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Public-Key Encryption in the Bounded-Retrieval Model

Public-Key Encryption in the Bounded-Retrieval Model. Speaker: Daniel Wichs. Joël Alwen, Yevgeniy Dodis , Moni Naor , Gil Segev , Shabsi Walfish , Daniel Wichs. Motivation: Leakage-Resilient Crypto. Security proofs in crypto assume idealized adversarial model .

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Public-Key Encryption in the Bounded-Retrieval Model

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  1. Public-Key Encryption in the Bounded-Retrieval Model Speaker: Daniel Wichs Joël Alwen, YevgeniyDodis, MoniNaor, Gil Segev, ShabsiWalfish, Daniel Wichs

  2. Motivation: Leakage-Resilient Crypto • Security proofs in crypto assume idealized adversarial model. • e.g. adversary sees public-keys, ciphertexts but not secret-keys. • Reality: schemes broken using “key-leakage attacks”. • Side-channels: timing, power consumption, heat, acoustics, radiation. • The cold-boot attack. • Hackers, Malware, Viruses. • Usual Crypto Response: Not our problem. • Blame the Electrical Engineers, OS programmers… • Leakage-Resilient Crypto: Let’s try to help. • Primitives that provably allow some leakage of secret key. • Assume leakage is arbitrary but incomplete.

  3. Models of Leakage Resilience • Adversary can learn any efficiently computable function f : {0,1}*  {0,1}L of the secret key. L = Leakage Bound. sk • Relative Leakage Model [AGV09, DKL09, NS09,…]. • “Standard” cryptosystem with small keys (e.g. 1,024 bits). • Leakage L is a large portion of key size. (e.g. 50% of key size). • Bounded Retrieval Model [Dzi06,…,ADW09]: • Leakage L is a parameter.Can be large. (e.g. few bits or many Gigabytes). • Increase sk size to allow L bits of leakage. • System must remain efficient as Lgrows: Public keys, ciphertexts, encryption/decryption times should be small, independent of L. f(sk) leak

  4. Why design schemes for the BRM? • Security against Hackers/Malware/Viruses: • Attacker can download arbitrary info from compromised system. • Leakage is large, but still bounded (e.g. < 10 GB). • Bandwidth too low, Cost too high, System security may detect. • Protect against such attacks by making secret key large. • OK since storage is cheap. Everything else needs to remain efficient! • Security against side-channel attacks: • After many physical measurements, overall leakage may be large. • Still may be reasonable that it is bounded on absolute scale. • How “bounded” is it? Varies! (few Kb – few Mb).

  5. Prior Work on Leakage Resilience • Restricted classes of leakage functions. • Individual bits of memory [CDH+00, DSS01,KZ03]. Individual wires of comp [ISW03] • “Only Computation Leaks Information” [MR04, DP08, Pie09] • Low Complexity functions [FRT09] Does not seem applicable to e.g. hacking/malware attacks. • Relative Leakage Model. • Symmetric-Key Authenticated Encryption [DKL09] • Public-Key ID, Signatures, AKA [ADW09, KV09] • Public-Key Encryption [AGV09, NS09] • Bounded Retrieval Model. • Symmetric-Key Identification,Authenticated Key Agreement [Dzi06,CDD+07] • Public-Key ID, “Entropic” Sigs, AKA [ADW09] • This work: Public-Key Encryption (and IBE) in the BRM.

  6. Definition of Leakage-Resilient PKE in BRM Adversary Challenger |Pr[b = b’]- ½| is negligible pk (pk,sk) à KeyGen(1s ) , L • Relative Leakage: 9 L = L(s) for which scheme secure. • L should be “relatively large”: maximize ratio of L to|sk|. • BRM: Secure 8 polynomial L = L(s). KeyGen depends on L. • Efficiency: 9 polynomial p(s)8 polynomial L(s): {pk size, cipher text size, encryption/decryption times} ≤ p(s) • Relative Leakage: also maximize ratio of L to |sk|. f : {0,1}*! {0,1}L f(sk) m0, m1 c bà {0,1} cÃEncrypt(mb,pk) Output b’

  7. Outline of Talk • A template for constructing BRM schemes in 3 easy steps. • Explains connection of Public-Key Encryption in BRM to IBE. • Highlights main ideas, but is incomplete. • Define Hash Proof Systems (HPS) and Identity-Based HPS. • HPS ) leakage-resilient PKE in relative-leakage model [NS09]. • IB-HPS ) leakage-resilient IBE in relative-leakage model. • Brief overview of IB-HPS constructions and parameters. • Show how IB-HPS naturally extends to the BRM. • Get PKE and IBE schemes in the BRM.

