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Explore the impact of algorithmic game theory on markets in the digital age, including the emergence of new market models and the need for an inherently algorithmic theory of market equilibrium.
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Markets and the Primal-Dual Paradigm Algorithmic Game Theoryand Internet Computing Vijay V. Vazirani
Revolution in definition of markets • New markets defined by • Google • Amazon • Yahoo! • Ebay
Revolution in definition of markets • Massive computational power available for running these markets in a centralized or distributed manner
Revolution in definition of markets • Massive computational power available for running these markets in a centralized or distributed manner • Important to find good models and algorithms for these markets
Theory of Algorithms • Powerful tools and techniques developed over last 4 decades.
Theory of Algorithms • Powerful tools and techniques developed over last 4 decades. • Recent study of markets has contributed handsomely to this theory as well!
AdWords Market • Created by search engine companies • Google • Yahoo! • MSN • Multi-billion dollar market – and still growing! • Totally revolutionized advertising, especially by small companies.
Historically, the study of markets • has been of central importance, especially in the West
Historically, the study of markets • has been of central importance, especially in the West General Equilibrium TheoryOccupied center stage in MathematicalEconomics for over a century
Leon Walras, 1874 • Pioneered general equilibrium theory
Arrow-Debreu Theorem, 1954 • Celebrated theorem in Mathematical Economics • Established existence of market equilibrium under very general conditions using a deep theorem from topology - Kakutani fixed point theorem.
Kenneth Arrow • Nobel Prize, 1972
Gerard Debreu • Nobel Prize, 1983
General Equilibrium Theory • Also gave us some algorithmic results • Convex programs, whose optimal solutions capture equilibrium allocations, e.g., Eisenberg & Gale, 1959 Nenakov & Primak, 1983 • Cottle and Eaves, 1960’s: Linear complimentarity • Scarf, 1973: Algorithms for approximately computing fixed points
General Equilibrium Theory An almost entirely non-algorithmic theory!
What is needed today? • An inherently algorithmictheory of market equilibrium • New models that capture new markets and are easier to use than traditional models
Beginnings of such a theory, within Algorithmic Game Theory • Started with combinatorial algorithms for traditional market models • New market models emerging
A central tenet • Prices are such that demand equals supply, i.e., equilibrium prices.
A central tenet • Prices are such that demand equals supply, i.e., equilibrium prices. • Easy if only one good
Irving Fisher, 1891 • Defined a fundamental market model
Utility function utility amount ofmilk
Utility function utility amount ofbread
Utility function utility amount ofcheese
Total utility of a bundle of goods = Sum of utilities of individual goods
Fisher market • Several goods, fixed amount of each good • Several buyers, with individual money and utilities • Find equilibrium prices of goods, i.e., prices s.t., • Each buyer gets an optimal bundle • No deficiency or surplus of any good
Combinatorial Algorithm for Linear Case of Fisher’s Model • Devanur, Papadimitriou, Saberi & V., 2002 Using the primal-dual schema
Primal-Dual Schema • Highly successful algorithm design technique from exact and approximation algorithms
Exact Algorithms for Cornerstone Problems in P: • Matching (general graph) • Network flow • Shortest paths • Minimum spanning tree • Minimum branching
Approximation Algorithms set cover facility location Steiner tree k-median Steiner network multicut k-MST feedback vertex set scheduling . . .
No LP’s known for capturing equilibrium allocations for Fisher’s model
No LP’s known for capturing equilibrium allocations for Fisher’s model • Eisenberg-Gale convex program, 1959
No LP’s known for capturing equilibrium allocations for Fisher’s model • Eisenberg-Gale convex program, 1959 • DPSV:Extended primal-dual schema to solving a nonlinear convex program
Fisher’s Model • n buyers, money m(i) for buyer i • k goods (unit amount of each good) • : utility derived by i on obtaining one unit of j • Total utility of i,
Fisher’s Model • n buyers, money m(i) for buyer i • k goods (unit amount of each good) • : utility derived by i on obtaining one unit of j • Total utility of i, • Find market clearing prices
An easier question • Given prices p, are they equilibrium prices? • If so, find equilibrium allocations.
An easier question • Given prices p, are they equilibrium prices? • If so, find equilibrium allocations. • Equilibrium prices are unique!
Bang-per-buck • At prices p, buyer i’s most desirable goods, S = • Any goods from S worth m(i) constitute i’s optimal bundle