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Moral Responsibility. Themes in Ethics and Epistemology Shane Ryan s.g.ryan@sms.ed.ac.uk 16/10/13. Problem. There's a compelling case that we don't have free will. But if we don't have free will then it's hard to see how we can have moral responsibility.
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Moral Responsibility Themes in Ethics and Epistemology Shane Ryan s.g.ryan@sms.ed.ac.uk 16/10/13
Problem • There's a compelling case that we don't have free will. But if we don't have free will then it's hard to see how we can have moral responsibility. • And if we don't think that people can have moral responsibility then it's hard to see how we can morally praise or blame anyone. But if we can't morally praise and blame, then we can't laud people such as Gandhi or condemn people such as Hitler.
Structure 1. Free Will 2. Determinism and Indeterminism 3. Positions on Free Will 4. Moral Responsibility 5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist argument 6. Strawson's Pessimism
1. Free Will Case 1: John is struggling to finish writing an essay. The essay has to be submitted in the next day. He gets an sms from a girl he likes inviting him to a party taking place that very evening. John can choose to continue to work on his essay or go to the party. John chooses to continue to work on his essay. It looks like John has exercised his free will.
1. Free Will Case 2: Lena is an international student who has just completed her MA. She has lived away from home for the last four years. She enjoys living abroad but she knows that her family would like her to move back home. Lena also knows that she could continue living abroad. Lena faces a choice between moving back home and continuing to live abroad. She chooses to continue living abroad. It looks like Lena has exercised her free will.
1. Free Will • But some philosophers deny that people have free will; therefore they would deny that John and Lena have exercised free will. (And that John and Lena can be said to have made a choice in the sense in which people using the word ordinarily mean.) • But what reason could they have for denying the common sense claim that we have free will?
1. Free Will • But first we should try to get clearer on what is meant by free will. • Is exercising free will just wanting something and doing it? • Suppose as part of an experiment a team of psychologists had brainwashed John into wanting to work on his essay above all else. • If this were the case, then it would seem mistaken to say that John exercised his free will in the case described.
1. Free Will • Some attempts at a provisional definition: • Timothy O’Connor (2011): “Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about.” (Emphasis added.)
1. Free Will • Michael McKenna (2009): “[A]s a theory-neutral point of departure, free will can be defined as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility. Clearly, this definition is too lean when taken as an endpoint; the hard philosophical work is about how best to develop this special kind of control. But however this notion of control is developed, its uniqueness consists, at least in part, in being possessed only by persons.”
1. Free Will The main components mentioned: • A particular sort of capacity to choose. • Free will involves control of an agent over her action or conduct. • It requires a level of control necessary to allow for moral responsibility. • It is only possessed by rational agents/persons.
2. Determinism and Indeterminism The Classical Formulation of the free will problem: 1. Some person (qua agent), at some time, could have acted otherwise than she did. 2. Actions are events. 3. Every event has a cause. 4. If an event is caused, then it is causally determined. 5. If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the act could not have acted otherwise than in the way that she did. (McKenna, 2009.)
2. Determinism and Indeterminism Determinism and indeterminism • Timpe (2006): “Causal determinism... is the thesis that the course of the future is entirely determined by the conjunction of the past and the laws of nature.” • Timpe asks us to imagine a proposition that comprehensively describes the universe at some point in the past, and a proposition that expresses each of the laws of nature. Determinism is the view that given these two propositions there is only one possible future.
2. Determinism and Indeterminism Determinism and indeterminism • This not the view that finite beings are able to predict exactly how the universe will turn out. • Neither is it the fatalistic view that something (say passing your exams) is bound to happen regardless of what you do.
2. Determinism and Indeterminism Determinism and indeterminism • Two kinds of ways the world might not be deterministic: - If the laws of nature are indeterministic or probabilistic. - If some entities are not completely governed by the laws of nature. • Doesn’t quantum theory claim that the world isn’t deterministic? The standard interpretation of quantum theory claims that events at the micro-particle level are indeterministic. But even if there is quantum indeterminacy, that doesn’t show that larger objects, like us, aren’t subject to deterministic laws. (Timpe, 2006)
2. Determinism and Indeterminism Determinism and indeterminism • So even if we have reason to reject determinism, “near determinism” may still be true; much of our universe including ourselves are governed by deterministic laws. (Timpe, 2006)
3. Positions on Free Will • Determinism and indeterminism are theses about the nature of our universe. • Traditionally the truth of either claim is taken to have implications for free will. • Incompatibilists think that free will is incompatible with determinism • Compatibilists think that free will is compatible with determinism.
3. Positions on Free Will • Incompatibilist positions: Hard determinism and libertarianism. • Hard determinism: P1. If determinism is true then we don’t have free will. P2. Determinism is true. C. We don’t have free will. - When John stays in to work on his essay he has not exercised his free will.
3. Positions on Free Will • Libertarianism: P1. If determinism is true then we don’t have free will. P2*. We do have free will. C*. Determinism is not true. - When Sarah stays abroad she has exercised her free will. (The libertarian needs indeterminism to be true for it to be true that we have free will.)
3. Positions on Free Will • Compatibilists hold that free will and determinism are compatible. They don’t think that one rules out the other. • Therefore a compatibilist is committed to rejecting P1 (If determinism is true then we don’t have free will.)
3. Positions on Free Will 1. Some person (qua agent), at some time, could have acted otherwise than she did. 2. Actions are events. 3. Every event has a cause. 4. If an event is caused, then it is causally determined. 5. If an event is an act that is causally determined, then the agent of the act could not have acted otherwise than in the way that she did. (McKenna, 2009.)
