The Managing the Atom Project: Its Rationale, History, and Future

1. The Managing the Atom Project:Its Rationale, History, and Future John P. Holdren Teresa and John Heinz Professor and Director of the Program on Science, Technology and Public Policy Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs MTA Research Seminar September 18, 2007

2. Topics • What MTA is • External and internal rationales • The intellectual terrain and MTA focuses within it to date • Thinking about the future: nuclear weapons • Thinking about the future: nuclear energy • MTA’s future focuses • MTA’s institutional context & connectivity

3. MTA is… A joint venture of the Belfer Center programs on • Science, Technology, and Public Policy (STPP) • International Security Policy (ISP) • Environmental and Natural Resource Policy (ENRP) Engaged collectively since 1996 in • research and analysis • public and policy-maker education • development and promotion of policy proposals Focused on • reducing the risks from nuclear & radiological terrorism • stopping nuclear proliferation & shrinking nuclear arsenals • lowering the barriers to expanding nuclear-energy use • addressing the connections among these problems

4. Rationales for these focuses “EXTERNAL” • They relate to a large subset of the biggest challenges facing civilization: • war, wherein nuclear weapons loom large in both cause and potential consequence • terrorism, of which arguably the worst form would be nuclear terrorism • economic prosperity – creating it, expanding it, sustaining it – for which affordable energy is essential and the role of nuclear energy is in question • environment & health, wherein fossil-fuel use creates some of the biggest problems (air pollution, climate change)…which nuclear energy might help reduce.

5. Rationales (continued) “INTERNAL” • All of these challenges are about “science (and technology) and international affairs”, i.e., precisely the interdisciplinary intersections around which the Belfer Center is organized. • The interconnections of these challenges lend themselves to a joint approach engaging ISP, ENRP, and STPP (desirable for BCSIA integration, interaction, making whole > parts). • The overarching MTA focus could exploit, continue, & link important efforts in which the principal MTA players had already been engaged.

6. Prior efforts built upon by MTA AT KSG • Decades-long focus on nuclear-weapon policy, arms control, nonproliferation (Allison, Carnesale, Carter, Doty, Miller, Nye…) • Early recognition & conceptualization of issues around nuclear terrorism (Allison, Carter, Coté, Falkenrath, Miller… • Germination, development, & promotion of what became the Nunn-Lugar Nuclear Threat Reduction Program (Allison, Carter, Coté, Miller…) • Long-standing focuses on national/international energy-electricity-environment-climate policy (Clark, Hogan, Lee, Stavins…)

7. Prior efforts(continued) ELSEWHERE • Leadership roles in the nuclear-weapons and nuclear-energy work of the Pugwash Conferences on Science & World Affairs(Doty, Holdren, Miller) • Leadership roles in the NAS Committee on International Security & Arms Control and its studies of the US-Soviet relationship (1991), management of excess weapon plutonium (1994-5), and the future of US nuclear weapon policy (1997) (Bunn, Holdren) • Leadership roles in White House studies of nuclear-materials protection, control, & accounting and US-Russian cooperation in this domain (1995, 1996-7) and US nuclear energy R&D (1995, 1997) and in drafting resulting policies (Bunn, Holdren)

8. The intellectual terrain andMTA focuses within it to date

9. NEED current & projected electricity motivation for reducing GHG prospects for other options POWER-PLANT ISSUES construction & operating costs safety (accidents, natural & civil disasters, terrorism, war) FUEL SUPPLY ISSUES U availability vs price U enrichment (tech & policy) Reprocessing/recycle resource aspects cost emissions & wastes proliferation vulnerability RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT interim spent-fuel storage decommissioning & disposal of facilities partitioning & transmutation geologic repositories for spent fuel, HLW, TRU generic issues Yucca Mountain International comparisons transport of wastes CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES ionizing radiation protection/disposition of weapon-usable materials management, regulation, & public participation The nuclear-energy terrain

10. NEED current & projected electricity motivation for reducing GHG prospects for other options POWER-PLANT ISSUES construction & operating costs safety (accidents, natural & civil disasters, terrorism, war) FUEL SUPPLY ISSUES U availability vs price U enrichment (tech & policy) Reprocessing/recycle resource aspects cost emissions & wastes proliferation vulnerability RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT interim spent-fuel storage decommissioning & disposal of facilities partitioning & transmutation geologic repositories for spent fuel, HLW, TRU generic issues Yucca Mountain International comparisons transport of wastes CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES ionizing radiation protection/disposition of weapon-usable materials management, regulation, & public participation MTA focuses to date: Nuclear energy

11. The nuclear-terrorism terrain TYPES OF NUCLEAR-TERRORISM DANGERS • “dirty bombs” – conventional explosives dispersing radioactive materials • attacks on nuclear-weapon or nuclear-energy facilities • terrorist acquisition & use of nuclear-explosive weapons CHARACTERISTICS OF THESE DANGERS #1 is easiest for terrorists, causes few fatalities but potentially large economic damage. #2 is far harder for terrorists to achieve, but success could cause 100s of early fatalities, tens of thousands of delayed fatalities, and immense economic damage. #3 is probably most difficult to achieve, but could produce ≥100,000 prompt fatalities, immense economic damage.