  8. Template for BRM Schemes:1. Leakage Amplification (via Parallel-Repetition) • Wait! That’s not how leakage works! • Learningf(sk’) withL = nL’bit output NOT the same as learning gi(ski)withL’bit output. • Q: Does parallel-repetition amplify leakage-resilience? • A1:No general black-box reduction is possible. • A2: Works if original PKE has extra properties. • What about efficiency? Does not satisfy BRM. • Assume: Have scheme resilient to L’ bits of leakage. • Given L, construct scheme resilient to Lbits of leakage. • Answer 1: Inflate the security parameter s until L’(s) > L. • Answer 2: Parallel-Repetition. Take n copies of the scheme. • Choose n pairs (pk1,sk1),…,(pkn,skn). Set PK = (pk1,…,pkn ) , SK = (sk1,…,skn) • To encrypt under PK: • n-out-of-n “secret-share” message: SS(m) = (m1,…,mn). • Encrypt each share mi separately ci = Enc(mi, pki). • Send C = (c1,…,cn). • Intuition:Scheme should tolerate L = nL’ bits of leakage. • If leakage on SK is < L = nL’bits then leakage on some ski is < L’ bits.

  9. Template for BRM Schemes:2. Efficiency via Random-Subset Selection Scheme from last slide Encryption Decryption PK SK c1 = Enc(m1, pk1) pk1 sk1 c2 = Enc(m2, pk2) pk2 sk2 c3 = Enc(m3, pk3) pk3 sk3 c4 = Enc(m4, pk4) pk4 sk4 c5 = Enc(m5, pk5) pk5 sk5 … … cn = Enc(mn, pkn) skn pkn • n-out-of-n “secret-share” message: SS(m) = (m1,…,mn). • Encrypt each share mi under pki.

  10. Template for BRM Schemes:2. Efficiency via Random-Subset Selection Encryption Decryption PK SK keys={2,4,…,n} pk1 sk1 pk2 sk2 pk3 sk3 pk4 sk4 pk5 sk5 … … skn pkn • Choose t random key-pairs and only use these to encrypt.

  11. Template for BRM Schemes:2. Efficiency via Random-Subset Selection Encryption Decryption PK SK keys={2,4,…,n} pk1 sk1 c1 = Enc(m1, pk2) pk2 sk2 pk3 sk3 c2 = Enc(m2, pk4) pk4 sk4 pk5 sk5 … … … ct = Enc(mt, pkn) skn pkn • Choose t random key-pairs and only use these to encrypt. • t-out-of-t “secret-share” message: SS(m) = (m1,…,mt). • Encrypt each share mi under the ith chosen public-key. • Hope: t can be much smaller than n, only proportional to s. • Leakage < εL’n meansonly εfraction of secret-keys “badly compromised”.

  12. Template for BRM Schemes:3. Adding a Master Public Key. Encryption Decryption PK = MPK SK keys={2,4,…,n} sk1 c1 = Enc(m1, ID=1) sk2 sk3 c2 = Enc(m2, ID=4) sk4 sk5 … … ct = Enc(mt, ID = n) skn • Use Identity-Based Encryption (IBE). • The component secret keys ski correspond to secret-keys for identities i. • The master-secret-key msk of the IBE is only used to generate SK.

  13. Template for BRM Schemes:3. Adding a Master Public Key. Encryption Decryption PK = MPK SK keys={2,4,…,n} sk1 c1 = Enc(m1, ID=1) sk2 sk3 c2 = Enc(m2, ID=4) sk4 sk5 … … ct = Enc(mt, ID = n) skn • Scheme meets the efficiency requirements of the BRM. • Security? • Does not amplify leakage-resilience in general (counterexample). • Rest of talk: making it work with “special” IBE constructions.

  14. Outline of Talk • A template for constructing BRM schemes in 3 easy steps. • Highlights main ideas, but is incomplete. • Explains connection of Public-Key Encryption in BRM to IBE. • Define Hash Proof Systems (HPS) and Identity-Based HPS. • HPS ) leakage-resilient PKE in relative-leakage model [NS09]. • IB-HPS ) leakage-resilient IBE in relative-leakage model. • Brief overview of IB-HPS constructions and parameters. • Show how IB-HPS naturally extends to the BRM. • Use IB-HPS to get PKE and IBE schemes in the BRM.

