Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science How the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates

Jean Nicod Lectures 2007 Moral Theory Meets Cognitive ScienceHow the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates Stephen Stich Dept. of Philosophy & Center for Cognitive Science Rutgers University sstich@ruccs.rutgers.edu

Jean Nicod Lectures 2007 Lecture 2 The Persistence of Moral Disagreement

Philosophical Background • Fundamental Moral Disagreement • No one doubts that moral views differ both within cultural groups

Philosophical Background • Fundamental Moral Disagreement • No one doubts that moral views differ both within cultural groups and across cultural groups

Philosophical Background • Fundamental Moral Disagreement • But whether that diversity of views would persist under idealizedcircumstance is a hotly debated question • How to characterize the relevant sort of idealized circumstances is a difficult and contentious question

Philosophical Background • It is widely agreed that in to be “ideally situated” people must be • rational • impartial • agree on all relevant non-moral issues • There is much debate on how these notions are to be understood • But I’ll assume we all have a rough understanding which is good enough for present purposes

Philosophical Background • If a moral disagreement would persist under idealized circumstances, I’ll say that the disagreement is Fundamental • If it would not persist under idealized circumstances, I’ll say that the disagreement is Superficial

Philosophical Background • There are many reasons why it’s philosoph-ically important to know whether moral disagreement is fundamental or superficial • I’ll focus on two • Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude Theories • Moral Realism

Philosophical Background • Ideal Observer & Qualified Attitude Theories • (arguably) defended by Adam Smith, Hume & Hutcheson • and by Firth, Brandt, Lewis, Harman & other leading moral theorists in the 20th century

Philosophical Background • Semantic Version: • ‘x is morally right (wrong)’ means anyone who is ideally situated (= rational, impartial, fully informed, etc.) would have a (un)favorable attitude toward x • If ideally situated people disagree about x, then x is neither right nor wrong • Semantic version + fundamental disagreement  Moral Skepticism

Philosophical Background • Justification Version: • a moral claim is justified iff the person making the claim would have the appropriate attitude toward the matter at hand, after going thru an appropriate idealizing process (= a process that corrects relevant false beliefs & removes partiality, irrationality, etc).

Philosophical Background • If two ideally situated people have different attitudes about x, then • ‘x is wrong’ is justified for one while • ‘x is not wrong’ is justified for the other • This version of the Ideal Observer Theory + fundamental disagreement  Moral Relativism

Philosophical Background • Moral Realism • defended by Boyd, Brink, Railton, Michael Smith, Sturgeon & many others • there are lots of important differences between these theorists • but for most of them, the persistence of moral disagreement that does not depend on non-moral disagreement(or other distorting factors, like self-interest or irrationality) would pose a significant problem

Philosophical Background • Richard Boyd: "careful philosophical exam- ination will reveal …that agreement on nonmoral issues would eliminate almost all disagreement about the sorts of issues which arise in ordinary moral practice.” "(1988)

Philosophical Background • David Brink: “It is incumbent on the moral realist . . . To claim that most moral disputes are resolvable at least in principle.” (1984)

Michael Smith: Philosophical Background The notion of objectivity “signifies the possibility of a convergencein moral views” (1994: 6)

Philosophical Background • Many Moral Realists and many Moral Anti-Realists would agree that Fundamental moral disagreement (i.e. persisting diversity under idealized conditions) entails, or at least strongly suggests, that Moral Realism is False * *“Non-Convergentists” disagree

Philosophical Background • For these reasons (and others) it is clearly philosophically important to determine whether (and to what extent) moral disagreement is fundamental

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Arguably the first “experimental philosopher” of the modern period was Richard Brandt 1910 - 1997

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • There is a large anthropological literature (going back to Westermark 1906) documenting radically divergent moral outlooks in different cultures. • But traditional ethnography gives little guidance about what people’s moral attitudes would be under idealized circumstances. • In the 1950s, Brandt’s began a study of the Hopis aimed at providing the sort of ethno-graphy that would be useful to philosophers

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Brandt found a number of examples of moral differences between Hopis & white Americans that he could not trace to non-moral disagreement • Hopi have no moral qualms about allowing children to “play” with small animals in a way which causes them great pain, breaks their bones and ultimately kills them • Brandt looked for evidence that the disagreement between the Hopis’ moral view and the view of contemporary white Americans was superficial • But he found none

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Hopi do not believe that these animals lack the capacity to feel pain • nor do they believe (e.g.) that animals are rewarded for martyrdom in the afterlife • nor could Brandt find any other nonmoral belief or failure of imagination that could account for the disagreement

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Brandt concluded that these moral disagreements are fundamental • they reflect a “basic difference of attitude” which would not disappearunder idealized conditions like those that his own “qualified attitude theory” specified

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • He went on to argue that the “Qualified Attitude Theory” (his own justification-based version of the Ideal Observer Theory) led to relativism • and that some semantic versions of the Ideal Observer Theory led to skepticism

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Richard Nisbett’s studies of attitudes toward honor & violence in “Cultures of Honor” is a rich source of evidence suggesting that some very important examples of moral disagreement are fundamental

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • “A key aspect of the culture of honor is the importance placed on the insult and the necessity to respond to it. An insult implies that the target is weak enough to be bullied. Since a reputation for strength is of the essence in the culture of honor, the individual who insults someone must be forced to retract; if the instigator refuses, he must be punished – with violence or even death.” (Nisbett and Cohen 1996: 5)

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Cultures of honor tend to arise in situations where resources are liable to theft and where the state’s coercive apparatus cannot be relied on to prevent or punish theft • These conditions often occur in relatively remote areas where herding is the main viable form of agriculture; the "portability" of herd animals makes them prone to theft • They also occur in many urban, inner city areas where police protection for minorities is unreliable