12. MTA focuses to date: nuclear terrorism • “dirty bombs” – conventional explosives dispersing radioactive materials modest focus: ~1-yr-long internal seminar series on radiological hazards (Walsh...) • attacks on nuclear-weapon or nuclear-energy facilities minor focus: quick surveys of the issues for CISAC bilateral meetings & NAS symposia (Holdren) • terrorist acquisition & use of nuclear-explosive weapons major focus: largely NTI-funded series on “Controlling Nuclear Warheads & Materials” and “Securing the Bomb”, NTI nuclear-terrorism website development, many policy proposals & interventions(Bunn, Wier…)

13. The nuclear-weapon terrain NUCLEAR-WEAPON DANGERS • Use of existing weapons (accidental, unauthorized, or arising out of a crisis dynamic) by states (de jure or de facto) • Nuclear arms competitions among existing weapon states leading to new developments & deployments that • increase dangers of use • thwart attempts to reduce dangers through arms control • Proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states (adding to dangers of use, of acquisition by subnational groups, and of further proliferation), propelled by • demand pull • supply push

14. MTA focuses: nuclear weapons NUCLEAR-WEAPON DANGERS • Use of existing weapons (accidental, unauthorized, or arising out of a crisis dynamic) by states (de jure or de facto) • Nuclear arms competitions among existing weapon states leading to new developments & deployments that • increase dangers of use • thwart attempts to reduce dangers through arms control • Proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional states (adding to dangers of use, of acquisition by subnational groups, and of further proliferation), propelled by • demand pull • supply push

15. Thinking about the future

16. Nuclear-weapon-state postures, proliferation, and the prospects for nuclear terrorism prospects are intertwined in several ways • Maintaining the non-proliferation “bargain” requires that NWS take Article VI obligations seriously.

17. Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. Non-Proliferation Treaty, Article VI, 1968

18. NWS postures, non-proliferation, & nuclear terrorism prospects are intertwined (continued) • Evident intentions by NWS to • retain large arsenals indefinitely, • maintain high states of alert, • reserve “right” to use nuclear weapons first & against non-NWS • pursue development of new types of nuclear weapons for increased effectiveness or new purposes are all incompatible with the non-proliferation bargain and corrosive of the non-proliferation regime.

19. Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable; it cannot be sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by any state is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them. Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1995

20. NWS postures, non-proliferation, & nuclear terrorism prospects are intertwined (continued) • Constraints on numbers & dispersion of nuclear weapons (strategic & nonstrategic) are essential • not just to reduce probability & consequences of accidental, erroneous, or unauthorized use • but also to reduce chances of weapons coming into hands of proliferant states and terrorists • Proliferation itself expands opportunities (as well as incentives) for further proliferation and for terrorist acquisition of nuclear weapons • by putting nuclear weapons & nuclear-explosive materials into additional hands • and in contexts where there is little experience with protecting them.

21. Three Futures

22. Three Futures MUDDLING THROUGH • 8-12 nuclear-weapon states maintain arsenals consistent with modest to expansive views of their “security needs”. • US view of role of its nuclear weapons continues to include threat of retaliation against (or even pre-emption of) chemical, biological, & conventional attack • Russia persists in a similar view. • Despite “nuclear disarmament” language in PTBT, NPT, etc, USA, Russia, other NWS continue to regard their nuclear-weapon “needs” to be of indefinite duration. • Global stockpile remains at ≥10,000 weapons. • The 180+ non-NWS grumble but nearly all remain non-nuclear.

