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“. ”. Economic Aid to the DPRK: The Human Rights Dimension. David Hawk Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow National Endowment for Democracy July 15, 2008.
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Economic Aid to the DPRK: The Human Rights Dimension David Hawk Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow National Endowment for Democracy July 15, 2008 The views expressed in this presentation represent the analysis and opinions of the speaker and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Endowment for Democracy or its staff.
“It is important to underline the need to generate food security in the country, for which no foreign aid could be a substitute. This is very much linked with the need for a sustainable development process based on broad people’s participation in income and food generation, conservation and regeneration.” —Vitit Muntarbhorn UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DPRK 15 February 2008
“The international community is invited to take the following measures: • Emphasize the need for participatory and sustainable development in the country and highlight strategies for food security, while continuing to provide humanitarian aid on the basis that the aid must reach the target groups . . . coupled with effective monitoring.” —Vitit Muntarbhorn UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the DPRK 15 February 2008
“The long history of developed countries’ aid to developing countries suggests that aid can be futile, even counterproductive, in the absence of complementary reforms. Therefore, economic assistance to the DPRK, which would be part of the package for the solution of the nuclear problem, should be aimed at assisting system transformation, not at conservation of the outdated model by uncritically satisfying North Korean requests.” — Georgy Toloraya Korean-speaking Russian Economist and Diplomat
“Of course, the economic dimension to this puzzle is also important, and there has been precious little coordination among the six parties or international financial institutions (IFIs) to develop a shared assessment of North Korea’s economy and a complementary assistance program. The economic engagement picture is much more complicated than simply providing food, fuel oil, and related energy assistance. . . . How will the six parties manage a potential “middle period” when denuclearization is not yet complete…? There is a danger that the parties will lose control of economic levers in the negotiations, which could undermine both denuclearization and economic development objectives. The economic piece is a crucial part of overall implementation.” —James L. Schoff, co-author of Nuclear Matters in North Korea: Building a Multilateral Response for Future Stability in Northeast Asia.
Working Groups of the Six-Party Talks • Denuclearization • Japan—DPRK normalization • USA—DPRK normalization • Energy and economic cooperation • Regional security Referenced in the September 2005 Joint Statement (related but separate): • Four-Party Talks to convert Korean War Armistice to peace regime on the Korean Peninsula