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Chapter 8. Reciprocity and Group Behaviour. Reciprocal Altruism. Non-kin Sacrifice now for possible future return Requirements for behaviour’s evolution Cost to donor less than benefit to recipient Recognition of individuals Long(ish) life span . Non-human Examples.
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Chapter 8 Reciprocity and Group Behaviour
Reciprocal Altruism • Non-kin • Sacrifice now for possible future return • Requirements for behaviour’s evolution • Cost to donor less than benefit to recipient • Recognition of individuals • Long(ish) life span
Non-human Examples • Thwarting predators (alarm calls) • Cooperative breeding • Food sharing • Dominance (ritualized aggression) • Apes, monkeys, wolves, African wild dogs, vampire bats...
Baboon Mating (Packer 1977) • Males solicit help in conflict situations • Establish eye contact with “helper” • Gaze at antagonist • 20 cases of conflict between males over females • 16 helpers; helper doesn’t directly benefit • Males who give help are more likely to get help • “Friendless” males rarely mate
Vampire Bats • Up to 12 mothers with offspring • Males leave early • Associated together 60% of the time • Successful feeding learned over time • 33% yearlings failed vs. 7% of 2+ years • Can go 3 days without feeding • Regurgitate blood for “friends” • Friends = bats who have given food in the past • Friends regurgitate for friends in need • e.g., within 13 hours of starvation
Chimpanzee Politics • Chimps in Arnhem (Netherlands) zoo • Yeroen: dominant male • 75% of matings • Luit: younger, subordinate male • 25% of matings; challenger • Females gradually defect to Luit • Yeroen’s matings dropped to 0% • Luit’s matings increased to >50%
Yeroen makes alliance with Nikkie • Nikkie’s matings: 0% --> 50% • Yeroren’s matings: 0% --> 25% • Male-male alliances and male-female support • Can’t be dominant without female support
Risk-reduction Hypothesis • Reciprocal relationships as insurance • Safety in uncertain conditions • Survival • Behavioural risk • Positive correlation with reciprocal altruism
Failure of Reciprocal Altruism • What would cause it to fail? • Cheating • Societal knowledge • Recognition of individuals • Selection against cheaters
Issues to Consider • Resources being shared • Food, shelter, labour, etc. • Size of population • Chance of kinship, risk of extinction, etc. • Environmental conditions • Variability/predictiveness, carrying capacity • Benefit to altruist?
Competitive Altruism • Desire to be known as an altruist • Advertising • Reputation and social standing
Show-off Hypothesis • Take risks for increased status • Results in subsequent “reciprocity” • Competitive altruism • Mating opportunities • Intersexual and intrasexual selection • More common in males than females • Conflict between mating and parenting strategies • Audience
Social Incentives • Hawkes (1993) • “Safe” game provides more food than “risky” • Hunting may not only be about food provisioning • “Risky” resources shared by men • Provides social attention --> more helpers and mates • Controversial hypothesis • May be delayed reciprocity
Wall of Heroes • Postman’s Park, London • Mr. G.F. Watts’ memorial, started 1900
War • Until recently, many argued humans and ants were the only species to wage war. • This is not true. • Other species wage war, albeit differently from the modern human style. Dyer (2004) p. vi
Origins • Organized war throughout recorded history • Artifact of civilization? • Innate behaviour? • Nurture or nature?
Thomas Hobbes • Leviathan (1651) • Pre-civilized man: • “No arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.” • Political tract favouring centralized state
Jean-Jacques Rousseau • Discourses on the Origin of Inequality (1755) • “Noble savage” • Freedom and equality
Political theorists No actual knowledge of the lifestyle of “pre-civilized” people Assumption: wars caused by inequality French Revolutionaries, Marxist, most 20th century anthropologists Konrad Lorenz (1966) On Aggression “Malfunctions of aggression” Quincy Wright (1965) A Study of War Data from 633 primitive cultures “the collectors, lower hunters and lower agriculturalists are the least warlike… while the highest agriculturalists… are the most warlike of all.” (p. 63) Bias
Hunter Gatherers • Really very rare now • Remaining groups in highly marginalized environments • 20-80 adults • Not much in the way of social hierarchy • Often collective decision making • Easy to leave one group and join another • Sharp division of labour • Men: more “political” power (women out-marry)
Fatal Encounter • “One year later, a gang from Kasekela found their third victim. This time the target was Goliath, now well past his prime, with a bald head, very worn teeth, protruding ribs and spine… He had been a well-integrated member of the Kasekela community only five years before, and now (though he had since joined the Kahama group) he was little threat to anyone. It began as a border patrol…. The raiders rushed madly down the slope to their target. While Goliath screamed…he was held and beaten and kicked and lifted and dropped and bitten and jumped on. At first he tried to protect his head, but soon he gave up and lay stretched out and still…. They kept up the attack for 18 minutes, then turned for home…. Bleeding freely from his head, gashed on his back, Goliath tried to sit up but fell back shivering. He too was never seen again.” • Wrangham & Peterson (1996), p. 17.
Opportunistic Conflict • Small group attacks • Ambush • Only if distinct advantage to one side
Hunter-Gatherer War • “Choreographed” • Distinct advantage? • Few die in each battle • Many battles each year = lot of dead Dani formal battle, New Guinea highlands (Dyer 2004, p. 78)
The Mae Enga • 25% of men and 5% of women died from warfare • Staged confrontations a way of measuring opposition’s strength • When strength imbalance, daytime choreographed battles go to nighttime or dawn raids • Aim is to exterminate rival group • 30% of villages destroyed each century
Pre-history • Homo erectus • 750,000 years ago • Depression fractures in skulls consistent with clubs • Cut marks on bones suggesting de-fleshing; cannibalism • Homo sapiens neanderthalis • 100,000 - 40,000 years ago • Death by weapons, spear wounds, mass burial • 5+% of Neanderthal burials show marks of violence
Warfare and the Predator • If you’re not equipped to kill interspecifically, you probably aren’t going to be very good at intraspecific killing • But not all predators wage “war” • e.g., tigers, eagles, weasels rarely fight to death • Too much risk; no advantage worth 50% chance of death
Social Structure • Loosely related group (kinship) • Variable size • Leads to opportunities to eliminate individuals from rival groups • Group kills individual with little risk • Lions, hyenas, wolves, chimpanzees, human hunter-gatherers
Selfish Genes and Fitness • Competition for resources • Reducing membership of another group gives your group an advantage • Kinship • Adults who do the killing are probably related; if the group does well, so do the individuals’ genes • Selective pressure for behaviour • Kill if opportunity arises and risk is low
Dominance Systems • Within-group regulation • Despotism or hierarchical • Vertical and horizontal • Absolute and relative dominance hierarchies • Dominants and subordinates • Reduces conflict in long run • Evolved rules, behaviours