • Christopher Chyba, PhD, Professor of Astrophysical Sciences and International Affairs. Professor Chyba recently served on the IOM/NRC panel on "Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences."

3. Activities at Princeton University • Biodefense Seminar Series supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York • Description of Series • Papers from Series • Four State Public Health Preparedness Study supported by the Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation of New York • Key Findings

4. Carnegie Biodefense Seminar Series Goals: • To engage leading university, biotech, and pharmaceutical industry scientists in discussions with security analysts of issues of biodefense, biothreats, biosecurity, biosafety, and bioethics. • To help the life sciences community contribute to biodefense policy development. • To develop collaborative relationships between policy and security experts and the bioscience community to deal with the dual-use dangers of modern biology.

5. 2003-2004 Seminar Series • Dr. David Franz, Vice President, Chemical and Biological Defense Division, Southern Research Institute, “Biosafety Level 4 labs: What research, how many and where?” • Dr. Mark Wheelis, Professor of Microbiology, UC Davis, “The Role for International Transparency in Biodefense R & D.” • Dr. Michael Moodie, President of the Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, Washington DC and Dr. Jonathan Tucker, Senior Researcher, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, “Strengthening the BWC: Lessons Learned from the Failed Attempt to Agree on a Verification Protocol; Where Next?” • Dr. Adel Mahmoud, President, Merck Vaccines, Merck and Co, Inc., “Technical, Economic and Legal Obstacles to the Development of Vaccines and Other Therapeutics for Potential Bioterrorism Agents.”

6. 2006 Spring Seminar Series • Dr. Richard Ebright, Rutgers University, 'Biodefense Research: NIH Role, NIH Management, Oversight of Safety, Oversight of Security, and Oversight of Dual-Use Implications.” • Dr. Nancy Connell, UMDNJ, 'Codes of Ethics and Whistleblowers in Biodefense Research.” • Dr. Alan Pearson, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, 'Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons.” • Dr. Christopher Chyba, Princeton University, “Proposed International Regimes for Regulating Biotechnology Research” • Dr. Scott Steele, FBI, “Coordination on Bioterrorism Prevention, Preparedness, and Response Initiatives.” • Dr. Laura Donohue, Stanford University, “Terrorist Speech and the Future of Free Expression.”

7. Spring Seminar Series at University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey (UMDNJ) (Coordinated by Dr. Nancy Connell) • Dr. Malcolm Dando, University of Bradford, UK & Dr. Brian Rappert, University of Exeter, UK, "The Life Sciences, Bio-security and Dual-Use Research." • Dr. Michael Allswede, University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, "Forensic Epidemiology." • Dr. Gigi Kwik-Gronvall, Center for Civilian Biodefense Studies, University of Pittsburgh, “From Anthrax to Flu: Preparing the Country for Biological Threats.”

8. Fall 2006 Seminar Series • October 6: Dr. Stanley Lemon, Chair and Director of the Institute for Human Infections and Immunity, University of Texas Medical Branch. “Biosecurity vs Bioinsecurity: BSL4 Research in the 21st Century.” • October 13: Milton Leitenberg, Senior Research Scholar on Arms Control and Biological Weapons, School of Public Policy, University of Maryland. “Assessing Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat.” • October 20: Ambassador Donald A. Mahley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Threat Reduction, Export Controls, and Negotiations, U.S. Department of State. “The Debate over the Role of the Biological Weapons Convention in Today’s Bio-Defense Equation.”

9. Fall 2006 Seminar Series (continued) • October 27: Dr. Jens Kuhn, Research Scholar, Division of Tumor Virology, New England Primate Research Center, Harvard Medical School. “Integration of Former Soviet Bioweapons Facilities into the International Research Community—Success or Failure?” • December 1, 2006 Dr. Dennis Kasper, Director Channing Laboratory, William Ellery Channing Professor of Medicine, Professor of Microbiology and Molecular Genetics, Harvard Medical School. Chair of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. What is the NSABB all about? • December 8, 2006Dr. W. Ian Lipkin, Jerome L and Dawn Greene Professor of Epidemiology and Director of the Infectious Disease Laboratory Mailman School of Public Health; Principal Investigator and Scientific Director, Northeast Biodefense Center, College of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia University. “Pathogen Surveillance and Discovery.”

10. Papers from Series • LH Kahn, “Biodefense Research: Can Secrecy and Safety Co-Exist?” Biosecurity and Bioterroism 2004, Volume 2. http://www.scienceboard.net/community/perspectives.110.html • J Tucker, “Biological Threat Assessment: Is the Cure Worse than the Disease?” Arms Control Today, October 2004. http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_10/Tucker.asp • S Wright, “Taking Biodefense Too Far,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2004. http://www.thebulletin.org/article.php?art_ofn=nd04wright

11. Biodefense Research: Can Secrecy and Safety Co-Exist? • Paper examined the interface between secrecy and safety. • Transparency of Select Agent Research to First Responders (physicians and public health professionals) • A National Surveillance System of Laboratory-acquired infections • Provide epidemiologic data on the incidence, severity, and community impact, if any, of these infections.

12. Josiah Macy, Jr. Foundation Supported Four State Public Health Preparedness Study • Goals of study: • To assess how state and local health departments, and state agriculture departments, are responding to the threats of emerging infectious diseases and bioterrorism. • To assess leadership, disease surveillance, clinical capabilities, laboratory capabilities, communications, funding, and attitudes. • Four states were studied: New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Surveyed all local health departments and over 4000 physicians and 4000 veterinarians.

13. Key Findings • For human public health, there is confusion between political and professional leadership. Confusion did not exist for animal health. • Minimal physician and veterinarian engagement with local public health organizations. Over a quarter of the respondents did not know if their community had a local public health agency or not. • Physicians’ and veterinarians’ opinions of local public health agency capabilities during a crisis were uniformly low.

14. Key Findings • There is minimal communication between physicians and veterinarians. In an era in which the vast majority of emerging infectious diseases are zoonotic, communication and collaboration between these professionals is critical. • With the exception of New York State, few of the local public health agencies were able to provide incidence-rate data for many vaccine-preventable diseases in human populations.

15. Key Findings • In a crisis situation, public health would be almost entirely dependent on volunteers, local clinics, physicians’ offices, and the National Guard for out-of-hospital clinical and preventive services. • Vaccination and disease statistics for all species of animals were not available in all four states.

16. Key Findings • Local public health agencies that depended upon local sources for primary funding were 11 times less likely to have received federal biodefense funds than agencies that received most of their funding from the state. • Local public health agencies that had received federal biodefense funding were more likely to have hired new surveillance staff and new equipment than those that did not receive these funds.

17. Thank you! • Carnegie Biodefense Seminar Series:http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/BW_series/index.html • Four State Public Health Preparedness Report: http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/Macy/index.html