Japan’s Triple Disasters and Human Security

1. Japan’s Triple Disasters and Human Security Miki Okamura Ray Kato RieToyokawa

2. Japan’s Triple Disasters Magnitude 9 March 11th, 2011 (14:46:23) 15-meter

3. Topic • Do you think it is useful to apply human security approach to Japan’s triple disaster? ☞YES!!!

4. Human Security (Four Elements) • 1. Prevention • 2. People-centered • 3. Universal • 4. Interdependence

5. Prevention • Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention. 1. Alleviating the risk of unpredictable natural disasters (earthquakes and tsunami) 2. Minimizing the possibilityof forming manmade disasters (nuclear energy) 3. Learning from the past mistakes and preparing for the future disasters Prevention

6. 1. Natural Disasters …alleviating the risk of unpredictable natural disastersQ. Was it really “想定外”(unpredictable)? • Avoiding to consider the worst case scenarios- earthquakes- tsunami • Ignoring predictions Prevention

7. Worst Case Scenario (1) Earthquake • Japan is one of the most earthquake prone country in the world. • 20% of the world’s earthquake with magnitude greater than 6 is in Japan. • Fukushima prefecture has the most earthquake in all of Japan. = Wrong location to construct cluster of multiple reactors Prevention

8. Number of earthquakes in all prefectures (5/26/2004~3/13/2014) Prevention

9. Worst Case Scenario(2) Tsunami • Japan is the most tsunami prone country in the world • Word origin of “tsunami” • Seawall before the crisis = 5.7 m • Signs and warnings ignored:- 2008 simulation by TEPCO- 2009 accusation by NISA • Cost to build a higher sea wall Prevention

10. Predictions • PM Kan: “We did not anticipate such a huge natural disaster could happen.” • Wise Predictions:- Jinzaburo Takagi (CNIC) predictions in 1996- 14 lawsuits • Oppositions Prevention

11. 2. Manmade Disasters …minimizing the possibilityof forming manmade disastersQ. Are we victims? Or did we cause it on our own? • Wishful thinking:- pride in technology-safety of 100% myth- developed country • Shifting blame between TEPCO vs. PM Kan • Huge reliance on nuclear energy Prevention

12. Wishful Thinking • Contradictions to our pride in hightechnology- old reactors as old as 40 years • 100% myth reassuring safety- no evacuation drill or disaster training • Developed country- Difference between rich and poor- “it would never happen to us” = Accidents happen Prevention

13. Shifting Blame • The battle between TEPCO vs. PM Kan • Nuclear Village: blaming PM Kan that it was his order • Media: shifting the attention to PM Kan • Citizens: many wanted PM Kan to resign = While they were busy blaming one another and the situation further exacerbated Prevention

14. Nuclear Energy • Heavy reliance on nuclear energy • Nuclear energy = safe, reliable, & cheap • Before the crisis: 50 main reactors which provided 30% of the country’s electricity • Demand in increasing the number of reactors • After the crisis: 50 main reactors were offline for safety checks • Wanting to restart again despite the concern of citizens = We can live without nuclear reactors → alternate energy resources Prevention

15. 3. Future Disasters …learning from the past mistakes and preparing for the future disastersQ. What should we do to prepare for future disasters as much as possible? • Success from learning from the past mistakes- Kobe earthquake • Big earthquake in the very near future Prevention

16. Past Mistakes • Lessons learned from the past- Chernobyl nuclear crisis- Hanshin Awaji Earthquake • Never making the same mistake again = prevention • Every disaster is different- Fukushima Nuclear Crisis was a multi-location disaster Prevention

17. Future • The big earthquake that will occur in 30 years time = 70% chance • Estimation of 23,000 deaths & 95.3 trillion yen in damage • Predicting as much as possible, enough to mitigate the disaster before it occurs = “Good prevention is a solution multiplier in theresponse phase, and bad prevention is a threat multiplier in response phase.” Prevention

18. People-centered • Human security is people-centered • It means to prioritize disaster-affected people • Seems obvious but often neglected and hard to achieve • Looking at two cases in Japan’s triple disaster • TEPCO and the government • Housing policy People-centered

19. TEPCO and the government • Pre-disaster period: • Economic efficiency > People’s safety • To reduce country’s import of natural resources • To become self-sufficient on energy ☞ Promoted the nuclear energy: 100% safety myth • TEPCO and the government in difficult situation to discredit nuclear energy • Taboo subject to discuss about preparations for worst case scenario People-centered