  15. Hash Proof Systems • Simplified presentation as a key-encapsulation scheme: • (pk, sk)ÃKeyGen(1s) • (c, k)ÃEncap(pk) • k’ ÃDecap(c, sk) • Correctness: k = k’ (with overwhelming prob). • KEM Security: (pk, c, k) ¼c (pk, c, $) • HPS is a special way to prove KEM security.

  16. Hash Proof Systems • Simplified presentation as a key-encapsulation scheme: • (pk, sk)ÃKeyGen(1s) • (c, k)ÃEncap(pk) (valid encapsulation) • c* Ã Encap*(pk) (invalid encapsulation) • k’ ÃDecap(c, sk) • Correctness: k = k’ (with overwhelming prob). • KEM Security: (pk, c, k) ¼c (pk, c, $) • HPS is a special way to prove KEM security.

  17. Hash Proof Systems • Simplified presentation as a key-encapsulation scheme: • (pk, sk)ÃKeyGen(1s) • (c, k)ÃEncap(pk) (valid encapsulation) • c* Ã Encap*(pk) (invalid encapsulation) • k’ ÃDecap(c, sk) • Correctness: k = k’ (with overwhelming prob). • Valid/invalid indistinguishability given sk: (pk, sk, c) ≈c (pk, sk, c*) • Decapsulation of an invalid ciphertextc* has statistical entropy: • (m, ½)-Universality: • Conditioned on fixed value of pk: H1(sk) ¸ m. • 8sksk’ Prc*[Decap(c*, sk) = Decap(c*, sk’)] ·½. • Smoothness: for fixed pk, (c*, k*) ¼s (c*,$) where k*ÃDecap(c*, sk). • L-Leakage-smoothness: (c*, k*,f(sk)) ¼s (c*, $, f(sk)) where |f(sk)|=L.

  18. Hash Proof Systems • Relationship Between Universality/Smoothness/Leakage • An (m, ½)-Universal HPS with k 2 {0,1}vis “L-Leakage smooth” when L < m – v – (s) , ½ < (1/2v)(1 + negl(s)). • Any “smooth” HPS with k 2 {0,1}v can be composed with an extractor to get “L-leakage smooth” HPS with L = v - (s). • Simplified presentation as a key-encapsulation scheme: • (pk,sk)ÃKeyGen(1s) • (c, k)ÃEncap(pk) (valid encapsulation) • c*Ã Encap*(pk) (invalid encapsulation) • k’ ÃDecap(c, sk) • Correctness: k = k’ (with overwhelming prob). • Valid/invalid indistinguishability given sk: (pk, sk, c) ≈c (pk, sk, c*) • Decapsulation of an invalid ciphertextc* has statistical entropy: • (m, ½)-Universality: • Conditioned on fixed value of pk: H1(sk) ¸ m. • 8sksk’ Prc*[Decap(c*, sk) = Decap(c*, sk’)] ·½. • Smoothness: for fixed pk, (c*, k*) ¼s (c*,$) where k*ÃDecap(c*, sk). • L-Leakage-smoothness: (c*, k*,f(sk)) ¼s (c*, $, f(sk)) where |f(sk)|=L.

  19. HPS ) Leakage-Resilient PKE [NS09] • Theorem : A smooth HPS is a good KEM (standard). A L-leakage-smooth HPS is a L-leakage-resilient KEM: (pk, f(sk), c, k) ¼c (pk, f(sk), c, $) where (c, k) ÃEncap(pk) • Proof: (pk, f(sk), c, k) ¼s (pk, f(sk), c, k’) where (c, k) ÃEncap(pk) k’ ÃDecap(c, sk) ¼c (pk, f(sk), c*, k’) where c*ÃEncap*(pk) k’ ÃDecap(c*, sk) ¼s(pk, f(sk),c*, $) ¼c (pk, f(sk), c, $) Correctness Valid/Invalid Indistinguishability L-Leakage-Smoothness Valid/Invalid Indistinguishability

  20. Example Based on DDH • Params: prime p, group G of order p, generators (g, h) • KeyGen: sk = (a, b) pk = gahb • Encap(pk): c = (gx, hx) k = (pk)x = gaxhbx • Decap(c, sk): Parse c = (u,v) k’ = uavb • Encap*(pk): c* = (gx, hy) • Correctness: If u=gx, v=hxthen k’ = (gx)a(hx)b = k. • Valid/Invalid indistinguishability follows from DDH. • (m,½)-universal for m= log(p), ½ = 1/p. Also smooth. • Need an extractor to get L-leakage-smoothness for L ¼ log(p), L/|sk| ¼ ½. • Generalizes to t generators: m = (t-1)log(p), ½ = 1/p. • No extractor! Construction is L-Leakage-smooth for L ¼ (t-2)log(p), L/|sk| ¼ (1- 2/t) ¼ (1- ²).

