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Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations

Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations. David Albright ISIS November 3, 2013 Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st Century Sponsored by the American Physical Society Forum on Physics/Society & GWU Elliott School. Photo of Natanz, DigitalGlobe. Natanz Plant, September 2002.

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Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations

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  1. Status of Iran’s Nuclear Program and Negotiations David Albright ISIS November 3, 2013 Nuclear Weapon Issues in the 21st Century Sponsored by the American Physical Society Forum on Physics/Society & GWU Elliott School

  2. Photo of Natanz, DigitalGlobe

  3. Natanz Plant, September 2002

  4. Fordow Centrifuge Facility

  5. Arak Heavy Water (IR-40) Reactor

  6. Kalaye Electric

  7. Natanz Pilot Plant IR-1 Centrifuge Cascades

  8. 3.5% LEU Production at Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant

  9. Cumulative 3.5% LEU Production

  10. Taking Stock, August 2013 LOCATION 3.5% LEU product 3.5% LEU feed 19.75% LEU product FEP 9,704 kg N/A N/A PFEP N/A 1,455 kg 178 kg FFEP N/A 1,422 kg 195 kg GROSS TOTAL 9,704 kg 2,877 kg 373 kg NET TOTAL 6,774 kg* 2,877 kg 186 kg (in hex form)**

  11. Advanced Centrifuge Deployment: Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)

  12. Breakout to Enough Weapon-Grade Uranium for a Nulear Weapon

  13. Estimating Breakout Timelines • Illustrative IR-1 centrifuge plant to makeweapon-grade uranium (WGU),based on a four Step, Khan-Type Centrifuge Plant • 24 cascades (164 P1s/cascade) make 3.5% LEU--3,936 P1s • 8 cascades (164/cascade) make 20% from 3.5%--1,312 P1s • 4 cascades (114/cascade) 20 to 60%--456 P1s • 2 cascades (64/cascade) 60 to 90%--128 P1s • Total: 38 cascades with 5,832 P1s • Iranian cascades are not ideal and their performance and output is modeled by Houston Wood and Patrick Migliorini from University of Virginia’s Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering Department in collaboration with ISIS.

  14. Production of WGU in a Breakout at Declared Enrichment Sites • 2009 Nuclear weapons capability achieved in that Iran has enough IR-1 centrifuges and 3.5 percent LEU (about 1,500 kg 3.5 LEU hexafluoride to produce 25 kg weapon-grade uranium in a breakout in about 4,593 enriching IR-1 centrifuges. It would take longer than six months • August 2012-breakout time using Natanz only (IR-1 centrifuges being installed in Fordow) was 2.5-4.1 months with three-step process, 9,330 IR-1 centrifuges, a stock of 91 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, and use of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride (in three-step process) • August 2013-Breakout time with enriching IR-1 centrifuges only is 1.3-2.3 months, with three step process with 10,092 IR-1 centrifuges, 186 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride, and use of 3.5 percent LEU hexafluoride. [3.1-3.5 months with 3.5 percent LEU only, no near 20 percent LEU] • August 2013-Breakout time for scenario using all installed IR-1 centrifuges is 1.0 to 1.6 months with three step process as above but with 18,454 IR-1 installed centrifuges and 186 kg near 20 percent LEU hexafluoride. [1-9-2.2 months with 3.5% LEU only and no near 20% LEU] Note: calculational methods changed somewhat from Fall 2012 estimates to fall 2013 estimates

  15. Key Questions for Negotiations • How to extend breakout times? • How to cap the Iranian centrifuge program and ensure that it will not expand during the next 5-10 years? • How to increase the chance of finding a secret centrifuge or plutonium separation plant? How to establish adequate transparency in general, including Iran addressing the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s past and possibly on-going nuclear weapons efforts? • How to trade Iranian concessions for sanctions relief? • The United States anticipates obtaining an interim agreement followed several months later by a long-term agreement that will verifiably ensure that Iran will not build nuclear weapons. • What will an interim deal look like?

  16. Minimal Goals of an Interim Agreement • Stopping production of near 20 percent LEU; mothballing or disabling 6 cascades involved in making near 20 percent LEU at Natanz and Fordow • Reducing stocks of near 20 percent LEU, particularly those in hexafluoride form • Achieving the principle that Iran’s centrifuge program would be capped to below a certain size for the long term. Initially, there should be freezes in the numbers of installed and enriching centrifuges. • Cancelling the Arak heavy water reactor project • Developing a baseline of information about Iran’s gas centrifuge program, including its centrifuge manufacturing complex, a detailed declaration of any centrifuge plants under construction or planned, and Iran’s total inventory of centrifuges • Expanding IAEA monitoring, including remote camera monitoring of centrifuge plants and implementation of early notification of construction of new facilities (code 3.1) • Ensuring that Iran understands that significant sanctions relief requires that Iran address fully and cooperatively the IAEA’s concerns about Iran’s alleged past and possibly on-going work on nuclear weapons.

  17. Alleged Military Dimensions • IAEA has considerable evidence of Iranian work on nuclear weapons prior to 2004 and some evidence suggesting that some of that work continued afterward and may continue today. • Western intelligence agencies are united in assessing with high confidence that Iran had a nuclear weapon program prior to 2004. They are less united about any such work after 2004. • There is general agreement that the Iranian regime has not decided to build a nuclear weapon. There is less agreement whether Iran will refrain from building a nulear weapon in the future • Little hope of significant sanctions relief if Iran does not come clean about its past activities and address cooperatively and fully the IAEA’s concerns.

  18. Visits Associated with Resolving Concerns about Military Dimensions • Iran will need to allow the IAEA to visit several sites and interview a range of experts and officials in order to address their concerns. The IAEA has identified several sites to Iran, but so far Iran has refused the IAEA’s requests to visit these particular sites. • One set involves workshops that were involved in making mock-ups of missile re-entry vehicles suitable to hold a nuclear warhead. • Another of those is a site at the Parchin military complex that is alleged to have been involved in undertaking high explosive tests related to the development of nuclear weapons. After the IAEA asked to visit this site early 2012, Iran undertook extensive excavation and reconstruction at this site, compromising the IAEA’s ability to settle this issue. Iran will need to address the Parchin issue to the satisfaction of the IAEA, which will inevitably involve more than simply allowing a visit.

  19. Parchin: Before and After

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