INFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION ABOUT THE SMOLENSK CATASTROPHE

1. INFORMATION AND DISINFORMATION ABOUT THE SMOLENSK CATASTROPHE Katyn2010 Families Association Graphics and multimedia: MarekDabrowski July 2011

2. “Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog 16 April 2010 (Colonel Rzepa – military public prosecutor) • “Colonel Rzepa, when asked if conversations recorded from the cabin crew were conversations between the crew or between the crew and some of the passengers, he answered: ‘I am sure they were only conversations between the crew’ 15 May 2010 (Edmund Klich – Polish accredited representative to IAC) • “… E. Klich confirmed that while listening to the recording of the crew’s communication he didn’t hear anyone but the crew.” E. Klich: “I’ve been listening to the whole recording and I noticed just the conversation between the crew, and the crew and ground controllers. I didn’t hear anything except for that…”

3. “Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog JUNE 2010 • Despite many requests and motions Poland received only a copy of recordings and transcripts of crew conversations. • The transcripts were subsequently published. • There are sentences in the transcripts of crew communication allegedly credited to passengers • The media attack on crew and passengers starts .

4. Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog • Experts are curious about the length of the recording time: 38 minutes instead of 30 minutes. • Russians explains that the magnetic strip had been replaced but there is no evidence of such replacement. • The delivered copy is flawed. Minister Miller travels three times to Moscow for a replacement copy.

5. Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog • The Polish government keeps silent over media attacks on crew and passengers based on the content of the transcripts. • TVN station and „GazetaWyborcza”daily reports new not confirmed revelations from transcripts which allegedly prove both the submission and bravado of the crew: ‘He will kill me if I do not land’, “Watch the best men landing!” ”

6. Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog JANUARY 2011 – Moscow. IAC REPORT IS BEING PUBLISHED • The IAC bases their report on the June transcripts and suggests that the catastrophe was caused by the submission of the crew to pressure from the passengers. • Moscow continuously ignores Polish motions and requests for access to the originals.

7. “Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog January 2011 Warsaw Polish committee presentation. (…) The navigator of the Polish aircraft was not afraid during the flight to Smolensk that the “President (61) would go crazy” and the Pilot in Command did not ask the Director of Diplomatic Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – MariuszKazana (50), for “asking the boss what to do”. These words, contrary to what the Russians claimed, are not on the records presented by the Polish commission. In the fragments on which Russians based their report and formed the evidence of the pressure on Polish crew, our experts heard different words than the IAC heard. – These readings undermine the Russian version about the pressure exerted – says Major Fiszer on the TVN24 TV channel

8. Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101 8) regarding Page 117 of the Report. The inadequate decisions taken by the PIC and the crew actions were backed up by high level ofpsychological stress included by the understanding of importance of landing at the destinationaerodrome as well as by the presence of high-ranked officials in the cockpit. During the approach thelatter not once discussed with the crew the weather conditions, the decisions to continue the flight andthe possible negative reaction of the Main Passenger. The record of the on-board voice recorder located in the cabin of the aircraft Tu-154M (CVR) did notreveal any passage confirming the attempt to influence the actions of the crew by third persons,including the Main Passenger.

9. “Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog General Blasik’s voice disappears from the recorded material. On the Polish CVR copy of the readings at the presentation it is significant that the only sentence attributed to General Blasik does not exist. • 08:39:02,2-08:39:08   Navigator. Cabin. Landing gears, flaps extended. • 08:39:07,5-08:39:10,7  Anonymous. Flaps to be used to (incomprehensible) [voice in the chart reading background – General Blasik]

10. “Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog The words about the wing mechanisation which were allegedly credited to General Blasik in the Polish version are shorter and formulated by the Navigator and the co-pilot. The navigator’s expression starting with the word: “cabin” and the alleged comment by General Blasik from the Russian version do not exist. In fact the communication appears as follows: • 08:39:02 – 08:39:03    Navigator Flaps extended. • 08:39:03 – 08:39:04    Co-pilot     Flaps extended.