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Cultures of honor exhibit considerable cultural inertia, persisting for many generations after the conditions that gave rise to them disappeared • Parts of the American South were originally settled by Scotch-Irish herders with a long culture of honor tradition • Nisbett & Cohen argue that a culture of honor persists among white southerners in the USA • They support this claim with data of various sorts, including

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Demographic data indicating that • among southern whites homicides are more common in regions where herding once was common • white males in the South are much more likely than white males in other regions to be involved in homicidesresulting from arguments • they are notmore likely to be involved in homicides that occur in the course of a robbery or other felony

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Survey data indicating that white southerners are more likely to believe • that violence is “extremely justified” in response to a variety of affronts • that if a man fails to respond violently, he is “not much of a man”

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Legal scholarship indicating that southern states “give citizens more freedom to use violence in defending themselves, their homes, and their property"

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Particularly compelling were a field study of moral responses to culture of honor violence and a series of laboratory experiments • In the field study letters were sent to hundreds of employers in the North & South. • The letters purported to be from a 27 year old Michigan man who had one blemish on his otherwise solid record.

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • One letter explained: “I have been convicted of manslaughter… I got into a fight with someone who was having an affair with my fiancée…. He confronted me in front of my friends at a bar,… told everyone that he and my fiancée were sleeping together, …laughed at me to my face, and asked me to step outside if I was man enough.” • The other letter explained that the “applicant” had “stolen a couple of expensive cars” at a time when he needed money to support his family.

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Southern employers were more likely to be sympatheticin response to the manslaughter incident than the car theft. • There was no such difference in responses from northern employers.

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • One southern employer wrote back: “As for your problems of the past, anyone could probably be in the situation you were in. It was just an unfortunate incident that should not be held against you. Your honesty shows that you are sincere…. I wish you the best of luck for your future. You have a positive attitude and a willingness to work. These are qualities that businesses look for in employees.” • No northern employers were comparably sympathetic.

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • The laboratory experiments were conducted on white, male (mostly upper middle class) University of Michigan undergraduates from the North & the South • Subjects were told saliva samples would be collected to measure blood sugar as they performed various tasks • After a sample was collected, Ss walked down a narrow corridor where they were bumped by a confederate who called the S an “asshole” • A 2nd saliva sample was collected & both samples tested for cortisol (associated with stress) & testosterone (associated with dominance behavior & aggression)

85 80 75 70 65 60 55 50 45 40 35 30 0 15 10 5 0 % Change in Testosterone Level % Change in Cortisol Level Control Insult Control Insult Culture of Honor Subjects Non-Culture of Honor Subjects

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • These findings suggest that moral attitudes about the appropriateness of violence in response to insults will not converge even under idealized circumstances, and thus that these disagreements are fundamental • To see why, consider the standard examples of “defusing explanations” used by Moral Realists to argue that disagreement is not fundamental

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • The disagreement is caused or sustained by disagreement about relevant non-moral facts • It is hard to see what these non-moral facts might be • We know (for example) that there are no systematic religious differences between the Northern & Southern students in Nisbett’s experiment • Nor is there any reason to think that Northerners did not believe that calling someone an “asshole” is an insult

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Of course, it is always possible that there is an unsuspected systematic difference in belief • But it seems clear that the burden of argument falls squarely on those who deny that the moral disagreements between culture of honor subjects and non-culture of honor subjects are fundamental

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • The disagreement is caused by one group or the other failing to be impartial • There is no “reason to think that southerners’ economic interests are served by being quick on the draw, while northerners’ economic interests are served by turning the other cheek”. (Doris & Plakias, p. 30)

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • The disagreement is caused by one group or the other being significantly more irrational • On thin interpretations of rationality, this is singularly implausible • It is perhaps more plausible on “thick” interpretations of rationality because …

Southerners voted for Bush!

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • So they are OBVIOUSLY IRRATIONAL • But, of course, thick interpretations of rationality are typically normatively loaded, and thus question begging

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • The Geography of Morals Project(Doris, Peng, Uskul, Nichols & Stich) • Inspired by Nisbett’s findings • EAs are more collectivist; Ws are more individualist • The EA conception of the person emphasizes social roles (mother, teacher) and de-emphasizes “context independent attributes”(honest, gregarious) • This suggests EAs would take a harsher view of transgressions destructive of group ties & a more lenient view of transgressions that benefit the group

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Note that if these psychological differences have a significant impact on moral judgment, it is plausible that the resulting disagreement is fundamental

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Experiment I • Subjects were Asian & non–Asian undergrads at U.C. Berkeley • All experimental material was in English • Experiment 2 • Subjects were Chinese students in Beijing & non-Asian undergrads at U.C. Santa Cruz • Experimental material was translated into Chinese for Chinese subjects

Is (Some) Moral Disagreement Fundamental? A Look at the Data • Case I: The Magistrate & the Mob An unidentified member of an ethnic group is known to be responsible for a murder that occurred in a town. This causes many of the townspeople to become extremely hostile towards the ethnic group. Because the town has a history of severe ethnic conflict and rioting, the town's Police Chief and Judge know that if they do not immediately identify and punish a culprit, the townspeople will start anti-ethnic rioting that will cause great damage to property owned by members of the ethnic group, and a considerable number of serious injuries and deaths in the ethnic population. But nobody in the community knows who the murderer is, or where to find him. 

Moral Theory Meets Cognitive Science How the Cognitive Sciences Can Transform Traditional Debates