  21. Identity-Based HPS (IB-HPS) • (mpk, msk) ÃParamGen(1s) • skIDÃ KeyGen(ID, msk) • (c, k)ÃEncap(ID, mpk) (valid encapsulation) • c* Ã Encap*(ID, mpk) (invalid encapsulation) • k’ ÃDecap(c, skID) • Valid/Invalid indistinguishability holds for all ID, even if adversary sees “all” identity-secret keys skID (but not msk). • Decapsulation of an invalid ciphertextc* has statistical entropy: • (m, ½)-Universality: • Conditioned on fixed value of mpk, msk, ID: H1(skID) ¸ m. • 8skIDskID’ Prc*[Decap(c*, skID) = Decap(c*, skID’)] ·½. • L-leakage smoothness: for fixed mpk, msk, ID(f(skID),c*, k*) ¼s (f(skID), c*, $) if |f(sk)|=L.

  22. IB-HPS: Valid/Invalid Indistinguishability |Pr[b = b’]- ½| is negligible (mpk, msk) à ParamGen(1s ) mpk ID skID Challenge ID bà {0,1} c If b=0, c à Encap(ID) else c à Encap*(ID) ID skID Output b’

  23. Identity-Based HPS (IB-HPS) • (mpk, msk) ÃParamGen(1s) • skIDÃ KeyGen(ID, msk) • (c, k)ÃEncap(ID, mpk) (valid encapsulation) • c* Ã Encap*(ID, mpk) (invalid encapsulation) • k’ ÃDecap(c, skID) • Valid/Invalid indistinguishability holds for all ID, even if adversary sees the identity-secret keys skID (but not msk). • Decapsulation of an invalid ciphertextc* has statistical entropy: • (m, ½)-Universality: • Conditioned on fixed value of mpk, msk, ID: H1(skID) ¸ m. • 8skIDskID’ Prc*[Decap(c*, skID) = Decap(c*, skID’)] ·½. • L-leakage smoothness: for fixed mpk, msk, ID(f(skID),c*, k*) ¼s (f(skID), c*, $) if |f(sk)|=L.

  24. IB-HPS ) Leakage-Resilient IBE • Theorem: A “smooth” IB-HPS is a IB-KEM. A “L-leakage-smooth” IB-HPS is a “L-leakage-resilient” IB-KEM. • Allows leakage from secret-keys of all identities, but not the master secret key. • Allows us to construct leakage-resilient IBE. • Proof is analogous to the non-identity-based setting.

  25. Outline of Talk • A template for constructing BRM schemes in 3 easy steps. • Highlights main ideas, but is incomplete. • Explains connection of Public-Key Encryption in BRM to IBE. • Define Hash Proof Systems (HPS) and Identity-Based HPS. • HPS ) leakage-resilient PKE in relative-leakage model [NS09]. • IB-HPS ) leakage-resilient IBE in relative-leakage model. • Brief overview of IB-HPS constructions and parameters. • Show how IB-HPS naturally extends to the BRM. • Get PKE and IBE schemes in the BRM.

  26. Constructions • Three constructions of IB-HPS based on prior IBE schemes. • [Gen06]: Using “bilinear groups. • Based on the “q-TABDHE” assumption in the standard model. • Leakage-resilient IBE with relative-leakage ¼ ½. • [BGH07]: Based on “quadratic residuosity”. • Requires Random Oracles or an “interactive assumption”. • Only 1 bit of entropy in identity-secret-key. No leakage in IBE. • Fixed with BRM transformation (stay tuned). • [GPV08]: Based on lattices and the LWE problem. • Requires Random Oracles or an “interactive assumption”. • Leakage-resilient IBE with relative-leakage ¼ (1-²). [AGV09] • All schemes are “smooth” and (m,½)-universal for m¸ 1, ½· ½.

