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1. Natural Expectations,Macroeconomic Dynamics,and Asset Pricing
2. Two starting assumptions(cf. Fuster, Mendel, and Laibson 2010) Assume that macro fundamentals are hump-shaped.
Earnings momentum in the short-run.
Earnings mean reversion in the long run.
3. Second assumption 2. Agents do not know that fundamentals are hump-shaped and base their beliefs on parsimonious (simple) models that they fit to the data.
4. Economic reasons for parsimonious models Tradeoff between model flexibility and over-fitting
To avoid over-fitting limit number of parameters in model, k
Formalizations:
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC)
Bayesian (Schwarz) Information Criterion (BIC)
5. Psychological reasons for parsimonious models: Myopia: short-term predictions ? low k
Recency bias: small samples ? low k
Complexity aversion ? low k
Preference for tractability ? low k
Anchoring and Representativeness, also lead agents to underestimate mean reversion, which is similar to low k
6. Schematic for Economy Good news in aggregate earnings
Asset price over-reacts
parsimonious models predict earnings persistence
Consumption and investment slowly rise
Unanticipated mean reversion in earnings
asset price falls
debt overhang
consumption falls
investment falls
7. Consequences of parsimonious models: Agents recognize the short-term momentum but miss some of the long-run mean reversion
Endogenous extrapolation bias and pro-cyclical excess optimism
Asset returns are excessively volatile and exhibit overreaction
Returns negatively predicted by lagged returns, P/E, and ?lnC
Real economic activity has amplified cycles
?lnC negatively auto-correlated in medium run
Equity premium is large, although long-run equity returns covary weakly with long-run consumption growth
If agents had RE, equity premium nearly vanishes
Rational agents should hold high equity allocations on average
And follow counter-cyclical asset allocation policy
8. Related Literature Adam and Marcet (2011): learning and asset pricing
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998): extrapolative dividend forecasts
Barsky and De Long (1993): extrapolation and excess volatility
Benartzi (2001): extrapolation and company stock
Black (1986): noise traders
Campbell and Mankiw (1987): shocks are persistent in low-order ARIMA
Campbell and Shiller (1988a,b): P/E ratio and return predictability
Choi (2006): extrapolation and asset pricing
Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2009): positive feedback in investment
Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1991): return autocorrelations
De Long, et al (1990): noise traders and positive feedback
De Bondt (1993): extrapolation bias in surveys and experiments
De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1989, 1993): over-shooting in asset prices
Gabaix (2010): sparse representations
Hommes (2005, 2008): bubbles in the lab
Hong and Stein (1999): forecasting biases
9. Some Related Literature
10. Model CARA habit preferences (Alessie and Lusardi)
11. Dynamic budget constraint for wealth, wt
Elastic supply of foreign capital with gross return R
Assume foreign agents don’t hold domestic capital
Home bias
Moral hazard
12. Quick review of time series models If growth in dividends (?lnD = ?d) is captured by an auto-regressive model with p lags, then:
Refer to this as an AR(p) model.
13. Natural expectations
16. U.S. Log Real Capital Income (1947q1-2010q3)
17. Perceived IRF’s for real capital income
18. Calibration
19. Actual IRF’s for cumulative excess returnsderiving from a unit shock to dividends
20. Actual IRF’s for consumption
21. Covariance of consumption growth and cumulative return at different horizons
22. Empirical evaluation Annual data (1929-2010)
Real per-capita consumption: US NIPA
Excess returns
P/E ratios
Simulations annualized for comparisons
Simulations generated for 82 years of data
Monte Carlo to generate confidence intervals
23. Correlation of Excess Returns in Year t with Cumulative Excess Returns for Years t + 2 to t + 5, for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
24. Correlation of P/E40 in Year t with Cumulative Excess Returns for Years t + 2 to t + 5, for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
25. Correlation ?lnCt with Cumulative Excess Returns for Years t+2 to t+5, for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
26. Correlation of P/E40 in Year t with (lnCt+6 - lnCt+2), for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
27. Correlation of ?lnCt with (lnCt+6 - lnCt+2), for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
28. Application to equity premium puzzle
29. Equity Premium for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
30. Standard deviation of equity returns for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
31. Standard Deviation of Consumption Growth for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
32. Covariance of consumption growth and cumulative return at different horizons
33. How would RE agents behave in this economy? Closed form solution for consumption function and asset allocation
RE agents are relatively highly leveraged
RE agents adjust their equity allocation counter-cyclically
34. Leverage of RE agents for Different AR(p) Models of Earnings
35. Summary Fundamentals follow hump-shaped dynamics:
Short-run momentum
Long-run (partial) mean reversion
Agents estimate simple models
Parsimonious, tractable
Typical models chosen in economics literature
36. Summary Low order forecasting equations miss some of the mean reversion in fundamentals, so resulting asset prices exhibit excess volatility and long-run mean reversion
Cycles in consumption (and investment)
The covariance of returns and consumption growth rises and then falls with horizon h
Equity is perceived as many times riskier than it actually is
Rational investors should hold far more equity than typical investors
Rational investors should follow a countercyclical investment strategy
37. Future work High earnings should be a bearish indicator
Let’s test this by building a new predictor for bear markets.
Procedure:
Calculate book values using clean-surplus relation:
Construct earnings to book ratio from 1872-2010.
Calculate deviation of earnings to book ratio relative to ten-year moving average
Call this deviation: Earnings cycle.
38. Earnings cycle
40. Real returns
42. Performance metrics In years: 11.5% real return
Out years: -2.6% real return
All years: 7.9% real return
43. Macro predictors of high future excess returns Low P/E40
Low equity returns
Low consumption growth
Low earnings
Low real investment
Low return expectations