WHAT NOW?

1. WHAT NOW? Democracy and U.S.-Latin American Relations

2. APPROACHING THE QUESTION The Taming of Democracy The Pink Tide: Making Democracy “Dangerous” Again Looking Ahead: Prospects for Consolidation

3. QUESTIONS What explains the spread of democracy in Latin America? What kind of democracy? What quality? What’s new about the current phase of democratic change? How does it compare to prior periods? What role (if any) for the United States?

4. Dimensions of Democracy, 1900-2000

6. INITIATION OF DEMOCRACY • Era of oligarchic democracy (1900-1939) • Elite-led experiments in democracy: • Top-down mobilization, esp. of middle classes • Competition among elites • Co-optation of potential opposition • Weak ideological dimension: focus on politics, not economics

7. DANGERS OF DEMOCRACY The Onset of Mass Politics, 1940-77: • Popular mobilization • Specters of revolution • Grand policy schemes • Strong states Targets of Threat • Socioeconomic elite • Middle classes • Military • United States

8. THE TAMING OF DEMOCRACY • Making Democracy Safe, 1978-present: • Transitional pacts • De-mobilization of labor and peasantry • Fear of extremism • Evaporation of political left • Ideological vacuum • Declining strength of state • Thus: spread and duration of electoral democracy

9. DANGERS REVIVED? • Democracy as Protest/The Pink Tide (1998-present): • Leftist ideological orientation • Concern with poverty, social justice • Rebuilding state strength • Resistance to Washington Consensus • Condemnation of USA/Bush administration: • Aspiration for “Bolivarian dream” • Q:What good is a democracy that isn’t dangerous?

10. PENDULUMS OF HISTORY 1900-1939: democracy not “dangerous,” orchestrated by elites 1940-1977: democracy becomes dangerous, with mass mobilization and calls for sweeping socioeconomic reform 1978-present: democracy initially “tame” not dangerous, with neoliberal consensus 1998-present: democracy dangerous again, with rise of new Left

11. LOOKING AHEAD I Interim Developments: • 43% “democrats,” 30.5% “ambivalent,” 26.5% “nondemocratic” • Economic growth (reducing poverty + inequality) • 9/11 and its aftermath The Problem of Consolidation: • Longevity? Of what? • Deepening • From illiberal to liberal democracy? Or not?

12. LOOKING AHEAD II • The greater the frustration within the population, • The greater the sympathy with anti-establishment movements, • The more extensive the general participation in elections, • The more clearly defined the partisan or ideological alternatives, and • The more effective the role of representative institutions…

13. LOOKING AHEAD III The more divisive will be debates over policy content in Latin America, The greater the likelihood of nationalistic and/or anti-establishment policies, The greater the resistance to demands from the United States, and The greater the probability of policy conflicts with Washington. Thus: the greater the degree of democracy in Latin America, the greater the degree of inter-American tension and disagreement.

14. GWB AND LATIN AMERICA • Lack of high-levelattention • Abandonment of negotiationswithMexicoforimmigrationreform • Overridingconcernwithsupportfor anti-terroristcampaign (notdemocracy) • Politicization of drugwar • AwaitingFidel’sdemise • Oppositionto Chávez and thePinkTide

15. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO • Usedlanguage of thestreet (includingtheArabstreet)—e.g., the “devil” speech • Satatoppetroleum (now >$100 per barrel) • Putsmoneywherehismouthwas • Brokeestablished rules of thegame • Playedoff resentment of Bush, U.S. power • ChallengedWashington Consensus and FTAA • Wentforhighstakes • Soughtrearrangement of prevailingworldorder

17. AN ODD COUPLE • George’s “gifts” to Hugo: • discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural) • caricature of “ugly American” • unpopularity of foreign policies • inattention to Latin America • And Hugo’s reciprocation: • exaggerated rhetoric • potential threats to neighboring countries • authoritarian tendencies • Q1: What could Hugo do without George? • Q2: What about the price of oil?\ • Q3: What now? Maduro is not Hugo…

18. THE OBAMA RECORD • Exaggerated expectations • Intervening priorities, domestic (economy) and international (Afghanistan) • Hesitant beginnings, ambivalent stances • Nuanced view of Latin America

19. KEY ISSUES • Honduras: commitment to democracy? • Cuba: admission to OAS, Guantánamo • Points of tension: • Venezuela • Bolivia • “New Left” in general • War on Drugs • Immigration

20. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS • The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy • The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena • Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield • The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

21. U.S. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA • Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right • Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States • Unified—under U.S. leadership • Peaceful—in view of unanimity • Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

22. REALITY CHECK Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right” Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA Ideology = diversity rather than unity Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong and growing among large share of population Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game

23. ROLES FOR THE UNITED STATES? Focus on politics—beyond the war on terror, beyond free trade; recognize exceptional nature of current opportunity Adopt long-term view of national interest Hands off! Do not intervene in elections or encourage overthrows of elected leaders As opportunities arise, bolster institutions and “deepening” of democracy in Latin America Re-examine The Cherished Assumption

24. The end.