  27. Outline of Talk • A template for constructing BRM schemes in 3 easy steps. • Highlights main ideas, but is incomplete. • Explains connection of Public-Key Encryption in BRM to IBE. • Define Hash Proof Systems (HPS) and Identity-Based HPS. • HPS ) leakage-resilient PKE in relative-leakage model [NS09]. • IB-HPS ) leakage-resilient IBE in relative-leakage model. • Brief overview of IB-HPS constructions and parameters. • Show how IB-HPS naturally extends to the BRM. • Use IB-HPS to get PKE and IBE schemes in the BRM.

  28. Leakage Amplification of IB-HPS • IB-HPS with small leakage ) IB-HPS with BIG leakage. • Map n “identities” in small scheme to single identity in BIG scheme. • Secret-keys in BIG scheme consists of n “components” small keys. • To encapsulate: select random “t-out-of-n” small identities. Encapsulate to each one separately. • Apply a “universal-hash-function” g to symmetric-keys k1,…, kt. SK for Bob sk1 ID = “Bob_1” Encap: S=(S1,…,St) 2 [n]t (ci, ki) ÃEncap(“Bob_”Si) g: universal hash C = (S, c1,…,ct, g) K = g(k1,…,kt) ID = “Bob” sk2 ID = “Bob_2” sk3 sk4 sk5 … skn ID = “Bob_n”

  29. Leakage Amplification of IB-HPS • Assume: we start with (m, ½)-universal IB-HPS, for constant ½ < 1. • Theorem: For any constant ² >0, there exists a t = O(s) such that construction is L-leakage smooth for L = (1-²)nm – s. • Proof: Identity-secret-keys in construction have H1(SK) = nm. Universal? No! If keys differ in a single component then Prc*[Decap(C*, skID) = Decap(C*, skID’)] is high. SK for Bob sk1 ID = “Bob_1” Encap: S=(S1,…,St) 2 [n]t (ci, ki) ÃEncap(“Bob_”Si) g: universal hash C = (S, c1,…,ct, g) K = g(k1,…,kt) ID = “Bob” sk2 ID = “Bob_2” sk3 sk4 sk5 … skn ID = “Bob_n”

  30. “Approximate” Leftover-Hash Lemma • New notion: “approximately universal” hashing. • Any two values that are “far enough” in Hamming distance are unlikely to collide. • “Approximate” Leftover-Hash Lemma generalizes LHL. • Need extra log (volume of Hamming ball) entropy over LHL. • Easy to show: construction is “approximately universal”. SK for Bob sk1 ID = “Bob_1” Encap: S=(S1,…,St) 2 [n]t (ci, ki) ÃEncap(“Bob_”Si) g: universal hash C = (S, c1,…,ct, g) K = g(k1,…,kt) ID = “Bob” sk2 ID = “Bob_2” sk3 sk4 sk5 … skn ID = “Bob_n”

  31. Putting it all together… • Theorem: Assume there exist (m,½)-universal IB-HPS with m¸ 1 and ½ < 1. Then there exists PKE (and IBE) schemes in the BRM. • For any ²> 0: • Secret-key size can be made as small as |SK| =(1+ ²)(|sk|/m)L • Relative leakage as large as L/|SK| = (1- ²)m/|sk|. • No matter what the leakage bound L is: • Public-key size |PK| is the same as |mpk|. • Ciphertext size, encryption/decryption times differ by an O(s) factor from those of the small scheme.

  32. Extensions • Smaller ciphertexts in BRM. • Anonymous encapsulation (property of QR, Lattice schemes): • Sample ciphertextc and “witness” w independently of ID. • Using witness w, can compute symmetric-key k for anyID. • Gives us anonymous IBE. • In BRM construction, only need to send one ciphertextc. • We get different “approximately universal” parameters. Only good for QR scheme. • CCA security. • Generic Naor-Yung paradigm preserves leakage [NS09] and BRM efficiency. • Efficient CCA secure leakage-resilient IBE based on [Gen06]. • Relative leakage is (1/6 - ²).

  33. Parameters

  34. Open Questions • Does PKE in BRM require IBE? • Or at least some simplified version of it? • Is there a counterexample to parallel-repetition amplifying leakage-resilience of PKE? (no random-subsets, IBE). • More constructions of IB-HPS. Can we get best of all worlds? • No RO, (1- ²)-relative-leakage, anonymous encapsulation. • Efficient CCA secure PKE in BRM without RO and large relative-leakage.

  35. Thank You! Questions?

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