Human Rights: Philosophical Defenses, Cont.

1. Human Rights:Philosophical Defenses, Cont. Spring 2013

2. Ecce Homo

5. One formulation of the Categorical Imperative “Act so that you use humanity in your person, as well as in the person of every other, always at the same time as end, never merely as a means.”(G 4:429)

6. Key point By treating somebody merely as a means, I disregard capacity to value Which is a capacity I have myself Therefore I would disregard myself But as agent I am committed to valuing myself

7. Objection • that I value certain things only permits inference that I must value my having the capacity to value, my partaking of humanity • you must value your having capacity to value, or your partaking of humanity

8. Continued • I must value capacity to value, or to set ends, insofar as it is a capacity I possess • you must value capacity insofar as it is a capacity you possess

9. Continued • I do not need to value your capacity to value, and vice versa • neither you nor I must value capacity to value per se • no contradiction if I am using you as a means to ends that have value because I have conferred it upon them

10. Kant’s response Kant: “But you are now drawing an arbitrary distinction – between your capacity to value and mine.”

11. Kant’s response Kant: “But you are now drawing an arbitrary distinction – between your capacity to value and mine.” “That may well be true – but your goal is to offer an inconsistency argument – and that you have not offered.” Kant: (…)

12. What Kant’s argument shows • shows how you become intelligible to me as agent • how I come to see your actions as more than mere events – realize that, in a fundamental way, we are alike • But does not show I am inconsistent when not treating you as an end

13. Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism about Human Rights: the Most We Can Hope for?” • Position Cohen rejects: that JM leads to SM

14. Joshua Cohen, “Minimalism about Human Rights: the Most We Can Hope for?” • Substantive minimalism about human rights: human rights only prohibit violations of negative rights • Justificatory minimalism: justification for human rights must not assume any specific religious or philosophical viewpoints or ideologies • Position Cohen rejects: that JM leads to SM

15. Cohen rejects this view: “If you want a universally acceptable justification of human rights, you only get very few rights – only negative rights.” Cohen claims instead: “There is a universally acceptable justification of human rights that delivers a list of rights not limited to negative rights.”

16. Ignatieff – Cohen • Ignatieff: substantive minimalism is best we can hope for because of justificatory minimalism • Cohen: justificatory minimalism allows us to hope for more than substantive minimalism • “hope” because it’s about what vision one may have, not about what’s realistic

17. Cohen’s justificatory minimalism: not skeptical, not emprical “free-standing”, “un-foundational” does not rely on thick religious or philosophical foundations and is not at their intersection

18. Thereby addresses charge that human rights are Western construct – relying too much on liberal view of the person that conceived of individual as an autonomous decision-maker

19. Cohen’s proposal • Human rights norms are norms associated with idea of membership or inclusion in society

20. Cohen’s proposal • Human rights norms are norms associated with idea of membership or inclusion in society • Membership: one is member if one’s interests are being given due consideration – are taken into account by a country’s basic institutions

21. Cohen’s proposal • Human rights norms are norms associated with idea of membership or inclusion in society • Membership: one is member if one’s interests are being given due consideration – are taken into account by a country’s basic institutions • Disagreements about human rights become disagreements about what is required for such inclusion

22. His proposal • requires specific argument for precisely what rights would pass this test • But many more than on Ignatieff’s view – if we are expected to abide by society’s rules, there are basic goods society must provide for us in return • beyond respect for negative rights • Slavery, torture, threat of arbitrary arrests, but also poor health, lack of education, and absence of sufficient economic means undermine membership

23. Human rights = membership rights

24. “Fresh elaborations of traditions” • unfoundational view of human rights not simply “read off” intersection of traditions • still, approach will gain plausibility from “fresh elaborations” of religious or philosophical traditions that support it • after all, view must nonetheless speak to religious and philosophical traditions to be acceptable

25. Case study: Confucianism • Point is not that we find ideas about rights/human rights somewhere in Confucianism • Instead: central ideas of Confucianism can be represented in such a way as to support a conception of human rights

26. Relationships • Confucianism: particular duties arise from one's situation in relation to others • individual stands in different relationships: as a junior in relation to parents and elders, and as a senior in relation to younger siblings, students, and others

27. juniors owe their seniors reverence seniors have duties of benevolence and concern toward juniors

29. Goal of Confucianism: social harmony • results from every individual knowing his or her place in social order, and playing his or her part well

30. Hall of Supreme Harmony, Beijing

31. Confucianism Basic human rights: conditions for fulfilling obligations associated with human relationship

32. Slavery, torture, threat of arbitrary arrests, but also poor health, lack of education, and absence of sufficient economic means undermine ability to fulfill obligations

33. Continued • If human worth depends on one’s ability to fulfill one’s obligations, then one can expect of others to create conditions under which one can do so • Officials have obligations, such as peace and security – this too includes human rights

34. Here human rights enter into ethical framework that thinks of human beings centrally as embedded into social relations rather than fundamentally as autonomous beings

35. Crucial: point is not that we “find” human rights in Confucianism there is way of elaborating on central tenets of Confucianism that integrates human rights human rights do not require liberal view of personhood

36. “Asian values debate” – the values at issue • Predisposition towards single-party (even authoritarian) rule over pluralist democracy • Preference for social harmony rather than dissent • Concern with socio-economic well-being instead of human rights • Preference for the welfare and collective well-being of the community over individual rights • Loyalty and respect towards all forms of authority including parents, teachers and government

37. Case Study: Islam • Human beings must understand God’s law from within historical situations • There is no compulsion in religion – so not only societal leadership must be free to seek to interpret God’s law • And finally, a diversity of religious communities is part of the natural human condition

38. “We do things differently around here” • argument often rests on attribution of unanimity that does not exist • In case of egregious human right violations: no “we” on whose behalf anybody could speak • victims have complaints that are intelligible to us and on whose behalf we can speak up

39. What if “victims” agree with the practices? – Scanlon • “But even if the victims did take the view that they have no rights against what is is done to them (…) couldn’t they be wrong in thinking this?” • “[W]hich is the more objectionable form of cultural superiority, to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them,” or to attempt to protect the defenseless even when they themselves feel that suffering is their lot and they have no basis to complain of it?” (P 119)

40. Which is more objectionable form of cultural superiority? • to refuse to aid a victim on the ground that “they live like that – they don’t recognize rights as we know them,” • or to attempt to protect the defenseless even when they themselves feel that suffering is their lot and they have no basis to complain of it? Often aid: (2) is more problematic, whereas (1) seems like an enlightened attitude But: (1) can easily be the more objectionable form of cultural superiority – because people can be brainwashed

41. Must apply with extreme caution • False consciousness: people have been persuaded to support a regime that is to somebody else’s benefit • Brain washing -- severe Manipulation • Population itself, once through the transition, would presumably approve