11. “Pressure” evaporated with the Smolensk fog • There is no evidence supporting alleged “pressure” from the passengers. • The daily sensationalism of TVN TV and Gazeta Wyborcza is not true. • The Russians continue to deny the Poles request for access to the originals of black boxes.

12. PRESSURE ON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS • The IAC hid the fact that there was pressure placed on the air traffic controllers and a breach of procedures in the air traffic control tower. • The information about the role Colonel Krasnokucky played in the air traffic control procedures, as described in the IAC final report, is untrue. The Russians declared that this person did not take any direct part in managing the air traffic, but in fact that person was the most active participant in the process. • All the information about the pressure placed on the air traffic controllers comes from the evidence based on voice recordings from the air traffic control tower published by the IAC after acknowledging the Polish services were in possession of such recordings.

13. Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101 This is inconsistent with the information contained in the Report that the role of Col. Krasnokutskiwas only to provide information - coordinating without engaging in directing air traffic: This person was not directly involved in directing air traffic. (P. 145) IAC to date has not responded to the question about the role and powers of Col. Krasnokutski. According to extracts of the Report (page 145): “During the flights of 10.04.2010, according to the ATC recorder and his own explanations, this person was at the BSKP from time to time (including the time of the accident) providing general coordination of various services, informing (by phone) of different officials on the actual situationsconcerning the accepted flights and weather conditions as well as coordination of alternateaerodromes. He was not directly involved in the air traffic control.” According to the recordings (reel 9 channel 4) he took an active part in conducting radio communications, despite several suggestions from the CATC to discontinue the approach the Tu-154M aircraft by a clear command “Allowing them till 100 m only, 100 m no questions.” and cuts off any further attempts of CATC to send the aircraft to a reserve aerodrome.

14. PRESSURE ON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS • Despite repeated suggestions by the Air Traffic Controller to stop the landing approach procedure at 08:26:17, 15 minutes before crashing, Colonel Krasnokutsky’s unambiguous command ended up the conversation: “Allowing them till 100 m only, 100 m no questions”. • Members of the Polish committee confirm unambiguously that Colonel Krasnokutsky’s command “Allowing them till 100 m only, 100 m no questions” ended all the Air Traffic Controller’s attempts to send the aircraft to the reserve airfield, which was in violation of the regulations.

15. PRESSURE ON AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS Simultaneously, Colonel Krasnokutsky gives information about the situation regarding the Polish aircraft’s positioning and the landing conditions at the airport to an unidentified General. Seven minutes after pacifying Air Traffic Controllers, at 08:33:52 he reported: “Everything’s ready Comrade General, he is coming up to the traverse, everything switched on.” • The Russian side has refused to deliver any information about whom Colonel Krasnokutsky contacted and on what legal grounds during the conduct of events.

16. In the final report of the Interstate Aviation Committee it states that the Chief Air Traffic Controller and Landing Zone Controller underwent medical examinations and were authorised for air traffic control by a doctor on duty at the medical point of military unit 06755. According to the statement given to the Russian Federation public prosecutors on 10 April 2010 the medical point was closed at that time. Both controllers decided themselves that ‘there were no obstacles to fulfil their duties’ judged on their wellbeing.

17. The IAC report dismisses important and vital information such as allowing the Chief Air Traffic Controller (CATC) to perform his duties at the airport. There is no record of any existence of authorisation which permitted the Air Traffic Controller to work under difficult meteorological conditions. There is no documentation proving that the Landing Zone Controller had ever been trained or authorised to operate and supervise the Precision Approach Radar RSP-6M2 system in Smolensk. Requests filed by Polish commission to access these documents have been ignored by Russians.

18. 222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222 refused or ignored • In its final report the IAC declared that the co-operation with the Polish side was model and the Polish side had access to all required information needed. • The Poles acting through their representatives aimed to realise its defined powers on the grounds of Article 5.25 of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention and filed a dozen motions enquiring about 222 specified problems from which only 34 have been answered in full. The Russians have ignored or refused to acknowledge 169 enquiries; in the rest of the cases the information delivered was not satisfactory.

