Thomas M. Dousa GSLIS, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign ISKO 2010 Rome, Italy

1. Whither Pragmatism in Knowledge Organization?Classical pragmatism vs. Neopragmatism as KO Metatheories Thomas M. Dousa GSLIS, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign ISKO 2010 Rome, Italy

2. Pragmatism as a philosophical position: Some basic Tenets • Core Epistemological premise: The meaning of a concept or the truth of a pro- position is to be evaluated by considering the “experiential or practical consequences of its application” (Haack 2003, 774). •Other basic features (cf. Jacob 2000): * Fallibilism * Contingency * Social Embeddedness * Pluralism

3. Classical Pragmatism and Neopragmatism •Classical Pragmatism (hereafter, CP): -- Primary Exponents: * Charles Sanders Peirce (1839—1914) * William James (1842—1910) * John Dewey (1859—1952) •Neopragmatism (hereafter, NP): -- Primary Exponent: *Richard Rorty (1933—2007)

4. CP and NP as KO metatheories:Key questions • How does NP differ from CP? • Are the difference sufficient to make a metatheoretical difference for KO? • If so, is NP an advance over CP as a philo- sophical resource for KO?

5. CP and NP: Differences According to Rorty (1999, 35 & 95), there are two primary differences between CP and NP: (1) CP’s epistemic point of departure = “Experience” NP’s epistemic point of departure = “Language” (2) CP: scientific method is a privileged form of inquiry. NP: There is no privileged form of inquiry.

6. CP vs. NP: Epistemic point of Departure for inquiry (I) • CP: -- Inquiry based on experience * Purposeful interaction with the world involving “pushes and pulls” as human beings encounter, perceive, analyze, manipulate, and test objects and ideas to solve the problem to which inquiry is addressed. * Experience and inference therefrom pro- vide epistemological warrant.

7. CP vs. NP: Epistemic point of Departure for inquiry (II) •NP: Inquiry based on language: * No prelinguistic referent by means of which one can justify one’s conceptual- ization and belief. * Epistemological warrant reposes en- tirely on intersubjective agreement.

8. CP vs. NP: Method of Inquiry (I) •CP: * Privileged method is “method of science” or “experimental method”. * This method involves: hypothesis formation, manipulation of objects, observation of responses, deduction from observation, and submission of results to one’s peers. * Experimental method applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all inquiries.

9. CP vs. NP: Method of Inquiry (II) •NP: * views inquiry not as a form of “experimental method” but as a form of conversation. * Emphasizes ethical norms of conversation- al reasonableness over epistemic norms. * holds that “we should discard the metaphor of inquiry, and human society generally, as converging, rather than proliferating, be- coming more unified rather than more diverse (Rorty 1987, 45).

10. Metatheoretical Consequencesof CP and NP (I) •Do the metatheoretical differences between CP and NP make a practical difference for KO (meta)theory? •With respect to KO design, … NO •With respect to KO research methodology … NO

11. Metatheoretical Consequencesof CP and NP (II) • There are cases where the differences between CP and NP do have metatheoretical consequences … e.g., CP, but not NP, accommodates Hjørland’s (1997) views that * scientific classifications should be based on the “pure inquiry”, which constitutes “the pursuit of truth for its own sake” (p. 83). * “pragmatic realism” (pp. 81–82) is based on contribu- tions from both the inquirer and the external world. • … but may not have any practical import for the resultant theory of KO design.

12. Metatheoretical Consequencesof CP and NP (III) • The theoretical differences between CP and NP may have consequences for KO’s self-concept- ualization as a field. * CP’s call for a general method of inquiry is likely to lead to an integrative vision of KO. * NP’s repudiation of any general method of inquiry is likely to lead to a fragmented vision of KO. • In this respect, CP may prove a more useful metatheoretical option than NP.

13. References •Haack, S. (2003). Pragmatism, in N. Bunnin & E. P. Tsui-James (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy (2nd. Ed.; pp. 774—789). Malden, MA: Blackwell. •Hjørland, B. (1997). Information seeking and subject represent ation: an activity-theoretical approach to information science. Westport: Greenwood Press, CT. •Jacob, E. (2000). The legacy of pragmatism: implications for knowledge organization in a pluralistic universe. In C. Beghtol, L.C. Howarth, & N.J. Williamson (eds.), Dynamism and stability in knowledge organization: Proceedings of the Sixth International ISKO Conference, Toronto, Canada,10–13 July 2000 (pp. 16–22). Würzburg: Ergon. •Rorty, R. (1987). Science as solidarity. In J.S. Nelson, A. Megill, & D.N. McCloskey (eds.), The rhetoric of the human sciences: language and argument in scholarship and public affairs (pp. 38—52). Madison,WI: University of Wisconsin Press.

14. References •Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and social hope. London/New York: Penguin Books.