23. Three Futures NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES • N Korea tests again, S Korea follows  Japan converts its separated “civil” Pu into a formidable nuclear arsenal  Chinese reaction  Indian, Pakistani, Russian reactions… • Iran withdraws from NPT & tests  Israel reveals size of its arsenal  Egypt, Saudi Arabia test  southern-tier former-Soviet states reconsider their nuclear options… • Argentina & Brazil test  other Latin American states reconsider their options… • Global stockpile grows, as do weapons on alert. • Already high risks of “leakage” of nuclear weapons or materials into terrorist hands from inadequately protected stockpiles of 2005 are multiplied by new programs & arsenals  terrorists acquire nuclear weapons & start exploding them in cities

24. Three Futures DEVALUING THE NUCLEAR-WEAPON CURRENCY • USA declares its continuing possession of nuclear weapons is for “core” deterrence only, declares absolute no-first-use, accelerates Moscow Treaty timetable & expands its scope, ratifies CTBT, and announces its intention to work toward global prohibition on NW. • Russia agrees to take similar steps. • Germany, Japan, Brazil, South Africa are admitted to permanent membership in the UN Security Council on condition that they remain non-nuclear-weapon states. • These steps + economic & diplomatic incentives persuade N Korea & Iran to roll back their programs and India & Pakistan to cap theirs. • NPT Review Conferences begin to address conditions & timetable for a global prohibition.

25. Thinking about the nuclear-energy future • The most powerful reason for societal interest in the expandability of nuclear energy is its potential to help meet growing energy needs while reducing the fossil-fuel-generated greenhouse-gas emissions that are disrupting global climate. Avoiding an unmanageable degree of climate disruption in a world still getting ~80% of its energy from fossil fuels today is the most difficult part of civilization’s energy-environment-prosperity challenge.

26. For nuclear energy to make a dent in this challenge, its year-2000 contribution must grow by ~10-fold by 2100 (hence to circa 3500 1-GWe reactors by that time). • Under “business as usual” growth of electricity, a nuclear enterprise of this magnitude would just manage to double the nuclear share of world electricity from 1/6 in 2000 to 1/3 in 2100. • Serious analysis of and planning for a major role for nuclear energy must reckon with the implications of these numbers throughout the fuel cycle.

27. To be expandable to this degree, nuclear energy will need to improve its current performance in terms of… • vulnerability of facilities to accidents & terrorist attack, • management of radioactive wastes, • safeguards against misuse of facilities & materials for nuclear weaponry, • and (possibly) cost of electricity. The importance of the cost issue is uncertain because the future costs of the alternatives – renewables, fossil fuels with carbon capture/sequestration, fusion – are uncertain.

28. The most difficult of these requirements for fission is to shrink the real & perceived links between nuclear-energy operations and nuclear-weapon capabilities. • Civil nuclear energy might survive if a country or two acquires nuclear weapons with the help of civil nuclear-energy operations; but, if these weapons are used, the pressure to end civil nuclear energy will be immense. • Even one detonation of a terrorist nuclear bomb in a city, whether the materials for it are known to have come from civil facilities or not, could shut down the nuclear option worldwide.

29. Avoiding acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional nations is so important that every promising approach to preventing it should be used, “supply side” and “demand side”. • The importance comes from the dangers that: (a) proliferant nations themselves will use them; (b) proliferation will beget more proliferation; and (c) more nations with weapons increases possibilities for terrorists to get them. • “Supply side” means limiting access to weapon-relevant materials, technologies, knowledge; “demand side” means reducing incentives.

30. Current US policies tend more to increase demand for nuclear weapons by other countries than to decrease it. Problematic policies in this respect are: • preventive war at our discretion; • refusal to embrace no-first-use of nuclear weapons; • exploration of a wider range of applications for nuclear weapons we possess or propose to develop; and • refusal to embrace a prohibition of nuclear weapons even as a long-term goal. To the extent we opt for a world in which the role of nuclear weapons gets bigger, we are opting for one in which the role of nuclear energy will get smaller.

31. MTA’s future focuses In light of the foregoing and in consideration of the interests and expertises of the people who are here, I believe MTA will… • continue its highly successful focuses on protection of nuclear-weapon materials, on the proliferation problem in its most dangerous locations (e.g., Iran, North Korea), and on minimizing the proliferation & terrorism risks from nuclear energy; • give increasing attention to the enrichment side of nuclear energy’s proliferation links and to the interaction of major-power nuclear-weapon policies with the proliferation & terrorism issues.

32. MTA’s institutional context & connectivity • In addition to participation from people spread across the STPP, ISP, and ENRP programs in BCSIA, MTA benefits from interactions with others on the BCSIA Board and elsewhere at KSG and across the Harvard campus. • We have productive interactions as well with people in the Dept of Nuclear Engineering and the Security Studies Program at MIT and at the Union of Concerned Scientists in Cambridge. • We also have good working relations with people at a number of the other leading institutions around the USA and the rest of the world, particularly Princeton, Stanford, the University of Maryland, and the PIR Center in Moscow. • Some of these interactions are formalized through the MacArthur Science, Technology, and Security Initiative, with coordination through the AAAS Center for Science, Technology, and Security Policy (see next 2 slides).

33. http://cstsp.aaas.org/programs.html

34. International AAAS/MacArthur CSTSP Centers