From Nordpolitik to the MB Doctrine: South Korean Perspectives on China

1. From Nordpolitik to the MB Doctrine: South Korean Perspectives on China Brian Bridges Lingnan University

2. Overview of Sixty Years • Long historical and cultural linkages between China and Korea, but the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 and the People’s Republic of China in 1949 created a new relationship which was initially hostile and distant but which has been transformed in recent years. • This paper has two objectives: ( i ) to briefly sketch and analyse the ups and downs of this relationship over 60 years and ( ii ) discuss the key elements, internal and external, which are impacting on this relationship today.

3. Four Phases 1. 1949-1988 mutual suspicion and restraint 2. 1988-1994 normalization and honeymoon 3. 1994-2004 convergence and cooperation 4. 2004-present pragmatism and caution

4. 1948-88 Heavily dominated by Cold war politics. The legacy of the Korean War, PRC ‘volunteers’ intervention, and the role of alliances. Very limited contacts until 1980s, when economic interest began to grow and sporting events (1986 Asian Games and then 1988 Olympics) provided catalyst for semi-official contacts.

5. 1988-1994 South Korean push for normalization of relations with PRC, achieved in 1992. President Roh Tae Woo’s ‘nordpolitik’ – road to Pyongyang led through Beijing and Moscow. Economic reasons predominated for China (though Taiwan factor also important), but political and strategic objectives paramount for South Korea.

6. 1994-2004 Increasingly positive relationship. Frequent high-level exchanges, strong commercial links (an ‘emergency exit’ from Asian financial crisis), and Korean public opinion seemed to be becoming more pro-China and anti-American. South Korean expectation of constructive Chinese role in ensuring stability on peninsula and over North Korean nuclear crises. President Roh Moo-hyun’s ‘balancer’ concept exemplified this rethinking.

7. 2004-present Economic links remained strong – each became a major trading and investment partner of the other (by 2004 China was S.Korea’s largest trading partner and top investment destination), but China’s Koguryo project, apparent anti-Koreanism in Chinese society, growing concern about Chinese treatment of North Korean ‘refugees’ and, above all, the spectacular rise of Chinese economic and military power began to worry some South Korean elites.

8. Koguryo controversy dispute about historical extent of ethnic Korean territories in N.E.China, added to which came disputes over Mt Paekdu

9. South Korea as a ‘middle power’ South Korea is an important and technologically-advanced economy, situated at a strategic point in North-east Asia, but conscious of the large and growing population, economic and military power of its neighbour China. How do middle powers deal with such ‘big’ powers?

10. 5 Variables in PRC-South Korean relations • South Korean domestic situation • Chinese domestic policies • Alliance with United States • North Korean factor • Role of Japan

11. South Korean internal situation (I) A political system which is still strongly ‘presidential’, so that views of presidents impact strongly on external policies. But democratization has opened up the system to greater diversity of views and inputs – not just political parties, but also media, business circles and the public

12. South Korean internal situation (II) South Korea’s strategic priorities during the Cold War were clear (obtaining support against North Korean threat), but they have subsequently become disputed. Perceptions of China within South Korea now quite diversified. But the ‘China threat’ argument is a minority view, and both elite and public opinion is broadly favourable (although Koguryo controversy reduced that amity in opinion polls).

13. South Korean internal situation (III) While in 1990s and early 2000s most Koreans seemed to agree on some form of engagement with China, they differed on how to balance ties with it and with United States: ‘conservatives’ prefer to stress the primacy of the US alliance, while ‘progressives’ look for more balanced relations with the two ‘big brothers’.

14. Chinese priorities (I) 3 decades of successful ‘open door’ policies have made PRC a major economic force, strongly committed to rapid economic development, but more dependent on outside world economically (for resources, markets and technology). - in 1980s and 1990s Chinese wished to learn from Korea - aware of appeal of large market for Korean business community - but intensified Sino-Korean competition in third markets for exports and resources

15. Chinese priorities (II) China has a continuing political and strategic need for peaceful environment to allow continued economic development – but doctrinal shift from Dengist ‘lay low’ to Jiang’s ‘peaceful rise’ and now to a more proactive role, under Hu. China sympathetic to the ‘sunshine policy’ of Kim DJ and Roh MH, but unwilling to put as much pressure on North Korea – over nuclear issues in particular – as South Korea expects.

16. South Korea-US relations A latent anti-Americanism in Korean society, which surfaces intermittently. Generally, a slow decline in public support for US alliance in 2000s, but governments continue to recognise importance of US deterrence (even Roh MH, rather ambivalent about US, sent troops to Iraq).

17. MB Doctrine President Lee came to power advocating two fundamental pillars to his foreign and security policy thinking: • reciprocity in relations with North (economic benefits for de-nuclearization) • revitalising the alliance with US. China did not feature prominently in initial formulations.

18. US in the MB Doctrine President Lee puts greater positive emphasis on alliance with US – an approach which the recent nuclear/missile tests have encouraged further – but the Obama administration has broader perspectives than the Bush administration on North-east Asian affairs.

19. 2 Concerns for Lee Administration ( i ) Just as Kim DJ and Bush did not see eye-to-eye, will Lee and Obama also have differing perspectives, especially if Bill Clinton visit to Pyongyang leads to direct US-North Korean negotiations ? (ii) Could ‘Korea passing’ occur as US and China cooperate on solutions to settle nuclear and other Korea-related issues?

20. North Korea North Korea is a difficult neighbour for both China and South Korea. China’s centrality in six-party talks and its strong links with the North make it necessary for the South to court China.At the same time, China is the North’s strongest ally.

21. Korean reconciliation? Both the Koreas would like to sort out reunification between themselves, but they know that China – like other major powers – cannot be ignored. China has acted as a conduit or catalyst for inter-Korean talks from time to time, but South Koreans (and maybe North Koreans too) worry that China prefers two Koreas to one Korea (or ‘stability’ to ‘reunification’).

22. Role of Japan Both Koreans and Chinese have bitter memories of past Japanese wartime actions – and their ‘nationalisms’ are frequently ‘reactive’ against Japanese current actions or statements. But convergence of Chinese and South Korean views on Japan may be more apparent than real, as China does see pragmatic reasons for working with Japan which do not always sit well with more emotional Korean perspectives.

23. South Korean Options in China Policy • Bandwagoning aligning with a threatening state to avoid potential costs of being attacked • Hedging keeping open more than one strategic option against possibility of a future security threat

24. 3. Engagement rewarding a dissatisfied power to socialise it into accepting rules and institutions of existing international order 4. Balancing against a perceived potential adversary, either internally (shifting resources to military) or externally (cooperation with another state which faces same potential adversary)

25. South Korea, currently, seems be favouring a ‘low-intensity’ version (Denny Roy’s term) of external balancing, which implies keeping some constructive relations with China while also cooperating with its ally the United States.