19. 222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222 refused or ignored IAC refused to authorise access to: • Video recordings of radar to check the compliance of the aircraft blip on the landing radar with the actual aircraft position by the Chief Air Traffic Controller (landing approach of Il-76, Yak-40, Tu-154M flights) • Authorisation for servicing on two positions simultaneously (Chief Air Traffic Controller and Landing Zone Controller) • Data from the fly-around subsequent to the crash and the inspection of communication and navigation aids.

20. 222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222 refused or ignored The Polish authorities have not received a technical expert analysis of the wreckage debris. • The motion to authorise Polish specialists and accredited representatives to take part in the fly-around was refused. A protest after the refusal was ignored as well as the protest against the refusal to allow an inspection of the RSP-6M2 radar system in Smolensk on 10 April. • Photographic documentation from the crash scene.

21. 222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222 refused or ignored • All filed motions for enabling the Polish accredited representative (and his advisers) to fulfil his rights and duties on the grounds of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention. • No information about the rescue and extinguishing of fires has been provided. • No evidence regarding the presence or any traces of explosive materials has been provided. • No full post-mortem reports or other examinations have been provided.

22. Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101 1.17.5 Findings of the Ballistic and Pyrotechnic Expertise. The investigation team was provided the copies of conclusions of judicial expertise(ballistic andpyrotechnical) for criminal case No. 201/355051-10 in the letter from the Deputy Head of the secondadministration for investigation of VIP cases on crime against personal and common safety of theMain Investigation Administration of the Inquest Committee at the Main Prosecutor’s Office of theRussian Federation No. 201/355051-10 of 14.05.2010.Expert conclusions No. 897 of 13.04.2010 andNo. 3451 of 23.04.2010 on the pyrotechnical expertise contain conclusions that no explosives (trotyl,cyclonite or octogen) were found in the wash-offs of the Tu-154M 101 aircraft parts. The findings ofthe ballistic expertise confirm the presence of weapon (several handguns) and ammunition (cartridges). It was impossible to identify the date of last shots made from those guns. In the Report, the Russian side did not provide detailed information about investigative activitiesconducted at the scene of the accident. Data on ballistic and pyrotechnics tests are in fact notverifiable by the Polish side because the Russian side had not provided it with source materials.

23. 222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222 refused or ignored • Polish prosecutors on 10 April – immediately following the crash they requested the return of the black boxes. • They repeated this request with less stringent demands. The motion filed in June 2010 mentioned a loan for 60 days to permit examination by Polish specialists, but this was deemed to be a problem. • The last motion was filed in January 2011. The Russian side ignored it.

24. 222 enquiries for legal help – 169 of 222 refused or ignored • In mid March 2011 Prosecutor General AndrzejSeremet intervened in the case by contacting AleksanderZviagincev – Russian Vice-General Prosecutor. • The answer was ambiguous. • The wreckage and black boxes remain to this day in Russian hands.

25. Passed over in silence fragments of the crew communication. The IAC and media have suggested from the very beginning that the crew was misled by the topography of the terrain – descent of the terrain close to the runway threshold. Both IAC transcripts and report hide the information that the crew knew the topography of the terrain perfectly, which is supported by following transcript quotation (no existing in the Russian version), 5 km from the runway threshold at 08:40:10 • Co-pilot: There is a descent, Arek • Pilot in Command: I know, it will be soon, there is such… This interchange of information was published during Polish commission presentation while completely omitted in the IAC report and transcripts.

26. Rescue operation. The plane crash landed at 6:41:05 UTC, 400 hundred metres from the runway beam. • As detailed in the final report, the PCz-3 rescue services unit was on duty all day on 10 April at the aerodrome. The unit was not summoned until 6.50 UTC, 9 minutes after the crash. • The information eventually reached the unit, but according to witnesses’ testimonies, they headed in the opposite direction and had to do a U-turn. Finally it reached the scene 14 minutes after the accident took place.

27. Rescue operation. • Instead of alerting the unit, the Chief Air Traffic Controller commanded units stationed further away from the town location and they were at the scene 44 minutes later. • The Russians have not supplied any details of the rescue or actions taken to extinguish fires at the scene. • There is no information about the Medical Rescue Team present on the runway.

