CNCAN

1. CNCAN ROMANIA National Commission for Nuclear Activities Control Romanian Nuclear Safety Authority Experiences on Building the National Capability for Nuclear SecurityDr. Lucian BiroDirector GeneralTM/WS Topical Issues on Infrastructure Development:Managing the Development of National Infrastructurefor Nuclear PowerVienna, 9-12 February 2010

2. Content (1) • Romanian Policy Principles in the Nuclear Sector • Physical Protection - Historical Background • Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities • NPP Safety & Security Characteristics • Physical Protection Regulations

3. Content (2) • Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Actions Plans • Romanian Counter-Proliferation Group (RCPG) • Security Related Events Organized by CNCAN- Few Examples • Conclusions

4. Romanian Policy Principles in the Nuclear Sector

5. Policy Principles (1) • Non-proliferation policy; • Peaceful use of nuclear energy; • Fully compliance of international treaties, agreements and conventions provisions; • Transparency for all nuclear activities; • Implementation of high level nuclear and radiation safety internationally recognized standards;

6. Policy Principles (2) • Implementation of Nuclear and Radiological Security measures; • Export/import strictly under control; • Preventing and Combating the illicit trafficking; • International Cooperation.

7. Physical Protection- Historical Background -

8. Historical Background (1)

9. Historical Background (2)

10. Historical Background (3)

11. Historical Background (4)

12. Historical Background (5)

13. Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities

14. Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (1) • Lack of procedures • Inefficient procedures • Inefficient Physical Protection Systems • Lack of Facilities Personnel Training • Radioactive Sources Lost or Theft • Inefficient Transportation Physical Protection • Lack of communications between authorities

15. Nuclear Security Vulnerabilities (2) • Lack of coherent strategy • Gaps in Legal Framework • Inadequate Equipment • No specialized response units • Permissive Border Control • No background history of radioactive sources • No security culture

16. NPP Safety & Security Characteristics

17. NPP Characteristics • All NPPs have comprehensive measures for safety and security; • Comprehensive emergency and security plans; • Robust containment, spent fuel pools, and spent fuel storage containers; • Redundant and diverse plant safety systems; • Trained plant staff, skilled in accident and event response; • Well-trained, well-armed security forces.

18. Reactor Building Bio Shield Calandria Vessel Reactor Fuel CANDU-6 Multiple Layers Protection

19. Cernavoda NPP Units 1 & 2

20. Cernavoda NPP Units 3 & 4

21. Physical Protection Regulations

22. Regulatory Powers • Laws initiator • Issues Regulations • Issues Licenses • Regulatory Directives • Approvals • Agreements • Specifications

23. Regulatory Enforcement • Recommendation for licensee action • Action Notice • Regulatory Directive • License amendments • Restrictions for reactor operation • Reactor shutdown • Revocation or suspensions of the License • Prosecutions

24. Physical Protection Regulations (1) • Physical Protection Regulations in Nuclear Field • Design Basis Threat (DBT) • Regulations on using DBT • Regulations on requirements for guards and security personnel qualification

25. Physical Protection Regulations (2) • Implementation of the INFCIRC 225/Rev.4 recommendations; • To use extensively the IAEA IPPAS Missions in Romania; • To use the IAEA and DOE assistance to improve the design and to built the physical protection systems at: • TRIGA Research Reactor; • CANDU Nuclear Fuel Plant; • VVR-S Research Reactor;

26. Physical Protection Regulations

27. Radioactive Material Transport Regulations

28. Safeguards Regulations

29. DBT Review Process (1) • Changing of terrorists’ motivation • Interest for Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) • Using the technology to exploit the vulnerabilities of a particular society • Development of black markets may offer access to weapons • The rapid spread of technological knowledge can boost terrorists weapon attempts

30. DBT Review Process (2) • Technical barriers should not be regarded sufficient to prevent future nuclear terrorism; • Upgrading physical protection of nuclear material and radioactive sources; • Enhancing accident prevention;

31. DBT Review Process (3) • Reinforcing the emergency response mechanisms; • Co-operating with intelligence services; • Preventing any extremist group from achieving their goals could be done by preventing the access to fissile materials through state compliance to rigorous standards of nuclear material protection, control and accountability.

32. DBT Review Schedule

33. Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Actions Plans

34. National Nuclear Safety Strategy

35. Security Related Action Plans (1) • Actions Plan to Increase Capability and Independence of Nuclear Regulatory Authority • Actions Plan to Accelerate the Reviewing Process of the National Legislative Framework • Actions Plan for the Investigations of the Potential Sites with Orphans Radioactive Sources and to Set-up Corrective Measures • Actions Plan to Improve the Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Systems Technical Features and Administrative Procedures

36. Security Related Action Plans (2) • Actions Plan for the Nuclear & Radiological Security In-field Early Detection • Actions Plan for the Institutional Cooperation Development • Actions Plan to Increase the Bilateral and Multilateral International Cooperation

37. Security Related Action Plans (1) • Actions Plan to Increase Capability and Independence of Nuclear Regulatory Authority • Actions Plan to Accelerate the Reviewing Process of the National Legislative Framework • Actions Plan for the Investigations of the Potential Sites with Orphans Radioactive Sources and to Set-up Corrective Measures • Actions Plan to Improve the Nuclear & Radiological Security Related Systems Technical Features and Administrative Procedures

38. Security Related Action Plans (2) • Actions Plan for the Nuclear & Radiological Security In-field Early Detection • Actions Plan for the Institutional Cooperation Development • Actions Plan to Increase the Bilateral and Multilateral International Cooperation

39. Romanian Counter-Proliferation Group (RCPG)

40. Romanian Counter-Proliferation Group (RCPG) • Interdepartmental mechanism of co-operation; • Created at the initiative and the assistance of the Government of the United States of America and also as a part of the Strategic Partnership between the USA and Romania; • It is a result of the US Customs Service / Department of Defense Counter Proliferation Program with the Government of Romania; • In force from August 1998;

41. RCPG Mission (1) • “A multi-agency unified effort to seek to reduce the threat of WMD and the illicit trafficking in conventional arms, dual use goods and technologies”. • To combat the trafficking WMD and the illicit trafficking in conventional arms, dual use goods and technologies that might affect the security interest of Romania; • The RCPG agencies with enforcement control and investigation authority will take action for identifying and combating actions undertaking by all persons engaged in the trafficking of WMD and the illicit trafficking in conventional arms, dual use goods and technologies;

42. RCPG Mission (2) • The RCPG members may not exceed the authority of their respective agency or position and the competencies of their respective agencies; • The RCPG will only use legally established techniques and procedures for surveillance, control and investigations;

43. Security Related Events Organized by CNCAN- Few Examples -

44. Event Poster Layout (1)

45. Event Poster Layout (2)

46. Event Poster Layout (3)

47. Event Poster Layout (4)

48. RRRFR Project Partners for Romania

49. Physical Protection for Nuclear Fuel Transportation

50. International Meeting (1)