3. Positions on Free Will • Within this framework the compatibilist would have to deny (5). • Similarly the incompatibilist would have to affirm (5). • Of the incompatibilist positions: - The hard determinist will reject (1). - The libertarian might reject (3) or (4). • All might question whether (1) correctly represents what free will is. (McKenna, 2009.)
3. Positions on Free Will • Why might we think that (1) correctly represents what free will is? • The Garden of Forking Paths Model • In John’s case what seems important in order to say that he has free will is that he had the ability to choose between at least two alternatives, that different paths lay open to him. He has the ability to either stay and work on his essay or go to the party. • But remember that determinism is the claim that there is only one possible future.
3. Positions on Free Will • An argument against the Garden of Forking Paths Model (P1) If a person acts of her own free will, then she could have done otherwise. (P2) If determinism is true, no one can do otherwise than one actually does. (C) Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will. (McKenna, 2009.)
3. Positions on Free Will Source Incompatibilist Argument • We might think what’s important is not that John actually had two possible paths open to him but that his action came from him in the right way; that he “chose” makes him the source of what happened in the right kind of way. • John wanting to do well in his essay was the source of his action. It is that which means it makes sense to say that he exercised his free will. • But now we might worry that that source itself has a further source that lines outside of John.
3. Positions on Free Will • Again accepting determinism seems to rule out the possibility of free will. • Source Incompatibilist Argument: (P1) A person acts of her own free will only if she is its ultimate source. (P2) If determinism is true, no one is the ultimate source of her actions. (C) Therefore, if determinism is true, no one acts of her own free will. (McKenna, 2009.)
4. Moral Responsibility • Free will seems at the least to be a necessary condition for moral responsibility. If we don’t have free will then it seems that we can’t have moral responsibility. • What is moral responsibility? - A morally responsible person is one who is able to do morally right or wrong action and “is accountable for her morally significant conduct.” Such a person may aptly be morally praised or blamed. (McKenna, 2009.)
4. Moral Responsibility • Galen Strawson (1994: 9) provides a more colourful explanation of moral responsibility: “As I understand it, true moral responsibility is responsibility of such a kind that, if we have it, then it makes sense, at least, to suppose that it could be just to punish some of us with (eternal) torment in hell and reward others with (eternal) bliss in heaven.”
4. Moral Responsibility • We want to say that people like Gandhi are morally praiseworthy, while people like Paul Pot are morally blameworthy. • More mundanely, we want to say that someone who stops another person being bullied is morally praiseworthy, while someone who cheats in exams is morally blameworthy.
4. Moral Responsibility • Why does claiming that we don’t have free will appear to imply that we don’t have moral responsibility either? • If Paul Pot didn’t have free will then how can we blame him for what he did? • Similarly, why should we praise Gandhi if he wasn’t acting on the basis of free will?
5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist argument Frankfurt’s argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP). PAP: A person is morally responsible for what she does do only if she can do otherwise.
5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist argument Jones has resolved to shoot Smith. Black has learned of Jones's plan and wants Jones to shoot Smith. However, Black is concerned that Jones might waver in his resolve to shoot Smith, Black secretly arranges things so that, if Jones should show any sign at all that he will not shoot Smith (something Black has the resources to detect), Black will be able to manipulate Jones in such a way that Jones will shoot Smith. As things transpire, Jones follows through with his plans and shoots Smith for his own reasons. No one else in any way threatened or coerced Jones, offered Jones a bribe, or even suggested that he shoot Smith. Jones shot Smith under his own steam. Black never intervened. (McKenna, 2009.)
5. Frankfurt’s compatibilist argument In the case described, Jones couldn’t have done otherwise. He couldn’t have not shot Smith. Nevertheless, intuitively Jones is still morally responsible for his action. (McKenna, 2009.) Determinism may still be incompatible with the sort of free will that involves a capacity to do otherwise, but Frankfurt’s argument suggests that we don’t need that for moral responsibility.
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism Pessimism: Neither determinism nor indeterminism can result in us having moral responsibility. Pessimists believe that free will of the sort necessary for moral responsibility is impossible, even though they might accept certain compatibilist formulations of freedom. (Galen Strawson, forthcoming.)
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism (1) It is undeniable that one is the way one is, initially, as a result of heredity and early experience.(2) It is undeniable that these are things for which one cannot be held to be in any way responsible.(3) One cannot at any later stage of one’s life hope to attain ultimate responsibility for the way one is by trying to change the way one already is as a result of one’s heredity and previous experience.For one may well try to change oneself, but(4) both the particular way in which one is moved to try to change oneself, and the degree of one’s success in one’s attempt at change, will be determined by how one already is as a result of heredity and previous experience.
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism (5) any further changes that one can bring about only after one has brought about certain initial changes will in turn be determined, via the initial changes, by heredity and previous experience.(6) This may not be the whole story, for it may be that some changes in the way one is are traceable to the influence of indeterministic or random factors. But (7) it is foolish to suppose that indeterministic or random factors, for which one is ex hypothesi in no way responsible, can in themselves contribute to one’s being truly or ultimately responsible for how one is.(Galen Strawson)
6. Galen Strawson’s Pessimism The implications Every detail of how you are is a matter of luck. Whether you behave like Paul Pot or Gandhi is also a matter a luck. If your behaviour is a matter of luck, then you are not morally responsible. The same is true of everyone and therefore Jones is not morally responsible for shooting Smith.