28. Rescue operation. • Polish authorities point out that the first medical rescue unit arrived at the scene at 6.58 UTC, 17 minutes after the crash. A further seven medical crew units appeared 29 minutes afterwards, despite the fact that the airport is situated within the city boundaries. • Despite requests and motions, documentation of the rescue or actions taken to extinguish fires at the scene have not been delivered.

29. Misleading directing aircraft movements. 3) regarding Page 123 of the Report. 1. The landing radar screen mounted for the experiment (and during the accident flight) had lines approximately designating the following angles (shown in black on the chart): - Lower line - 2°42.3’; - Central line - 3°12.3’; - Upper line - 3°42.3’; 2. The landing radar underrates the indication of this aircraft distance from the runway threshold by about 90 ÷ 150 m (depending on the distance of the aircraft from the runway threshold). In the Report, there is reference to the difference between the test fight of 25 March 2010 (performedwith reference to the path of 2°40’ and on 15.04.2010 (path of 3°12.3’). There has been no analysisregarding the path of 2°40’ (±30’) valid for the approach cards. The explanation for changes in thepath of 2°40’ to 3°12.3’ may be an attempt to explain the lack of response from KSL to the deviationof position of Tu-154M aircraft from the valid glide path outside the permissible tolerance. Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101

30. Misleading directing aircraft movements. Analyses of the glide path of 3°10’ do not correspond with the valid and the published path of 2°40’. The information presented by IAC indicates that the aircraft blip was outside of the permissibleerror area of the linear deviation, even for the path of 3°10’, which is not commented by theauthors of the Report. The results of calculations carried out by the Polish side, taking into account theposition of the aircraft in relation to the glide path of 3°10’, are presented in the table. . Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101

31. Misleading directing aircraft movements. Location of the blip on the indicator corresponds to the position “on the glide path” when thepermissible error of linear deviation does not exceed 1/3 of the linear dimensions of the zone oftolerance”. (in accordance with paragraph 115 of FAPPPGosA) For the path of 3°10’ at a distance of 3.3 km to the DS26 the permissible error of linear deviation is ±28 m, i.e. with a tolerance of 1/3 of the value that is below - 9.33 m, KSL should have informed thecrew of its wrong position on the path. The conclusion is that even before reaching 3 km, KSLcontinued to inform the crew of their correct position “on the course and path”, when in fact the flightof the aircraft was lowering, increasing its vertical distance from the path. KSL, by giving the command “on the course on track” despite the fact that the aircraft was not there,placed the crew in the mistaken belief as to the correct position of the aircraft. Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101

32. Misleading directing aircraft movements. Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101 Despite the crew going below the glide path at a distance of 3.5 km from the runway threshold the Landing Zone Controller did not react and produced untrue information: “on course, on glide path”, which constituted false information about the distance from the runway beam, which misled them still more.

33. Remarks of the Republic of Poland on the draft Final Report by IAC on the investigation into the accident involving aircraft Tu-154M tail number 101 The command “Level 101” (10:40:53.4) was given about 14 seconds afterinforming the crew of the aircraft Tu-154M by KSL “two on course”(10:40:39,9), when in fact the plane was already on the glide pathat an altitude of 17 m in relation to the threshold of DS 26. The command “Level 101” was issued by KSL too late, when the aircraft’s markerdisappeared from the indicator (according to testimony). Although the aircraft was for 29 seconds outside the zone when the permissible error of lineardeviation does not exceed 1/3 of the linear dimensions of the zone of tolerance” (in accordance with point 115 FAPPPGosA), KSL did not give the crewinformation about its incorrect position relative to the path, still incorrectlyinforming it of the correct position “on course and path.”

34. The Russians have ignored in the most part any Polish motions relating to the final report draft. • Parts of the wreckage as well as the original black boxes remain in the hands of the Russians even though this is evidence which needs to be examined by investigators in Poland. This is in violation of Annex 13 of the Chicago Convention.

35. We believe that with international support behind us, Russia will have no choice but to return the black boxes and the wreckage back to its rightful owners - Poland. • We hope that setting in motion a credible international committee, we can get justice for the crew, passengers and restore Polish public opinion.