20. TEPCO and the government • Post-disaster period: • Cost of prevention > People’s safety • Ignored the warnings and did not take a preventative step because building higher levees was costly for them • Survival of Corporation > People’s safety • Refused to use seawater to cool the reactor because it will make it permanently unusable • concealed the contaminated ground water worrying their financial standing in the stock market People-centered

21. TEPCO and the government Being institution-oriented rather than being people-oriented ended up making TEPCO and the government to pay an enormous damage to clean up the mess Which costs more in the end? Cost of building higher levees Several $100 million Total economic loss of Fukushima accident $500 billion < People-centered

22. People-centered Housing Policy Previous case study in Japan Hanshin Awaji Earthquake • January 17th, 1995 • Hit near Kobe City in Hyogo Prefecture • First large-scale urban earthquake since WWII • The second most expensive earthquake in history People-centered

23. People-centered Housing Policy Problems of Kobe City’s housing policy: • Inconvenient location of temporal housing • Many evacuees refused to move into temporal housing • Scattered community • “Solitary death” • One-track support • No other options provided for the evacuees but to move into public housing Housing policy back in Hanshin Earthquake was not people-centered People-centered

24. Lessons learned in Kobe Improvements made in Tohoku housing policy: • Effort to preserve existing community • Financially support public constructions of housing • “Designated temporal housing” • Government paying a part of rent for evacuees apartment Towards a more people-centered housing policy =Cost efficient to be people-oriented People-centered

25. Housing policy in Tohoku is still not great... Situation in Tohoku is far more complicated... Depopulation and radiation • The balance of safety and convenience • The balance of people’s request and building a long-lasting sustainable community People-centered

26. People-centered Housing Policy • People-centered approach gives a holistic view on the reconstruction of people’s life • The view not only ensures the immediate physical need of housings • But also, calls for an importance of long-term community and sustainable livelihood People-centered

27. Universal • “Human Security is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor” • “People throughout the world, in developing and developed countries alike, live under varied conditions of insecurity” (UNDP1994) Universal

28. 対岸の火事 • Japan takes Human Security as other people or nation’s issue even though it can be seen in its own nation.“Matter of Others” ☞Japan is one of the biggest international supporter but it takes it as problem of others ☞Even though Japan is industrialized and wealthy democracy, it does not mean that people are “free from threats” Universal

29. Human Threats of Triple Disaster • Crimes -stealing, phone fraud, illegal loan, violence, rape, looting • Scandals -charity fraud, charity threat, cyber crime,stow away, Universal

30. Why is Human Security ignored in Japan? • Low awareness of Human Securitycaused by manipulation of information ☞strong connection between government, electric industry, and media ☞benefit first, security second Universal

31. Role of Media Threats being overlooked • “Quiet Dignity” -the fact the people not being much emotional made the situation overlooked • Media Regulation -inadequate information disclosure -foreign journalists excluded from the press conference held at the prime minister’s official residence(首相官邸) -not covering the harsh pictures ☞it does not make people feel that the disaster is “real” Universal

32. Role of Media • Freedom of Speech? Activist such as artists and singers who act against nuclear plant gets expelled from show business. ☞Most of the TV and Radio sponsoror top managers are deeply attached to nuclear power industry. -Pre Triple Disaster ・忌野清志郎 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BnU7Yr6tZxU https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K2baSCycSWk -Post Triple Disaster ・山本太郎 ・斉藤和義 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g2ctIBq0uX8 Universal

33. Role of Government Failed to behave in open manner and provide accurate information • Unpreparedness -No evacuation drills or disaster training (myth of 100% safety) because they did not want to alarm nearby residents. • Secretiveness -delay of announcing the melt down -delay of an evacuation order -not having consistent radioactivity level announcement • Changing Arguments -changes in evacuation area ☞economy important than security ☞people cannot take human security as its own issue Universal

34. Universal • Economy, Dignity ＞Human Security • Japan did not apply universal human security properly because it saw human security as “matter of other” because it was not “real” to the citizens. • Proper education through media and adequate information disclosure is the key for Japan to apply Human Security properly. Universal

35. Conclusion • Prevention • People-centered • Universal • Prioritization of money over protection of security. • Long term strategy > short term strategy • Human security approach can help us realize what is truly important.

36. Questions to Consider… • Despite what we have learned through Japan’s Triple Disaster, do you think there is a limitation to human security?

37. Thank you for listening! 