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O’Neill’s Kantian Argument for Famine Relief. O’Neill thinks that Kant’s theory might have little to say about famine relief since the theory requires that we refrain from harming, but does not seem to require that we help. . If you are a member of a famine-stricken population, you have a duty ….
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O’Neill thinks that Kant’s theory might have little to say about famine relief since the theory requires that we refrain from harming, but does not seem to require that we help.
If you are a member of a famine-stricken population, you have a duty … • not to cheat • to fulfill your duties to particular others, for example, your dependents
If you live with or near famine, you have a duty … • not to deceive or coerce members of famine-stricken populations in order to gain political or commercial advantages
O’Neill suggests that “relief of famine must stand very high among duties of beneficence.” Unfortunately, O’Neill fails to offer a very convincing argument for this claim. There is, however, a Kantian argument available.
Kantian argument for the claim that we have a duty to give to famine relief, 1 First, recall the practical imperative: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only.
Kantian argument for the claim that we have a duty to give to famine relief, 2 This formulation of the categorical imperative allows us to distinguish between kinds of duties. A strong duty requires us to refrain from treating humanity as a mere means. A weak duty requires us to treat humanity always as an end.
Kantian argument for the claim that we have a duty to give to famine relief, 3 Kant himself recognizes the existence of weak duties. He says, “To be kind where one can is a duty.” He also says that “the ends of any person, who is an end in himself, must as far as possible also be my end, if that conception of an end in itself is to have its full effect on me …”
Kantian argument for the claim that we have a duty to give to famine relief, 4 Next, notice that we can be kind to members of famine-stricken populations; it is not impossible (or even burdensome) for us to make their ends our ends.
Kantian argument for the claim that we have a duty to give to famine relief, 5 Thus, we have a weak duty (but a duty nonetheless) to give to famine-relief funds. We must – we are morally required to – give to famine-relief funds.