EU Climate Policy Post-Copenhagen

1. EU Climate Policy Post-Copenhagen Artur Runge-Metzger Director Climate Change & Air European Commission

2. Outline • COP15 • Copenhagen Accord • Way forward

3. COP15 - The Stats • No of registered participants up to 50,000 • 6 negotiating sessions, often in parallel • 15th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC • 5th meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol • 10th Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 10) • 8th session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action • Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice • Subsidiary Body for Implementation • > 100 heads of state, most of EU and G20, including all BRIC

4. COP15 –Limits of the UNFCCC process • Complexity vs consensus • Under the LCA track it was not possible to really discuss developing country actions • US did not engage on anything resembling Kyoto, keeping all options open to accommodate internal legislation • These dynamics only changed when Heads of State arrived, but time too limited to come in line with EU expectations • ALBA countries pursue own agenda and blocked final consensus

5. The Copenhagen Accord • Negotiated by around 30 countries during 24 hours • Heads of state negotiate line-by-line • Developing country delegations either did not send their political level, such as Sudan and Saudi Arabia, or tried to avoid having their Heads of State negotiate like China and India

6. Algeria Australia Bangladesh Brazil China Colombia Ethiopia Sweden European Commission Germany France Grenada India Indonesia Japan Republic of Korea Lesotho Maldives Mexico Norway Russian Federation Saudi Arabia South Africa Spain Sudan UK US The Copenhagen Accord Countries Covering all UN regional groups, LDCs and the alliance of small island states:

7. The Copenhagen Accord I • Recognises the 2C objective but no timing for peaking nor 2050 ambition levels • Economy-wide emission reduction targets for developed countries and mitigation action by developing countries • Measurement, reporting, verification (MRV) for developed countries based on existing and new guidelines but no clear common accounting framework • MRV for developing countries: • Supported actions MRV-ed internationally and included in a registry • Unsupported actions MRV-ed domestically and included in national communications + inventory (2 yearly)

8. The Copenhagen Accord II • Commitment by developed countries to provide new and additional resources approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 - 2012 • Committed goal to mobilise USD 100 billion dollars by 2020 • Variety of sources, both public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. • Establishment of a Copenhagen Green Climate Fund • High Level Panel will be established to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue • Weak language on (carbon) market

9. The Copenhagen Accord III • Register to record supported actions and the support itself • Mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and other uses (not specified); • Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer (not specified); • Establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including international support • A review to be completed by 2015, with a reference to exploring pathways to remain below 1.5° C temperature increase.

10. Appendix to the Accord –Developed countries • As of 5 February 94 parties have associated themselves with the accord or submitted actions in its appendix • EU (-20% to -30% vs 1990), Australia (-5% to -25% vs 2000) and Norway (- 30% to -40% vs 1990) have unconditional low end targets and conditional high end targets. • US (-17% vs 2005) conditiona on enactment domestic legislation • Canadian target is a retreat from their offer under the Kyoto Protocol. -17% vs 2005 instead of -20% vs 2006 (reversal of the ambition compared to 1990 from -3% to +3%) • Japanese -25% vs 1990 conditional on a fair global agreement • Russia’s (-15% to -25% vs 1990) target also refers to a conditionality linked to how it can use LULUCF

11. Appendix to the Accord –Developing countries • Basic countries have communicated their actions in the context of UNFCCC, not the Copenhagen Accord. • BASIC refers explicitly (S-Africa) or implicitly (Art 4.7, Art 12.4) to support, unclear extent of conditionality for individual actions. • Actions similar to what was known before COP15. Brazil being most detailed. China not only CO2 intensity target but also Non Fossil fuel and LULUCF target. • Singapore (-16%) and South Korea (-30%) introduced a target but expressed to baseline, thus remains flexible concept • Marshall Islands have introduced target of -40% compared to a base year (2009) but conditional on support.

12. Way forward -Time line of UN process 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Established 2005, COP 11, Montreal No text agreed at COP 15 AWG KP 10 sessions , 15 meetings No text agreed at COP 15 Established 2007, COP 13, Bali AWG LCA 8 sessions, 10 meetings ? Text agreed Not Unanimous Text agreed at COP 15 but not unanimous Copenhagen Accord 1 session 1 meeting

13. Way forward –Negotiations plus Action Now • Accord should be key to reinvigorate the process under the AWGs in order to reach a legally binding agreement: • Copenhagen accord was not adopted by the COP, only noted (Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba and to a lesser extent Tuvalu blocked) • Accord is not legally binding nor refers to a process towards it. • Accord refers several times to follow up COP decisions and draft AWG LCA and AWG KP texts forwarded to Mexico • BASIC seems to see it now as a mere political agreement • In parallel, the Accord requires swift implementation. • Majority of countries wants to act now on climate change. • Smart use of fast-start finance can build capacity and create confidence in ramping up action.

14. Way forward –Factors of success in 2010 • EU preference for a single legally binding outcome: By Mexico? • Simple amending Annex B of Kyoto Protocol is not an option • Completely undermines environmental integrity of 2020 target (LULUCF, surplus AAUs) • No level playing field between EU and US and other countries • Positioning of the ALBA countries • If consensus under the COP continues to be problematic, the Accord might stimulate Parties in the near future to take action and collaborate • COP could facilitate implementation of the Accord under Art 7(2)(c) • Outcome US legislative debate • Other informal processes could remain important, e.g. G20, G8, Major Economies Forum

15. Way forward –What should the EU do? Leadership starts at home Implement EU energy and climate package Link climate change to EU2020 strategy for sustainable growth, innovation and jobs, i.e. focus on transport, de-carbonisation of power sector, budget and CAP review, adaptation. Develop a low carbon development strategy with a vision of reducing emissions by 80-95% by 2050 and set milestones 2020/2030. Reaching out internationally Implement the Copenhagen Accord: EU will have to act swift on fast start finance and be transparent on how it will deliver the EU pledge of € 2.4 billion yearly over the period 2010-2012 Develop international carbon market: design and test sectoral crediting Mechanism. Amended ETS gives us the tools to do so. No alternative to the UN process: EU is ready to continue to negotiate

16. More information on EU climate policy:http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/home_en.htm