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H2 Safety Review - response

H2 Safety Review - response. paul drumm MICE VC, March 29 th ,2006. Osaka CM. Point by point answers were shown by Yury in Osaka Mostly in agreement with review One or two places where robust (analytical) answers are needed. My thoughts and suggestions… in red. *.

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H2 Safety Review - response

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  1. H2 Safety Review - response paul drumm MICE VC, March 29th,2006

  2. Osaka CM • Point by point answers were shown by Yury in Osaka • Mostly in agreement with review • One or two places where robust (analytical) answers are needed. • My thoughts and suggestions…in red

  3. * The original assesment was that the hydrogen zone did not extend out of the absorber vessel/pipe work. Is this changed or can the original view be defended?

  4. Finally • Additional items in report not covered in above list: • The Panel concluded that the HAZOP study as presented is incomplete. A full HAZOP study, and a failure modes effects analysis (FMEA) carried out with the aid of an external specialist, should be completed as a priority.  • What are the terms of the request to AP on the HAZOP?  The findings of these studies and the response of the MICE team should be independently examined before the designs finalised and accepted. • Keep this in mind! We may have an idea of this, but how is this to be done? • We wish to stress that the above remarks are restricted to the safety issues associated with the handling of liquid hydrogen. We have not considered the wider risks that may be encountered in carrying out the R&D activity. We suggest that a full qualitative risk assessment is undertaken by the MICE team to ensure that all hazards have been identified. • Presumably this should also have explicit agreement? • Finally, the Panel is of the opinion that no further external safety review of the Hydrogen Delivery System, R&D stage, is required before the proposed operations review, provided that the HAZOP study and FMEA are satisfactorily completed. • We agree with the MICE team that a review of how the Hydrogen Delivery System interacts with an absorber focus coil module as well as with the full control and interlock system of the MICE experiment will be needed before the implementation of the next stage. • Operating procedures, systems of work • RISK Assessment • FMEA • HAZOP

  5. Timetable • Review response at D&S • meeting being arranged ~soon! • Finalise Response ~mid April • Response sent to TB  EB  RAL Management ~ end April • Timely discussions in D&S group

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