70 likes | 195 Views
CCSDS IPsec Compatibility Testing. 10/28/2013 OKECHUKWU MEZU CHARLES SHEEHE CCSDS GRC POC. IPsec Project Overview.
E N D
CCSDS IPsec Compatibility Testing 10/28/2013 OKECHUKWU MEZU CHARLES SHEEHE CCSDS GRC POC
IPsec Project Overview • Performing Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) using pre-shared keys on a CCSDS Internet Protocol (IP) packet going from source node over a satellite in space to a destination node • Why this is important • Two independent verifications of a specification are required prior to acceptance • NASA GRC IPsec compatibility testing will satisfy one independent tests • It will be recorded in the CCSDS yellow book as official documentation of testing • CCSDS IPsec testing expected start date November 2013
IPsec Project Process • IPsec compatibility testing for CCSDS • Evaluate IPsec/CCSDS related standards • Define CCSDS/IPsec approved parameters by CCSDS working group • Develop Test Plan by working group • Approval of Test Plan by working group • Perform Compatibility Testing based on defined IPsec parameters • Validate Compatibility Testing results • Documentation of test results • Present result to CCSDS GRC working group • Present results to CCSDS working group • Key deliverable • Test report in CCSDS format for inclusion in yellow book
IPsec draft test topology Cisco 3825 Router CCSDS Satellite R2 Legend GE – Gigabit Ethernet GE 0/1 192.168.3.1 GE 0/0 192.168.2.2 GE 0/0 192.168.3.2 GE 0/1 192.168.2.1 GE 0/1 192.168.4.1 IPsec VPN GE 0/0 192.168.1.1 192.168.4.2 192.168.1.2 Cisco 3825 Router Ground Station R1 Cisco 3825 Router Receive Station R3 Tunnel represents a direct logicalconnection between R1 & R3 through R2. However, all communication between R1 & R3 go through R2 (representing a satellite/networked cloud)
Questions • Appendix D: Fragment Handling Rationale • There are three issues that must be resolved regarding processing of • (plaintext) fragments in IPsec: • - mapping a non-initial, outbound fragment to the right SA • (or finding the right SPD entry) • - verifying that a received, non-initial fragment is authorized • for the SA via which it is received • - mapping outbound and inbound non-initial fragments to the • right SPD/cache entry, for BYPASS/DISCARD traffic • The first and third issues arise because we need a deterministic • algorithm for mapping traffic to SAs (and SPD/cache entries). All • three issues are important because we want to make sure that • non-initial fragments that cross the IPsec boundary do not cause the • access control policies in place at the receiver (or transmitter) to • be violated. • Conclusions • There is no simple, uniform way to handle fragments in all contexts. • Different approaches work better in different contexts. Thus, this • document offers 3 choices -- one MUST and two MAYs. At some point in • the future, if the community gains experience with the two MAYs, they • may become SHOULDs or MUSTs or other approaches may be proposed